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ABSTRACT
This thesis uses a "strategic culture" approach to gain insights into non-nuclear
weapon outcomes in Australia, South Africa and Sweden. Strategic culture
refers to the ideational and cultural pre-dispositions possessed by states
towards military strategic issues. The theoretical aim for this research is to
explore the various conceptions of strategic culture offered in the literature and
to evaluate the potential benefits of conducting strategic cultural research.
Strategic Studies has traditionally been dominated by realist theories, which
typically provide rationalist materialist explanations for outcomes. This thesis
highlights the relevance of domestic strategic cultural context to strategic
decision-making and, in the process, explores the potential inadequacies of
non-cultural strategic analysis. It will be contended that strategic culture is ill-
suited to provide an alternative theory to explain causes of outcomes. Instead
it provides an approach for investigating the "cultural conditions of possibility"
for strategic decision-making. These will be seen as constituting the
assumptions made by theories that pursue rationalist materialist ontologies.
Non-nuclear weapon outcomes are potentially problematic for realist
explanations by suggesting instances of states not maximising their power by
acquiring the most powerful weaponry. This thesis focuses on non-nuclear
decision-making in Australia, South Africa and Sweden. In each case it is
possible to identify distinctive strategic cultural proclivities which have shaped
perceptions of security-material factors. The aim is therefore to provide a thick
description of these cultural tendencies and to explore how they affect nuclear
decision-making. This will provide insights into why the non-cultural accounts
which dominate the literature on these non-nuclear outcomes, might be
inadequate. Equally, it will emphasise the value of pursuing a strategic culture
approach.Contents
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IVChapter One: Introduction
"We are cultural beings, endowed with the capacity and the will to take deliberate
attitude toward the world and to lend it significance".1
Max Weber
Can cultural analysis tell us anything significant about strategic outcomes? This
question seems to have been ignored by strategists who base their analysis
primarily on rationalist materialist explanations. Positivist social scientists are
generally unsympathetic towards cultural analysis, mainly because it does not
offer directly observable and quantifiable explanations. As Peter Katzenstein
suggests, "most students of national security accord pride of place to material
forces that define the balance of power between states. They have no place for
intangibles like culture".2 However, the recent interest shown towards culture in
International Relations research has brought into question traditional assumptions
concerning the utility of cultural analysis and has stimulated a growth of new
research into strategic and nuclear decision-making. This thesis seeks to
contribute to this development.
Traditional explanations for military strategy are dominated by realist theories. It is
difficult to identify exactly what constitutes a realist theory within IR, since there
are many different varieties of realist analyses advanced.3 This thesis does not
set out to challenge the theoretical premises of all realist accounts. Instead the
task will be to confront those realist theories that fail to give adequate attention to
the role of strategic culture.
1 Quoted in Peter Katzenstein, Robert Keohane and Stephen Krasner, "International Organisations and the Study of World
Politics", International Organisation (Autumn 1998) p.681.
2
Quoted in John Duffield, World Power Foresaken: Political Culture, International Institutions and German Security Policy
After Unification (Stanford University Press, 1998) p.1.
3
See Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, "Is anybody still a Realist?" International Security, Vol.24, No.2 (Fall 1999)
and Peter D. Feaver, Günther Hellmann, Randall L. Schweller, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, William C. Wohlforth, Jeffrey W. Legro
and Andrew Moravcsik, "Brother can you Spare and Paradigm? (Or was Anybody ever a Realist?) (A Correspondence)"
International Security Vol.25, No.1 (Summer 2000)
1Many realist explanations assume that states exist in an anarchical international
realm and possess fixed, uniformly conflictual preferences that are determined by
external material stimuli.4 This thesis challenges these assumptions by
introducing the idea of cultural context. This will involve an investigation into the
idea that military strategies are formulated within the context of particular strategic
cultural environments that leads states to respond to each other in distinctive
ways.
Strategic Culture
Strategic culture refers to the collective ideational tendencies and pre-dispositions
of strategic communities. This acts as a perceptual lens through which decision¬
makers view the material environment, shaping perceptions of other states and
the range of possible military strategies that may be adopted.
This might lead to questions as to whether all states respond uniformly to
international anarchy in the way that many realists assume. It is the contention of
this thesis that a singular focus on material forces is insufficient in explaining
strategic outcomes. The aim will be to explore the importance of strategic cultures
in constituting and giving meaning to these material forces, in order to gain better
insights to these questions.
This thesis begins by exploring the various different conceptualisations of
strategic culture offered in the literature. How has it traditionally been defined?
How has it been applied? What are the problems with its use? Are there
competing conceptualisations?
4
According to Jeffrey Legro and Andrew Moravcsik these are the core assumptions that underlie all realist analyses. Ibid.
pp.12-18. However there have been a number of recent attempts to 'soften' or 'relax' some of these assumptions. See for
example, Randall Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1998); Stephan Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell
University Press); Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, Cornell, 1987).An attempt will be made to highlight the 'levels of analysis' problem confronting
strategic culturalists. The focus for this research will be on domestic strategic
cultures and sub-cultures. This is based on an assumption that states continue to
exercise a monopoly over the threat and use of force and are therefore the most
relevant (but not the only) referent objects of analysis. However, this is not
supposed to preclude research into other external strategic cultures. Indeed this
thesis should provide a stimulus for further research into the interaction between
domestic and external strategic cultures.
By investigating various domestic cultures, a strategic culture approach may bring
into question the idea that states are monolithic, rational unitary actors. This issue
was first explored by Graham Allison, who sought to break down the notion that
there was an "essence of decision" behind US policy during the Cuban Missile
Crisis, thereby challenging the idea that states are unitary actors.5 Allison
identified three models of decision: Rational Actor Model, Organizational Process
and Bureaucratic Politics, each of which is used to provide three different
accounts of the decisions that characterised this crisis. Allison concluded that that
there was no rational central control of state decision-making. Investigating
strategic culture may open up a similar possibility: states may be comprised of
many cultures at many different levels.
It is also necessary to draw attention to the methodological problems confronting
strategic cultural research. What is the best way to conduct strategic cultural
research? As has already been suggested, cultural analysis is unattractive to
many social scientists because of its often vague and imprecise nature. Does this
mean that strategic cultures cannot be identified and their effects measured? This
may have important implications for how strategic culture is theoretically
conceptualised.
5 Graham Allison, Essence of Decision (Boston: Little Brown, 1970)
3A principal aim will be to investigate potential theoretical frameworks for a
strategic culture approach. Does it provide a substantive and alternative causal
theory? Questions will be raised about whether one can provide a theory of the
origins of strategic culture and how it is translated into strategic outcomes. Similar
questions must be asked about whether cultural variables have any
supplementary capacity for non-cultural explanations. At the core of this research
is an attempt to "problematise" traditional accounts for explaining strategic
outcomes. This may involve "culturalising" materialist realist theories by
"unpacking their implicit cultural baggage". Beyond this, it might be necessary to
be conservative in terms of what should be expected from a strategic culture
approach.
To investigate the potential uses of strategic culture, this research will focus on
one particular aspect of military strategy, namely non-nuclear weapons decision¬
making. Three cases of states that have chosen non-nuclear weapon outcomes
will be explored according to the insights provided by strategic culture. Initially it is
worth justifying this focus on non-nuclear outcomes.
The Significance of Non-Nuclear Weapon Outcomes
In 1962, President Kennedy predicted that the United States could be facing the
threat of 15 to 25 nuclear-armed states by the 197O's.6 This argument had
previously been advanced in 1958, when the National Planning Association
published a study entitled 1970 Without Arms Control. This study concluded that
"by 1970, most nations with appreciable military strength will have in their
arsenals nuclear weapons
- strategic, tactical, or both".7 Britain's Defence
Minister Dennis Healey remarked at the time "so far, no country has resisted the
6
Quoted in T.V Paul, Power Versus Prudence: Why Nations Forego Nuclear Weapons (McGill-Queen's University Press,
2000), p.4,
7
The emergence in the 196O's of a belief that international security was being undermined by the spread of nuclear
weapons was characterised by the so-calied 'Nth power problem'. In 1961 Hedley Bull suggested that "the problem of
preventing the expansion of the nuclear club, or of making adjustments to it, is a single one faced by international society
as a whole (The problem), and that it is one raised by any addition to the club's membership (Mh power)". Hedley Bull, The
Control of the Arms Race: Disarmament and Arms Control in the Missile Age (London, IISS, 1961) p.147.temptation to make its own atomic weapons once it has acquired the physical
ability to do so".8
Nonetheless, despite the predictions of many proliferation analysts in the 195O's
relatively few states have crossed the nuclear threshold. Why is this the case?
This question comprises the focus of this thesis and will be addressed through the
use of the strategic culture approach outlined in chapter one. Non-nuclear
outcomes are potentially problematic for dominant realist explanations, because
they suggest instances of states not maximising their power. Might cultural
explanations offer better insights?
In one of the first systematic attempts to investigate non-nuclear decision-making,
Mitchell Reiss suggested that "domestic disincentives to nuclear weapons
acquisition were significant".9 This challenges the notion that all states respond to
external material stimuli in the way many realists assume. Reiss specifically
breaks down the assumption that states are compelled to act according to the
imperatives of technology.10 Instead, attention is given to political motivations
which "inspire or discourage nuclear weapons acquisition".11 Thus, it is not the
material constraints of technology that determine nuclear decision-making, but the
motivations that underlie them. This thesis seeks to give Reiss' ideas some
theoretical context, and to take them further by investigating the domestic
strategic cultural influences that shape these political motivations.
8
Quoted in John Mueller 'The Escalating Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons" in T.V Paul, Richard J.Harknett and James J.
Wirtz (eds.) The Absolute Weapon Revisited Nuclear Arms and the Emerging International Order (Ann Arbour: University
of Michigan Press, 1998).
9
Mitchell Reiss, Without the Bomb: The Politics of Nuclear Non-proliferation (New York; Columbia University Press, 1988)
p.249.
The idea that technology compels decision-makers, is often referred to as a 'technological determinist' argument.
Technological determinists would argue that if the technological capacity to acquire nuclear weapons exists, then decision¬
makers are compelled to proliferate. Reiss suggests that pessimistic predictions concerning nuclear proliferation have
tended to over-concentrate on technological capabilities to the neglect of political motivation. See Mitchell Reiss, Without
the Bomb: The Politics of Nuclear Nonproliferation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988) p.247. For a discussion of
the technological determinist argument see Stephen M. Meyer, The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation (University of
Chicago Press, 1984); Bradley Thayer, 'The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation and the Utility of the Non-Proliferation
Regime," in Raju G.C. Thomas Ed. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime: Prospects for the 21s' Century (London:
Macmillan, 1998) pp. 84-86.; Tanya Ogilvie-White, "Is there a Theory of Nuclear Proliferation? An Analysis of the
Contemporary Debate", The Nonproliferation Review, Vol.4 No.1, (Fall 1996).
11
Reiss, op cit, p.248.Despite many criticisms, the traditional means of approaching non-nuclear
outcomes continues to be driven by the realist assumption that the state in
question is simply acting according to self-interest, in response to material
conditions. Much of the literature focuses on the material capabilities of those
states that are considered to be threats and those that are considered to be allies.
If threats are benign then nuclear weapons may not be necessary; if allies are
equipped with large nuclear forces, then they may offer a nuclear protection,
which may dampen incentives for independent nuclear capabilities. Yet this leads
to questions as to why certain states are considered as threats or allies in the first
place, which non-ideational explanations seem ill-equipped to answer. The issue
of how fear is generated within states concerning the intentions of "hostile" others,
and how states strategic culturally differentiate between friends and foes, will form
an integral part of this thesis.
Many instances of non-nuclear outcomes are explained according to financial and
technological limitations. Do some states have little or no choice over nuclear
weapons acquisition because of the constraints imposed by finance and/or
technology? Do material factors automatically determine decision-making? It may
be that other political constraints are important in non-nuclear decision-making.
Do cultures shape the nature of political constraints?
It is also important to consider strategic cultural pre-dispositions towards nuclear
weapons issues. By the early 195O's nuclear weapons were emerging as state of
the art weaponry and an important feature of modern military strategy. The need
to acquire these weapons thus became an integral part of many states' strategic
cultures. By the late 196O's attitudes towards nuclear weapons were changing.
The realisation that they could be enormously destructive and that any nuclear
confrontation could be globally devastating, began to generate a "normative
prohibition" against the use of nuclear weapons.12 This strategic cultural 'taboo' of
12
T.V Paul, "Nuclear Taboo and War Initiation in Regional Conflicts", Journal of Conflict Resolution 39 (December 1995)
p.7O1.nuclear non-use may have imposed significant constraints on the strategic
doctrines of nuclear weapon states.
Furthermore, the proliferation of nuclear weapons was widely believed to increase
rather than diminish the chances of nuclear war. This facilitated the emergence of
an international culture of non-acquisition, which ultimately, manifested itself in
the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Hence it might also be possible to investigate the
possibility of strategic cultural taboo against the acquisition of nuclear weapons,
which while not as strong as that relating to non-use, may lead states to reject a
nuclear option.
Choosing Non-Nuclear Outcomes
The aim has been to assess the relevance of strategic culture in three cases of
non-nuclear outcomes. Having surveyed the available literature, it would appear
that Australia, South Africa and Sweden offer suitable case studies. Each of these
states appears to present distinctive strategic cultural characteristics and each
has chosen a non-nuclear outcome. The task will be to explore whether strategic
cultures had any influence over nuclear decision-making.
Chapter one will investigate the extent to which International Relations research
has focused on the issue of "strategic culture". The cases of South Africa and
Sweden have received rigorous treatment in the proliferation literature and will
thus provide a good basis for establishing whether strategic culture is given any
attention within proliferation research. With the recent release of historical nuclear
policy documents, the Australian nuclear story is beginning to attract the attention
of proliferation analysts and in a way that may present opportunities for a strategic
culture approach. This thesis will not attempt to empirically uncover new
information or evidence of nuclear decision-making. Instead the aim will be to
assess the dominant explanations for non-nuclear outcomes, which invariably areprovided by materialist realist theories. If materialist explanations predominate
then it will be necessary to expose their inadequacies by investigating the
possibility that strategic cultures may constitute material factors.
From the outset it will be acknowledged that the case of South Africa is different
to that of Australia and Sweden. Prior to its non-nuclear policy, South Africa
acquired nuclear weapons. A non-nuclear outcome thus emerged through a
process of denuclearisation. However, the focus of this research is on 'outcomes'
and in South Africa's case, the outcome involves an unequivocal non-nuclear
status. South Africa is widely cited by proliferation analysts as the first case of a
state unilaterally denuclearising and is often promoted as a model for future
nuclear rollback elsewhere. This thesis might therefore seem justified in
concentrating of South Africa's non-nuclear outcome. Furthermore, the aim of this
research is to investigate different cases of non-nuclear outcomes and to see if
strategic culture has resonance in all cases, regardless of whether the state
concerned has denuclearised or simply abstained altogether.
In approaching each case, the aim will be to uncover the cultural context under¬
pinning nuclear decision-making. Which strategic cultures are apparent within
these states? Are they susceptible to change? Do they shape distinctive national
strategic tendencies? How influential are they in shaping non-nuclear
preferences? It is important to grapple with the cultural complexities of each of
these cases in order to move away from assumptions of universal strategic logic.
It will therefore not be strictly necessary to use a universal methodological
framework that can be used identically in each case. However, with each state an
attempt will initially be made to outline the relevant nuclear history both from a
civilian and a military angle. Having done this, it will be possible to gain an
awareness of the main events that led to the decision to restrain (in the case of
Australia and Sweden) and retract (in the case of South Africa) the respective
nuclear capabilities. The task will then be to sketch the cultural parameters ofeach case. As has already been suggested, the focus is on domestic strategic
cultures. This could be analysed from an organizational, institutional, national or
societal standpoint. However, no attempt will be made to refute the importance of
other external cultural influences. The aim is to be inclusive rather than exclusive
in terms of levels of analysis.
Having identified what might be considered the main strategic cultural tendencies,
the task will then be to make links between these tendencies and nuclear
decision-making. What does strategic culture offer in terms of new insights? It
might be necessary to make comparisons between those accounts which focus
purely on material factors and a strategic culture approach. As was mentioned
above, a number of assumptions dominate mainstream accounts and need to be
assessed in each of these cases: What underlies perceptions of threats or allies?
Do material factors such as technology and finance present insurmountable
constraining barriers in these cases, or can culture shape responses? How do
these states perceive "nuclear weapons" issues and are states strategic culturally
predisposed to conform and contribute to international consensus' on nuclear
weapons issues?
Posing these questions will provide the basis for conclusions as to whether
strategic culture has any merit or value in offering insights into cases of non-
nuclear weapon outcomes. This thesis does not seek to challenge the
conclusions of traditional accounts by uncovering new information or by
suggesting radically different explanations. The scope for empirical revelations is
minimal, just as the theoretical ambitions will be limited. The aim is to critique and
problematise existing theoretical explanations of these cases, by investigating
how, if at all, references are made to ideational analysis and then to investigate
the potential benefits of a strategic culture approach.Chapter Two:
Conceptualising Strategic Culture
introduction
The term "strategy" has traditionally been used to refer to the way in which
military power is used by governments in the pursuit of their interests.1 How
are these interests defined? A "strategic culture" approach tackles this
question by considering the relevance of "cultural context". This implies that
strategic preferences are rooted in the formative experiences of the state in
question and are influenced, to an extent, by the cultural characteristics of the
state and its elites. For an advocate of strategic culture, there are no universal
truths in the realm of strategy. Instead, research should be directed towards
cultural and strategic relativism.
The concept of strategic culture was initially developed by several strategic
thinkers in the late 197O's in the first instance to argue that the Soviet Union
approached questions of nuclear strategy very differently from the United
States. As will be shown, writers such as Jack Snyder and Colin Gray have
illustrated the distinction between the national styles of the United States and
the Soviet Union and the importance of culture in accounting for this.2 But
having fulfilled this task, the concept of strategic culture was, for a
considerable period, consigned to the academic backwater, with minimal
conceptual development beyond its employment by Cold War strategists.
Hence, research was mostly confined to empirical analysis of regions and
states, with little attention given to theory or method.
1
John Garnett, "Strategic Studies and its Assumptions" in John Baylis, Ken Booth, John Garnett and Phil Williams
feds.) Contemporary Strategy: Theories and Policies (Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1975), p.3.
Jack Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Nuclear Opf/ons.(Rand R-2154-AF, Santa Monica
California. 1977) Colin Gray, "National Styles in Strategy: The American Example," International Security, Vol. 6, No.
2 (Fall 1981) Gray, Nuclear Strategy and National Style. (Hamilton Press, 1986). See also, Carnes Lord, "American
Strategic Culture," Comparative Strategy, Volume 5, No.3. See also Richard Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks it
Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War," Commentary, Vol.64. No.1 (July 1977). For a good overview of this literature
see Alan Macmillan, Strategic Culture and British Grand Strategy, 1945-1952 (PhD, University of Wales, Aberystwyth,
1996).
10In the 199O's there has been a renewed interest in the relationship between
culture and military strategy in a way that has re-opened a number of old
debates, as well as bringing new issues to the fore. This re-vitalised interest in
strategic culture can be accredited to two trends. On the one hand, writers
such as Alastair lain Johnston have sought to re-conceptualise the debate by
seeking a comprehensive theory and methodology of strategic culture through
the development of a sophisticated and rigorous research design.3
Concurrently, a broader debate has emerged concerning the potential of
cultural theories within international relations research and their credibility as
alternatives to dominant realist theories. Contemporary research into strategic
culture now forces the analyst to address a number of complex theoretical
issues in a way that has pushed the debate well beyond the rather narrow
confines of earlier research.
This chapter seeks to outline these contemporary developments and assess
their implications for further research. The current debate over strategic culture
is characterised by a broad range of research. As Alan Macmillan suggests,
the list of writers concerned with strategic culture includes some "strange
bedfellows" in Colin Gray, Ken Booth, Charles Kupchan and Bradley Klein.4
While this is illustrative of a broad acceptance of the importance of strategic
cultural discussion, it appears to have led to a diverse and non-cumulative
research agenda.
While much recent attention has been given to the flawed nature of early
conceptualisations of strategic culture, it is doubtful whether contemporary
research has achieved a consensus as to how to overcome these problems.
Despite the flawed nature of early research, traditional conceptualisations of
strategic culture maintain a focus (albeit rather narrow) which is often lacking
in contemporary research. This raises questions about why scholars are
currently researching into strategic culture and whether there is any possibility
of a consensus as to its purpose.
3
Alastair lain Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture", International Security\9 (4) 1995.
4
Macmillan, Strategic Culture and British Grand Strategy, op cit, p.33.
11This chapter will seek to review the main "generations" of research into
strategic culture while addressing three broad areas of concern. Ontology.
what should strategic cultural analysis concern itself with? Methodology, how
might strategic research be conducted? Epistemology. can there be a theory
of strategic culture? In addressing these questions, it is hoped that a more
credible conceptualisation of strategic culture can be provided.
In many ways, the lack of consensus and unanimity exhibited by strategic
culturalists can be attributed to an avoidance of theoretical discussion. It is the
aim of this chapter to sketch the principal theoretical issues at stake, in the
hope that scholars can navigate their way towards a more credible
conceptualisation of strategic culture. Hence, the task here is not to solve
theoretical puzzles, but rather to provide focus to a currently disparate
research area.
The Need for Strategic Relativism
Prior to WWII, literature on military strategy was mainly provided by military
practitioners who sought to chronicle particular military events and battles or
equip armies with tactical manuals.5 As an academic enterprise, strategic
studies "dates from the almost simultaneous occurrence of the nuclear
revolution and the Cold War".6 The work of early writers on nuclear strategy
represented an intellectual response to the advent of nuclear weapons.7 For
many, the emergence of nuclear weapons suggested the need for a new
strategic approach.
Writing in 1946, Bernard Brodie suggested:
5
Booth lists a handful of writers who he considers to have provided "classic" texts including, Sun Tzu, Thucydides,
Machiavelli, Clausewitz, Mahan, Douhet and Udell Hart. Ken Booth, "Strategy" in A.J.R. Groom and M. Light (eds.)
Contemporary International Relations: A Guide to Theory (London: Pinter, 1994),p.1O9. 6 Ibid. p.1O8.
7
Barry Buzan, An Introduction to Strategic Studies: Military Technology and International Relations, (London:
Macmillan, 1987) p. 143.
12"Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars.
From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no
other purpose".8
The task of grappling with the problems raised by nuclear weapons was taken
away from military personnel and handed to civilian, academic strategists. The
subsequent emergence of 'deterrence' literature during the "golden age" of
strategic thinking in the 195O's and 1960's provided the conceptual framework
for Western nuclear strategy during the Cold War. Theories of nuclear
deterrence provided by writers such as Thomas Schelling and Herman Kahn
were based on the use of abstract theoretical models such as "game theory'"
which provided predictions as to how states as rational actors would act in
certain strategic scenarios.9
In the 1960's a number of writers such as Anatol Rapaport and Philip Green
began to question the abstract formulations provided by game theorists.10 For
writers such as Schelling and Kahn, a timeless rationality could be applied to
all states, with no attention given to national history, politics or culture. As a
result, strategic theory appeared unable to recognise the diversity of national
military strategies.
By the 197O's writers such as Ken Booth were suggesting that the golden age
of strategic theory had led to a profoundly ethnocentric outlook which gave
little (if any) credence to the idea of "national styles in strategy".11 For Booth,
the use of rational choice analysis as a tool for thinking about the world led to
dangerous distortions. To counter this he argued there was a need for
"strategy with a human face" and to categorise strategy in contextual rather
than universal terms. Booth highlighted the intellectual hegemony of
"American strategic man" and rational actor models and thus prepared the
ground for a strategic culture approach.
8
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13The implication of Booth's analysis was that states do not necessarily respond
to external stimuli in the mechanical way implied by rational materialists.
Indeed, if they respond at all, then they do so according to national styles and
idiosyncrasies. Furthermore, Booth argued that if strategic studies was to be
improved, then it was necessary to embrace more completely the idea of
strategic relativism. This suggests that "truth" in strategy is relative to the
individual or group in question and to the time and place in which the individual
or group acts.12 His conclusion was that we should seek to deconstruct
Western strategic assumptions, which he considered were the result of the
"methodological fallacy of ethnocentrism".13
Thus, according to Booth, the analyst as a strategic anthropologist should
move towards the liberating realm of cultural relativism, which acted, he
argued, as a useful anti-dote to the grip of "ethnocentrism, ignorance and
megalogic".14As will be shown, Booth's work provides one example of a
general realisation within strategic studies by the late 197O's, of the
importance of cultural context to strategic analysis.
Culture and International Relations
What is meant by "culture"? The term is frequently and indiscriminately used
and yet it defies a universally accepted definition. Writers appear to disagree
as to what "cultures" are, how they can be identified and what they do. As
Clifford Geertz suggests, "cultural analysis is intrinsically incomplete. And,
worse than that, the deeper it goes, the more incomplete it is".15
For positivist social scientists who seek observable, quantifiable data, culture
appears unattractive as an analytical tool. This is because cultural variables
are often hard to define and operationalize. As a result, culture has tended to
be used as a residual variable, employed only as a last resort. David Elkins
and Richard Simeon have proposed that culture be viewed as a residual
12
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14explanation towards a set of preferences and cannot explain particular
choices: "Culture is unlikely to be of much help in explaining why alternative A
was chosen over alternative B - but it may be of great help in understanding
why A and B were considered, while no thought was given to C,D or E".16
Yet should culture be so easily relegated to a "second order" factor? While
culture might defy a precise definition and may not provide clear-cut
explanations for outcomes, it might seem premature to dismiss it as a
secondary issue. As Eric Herring asks, why should the parameters that culture
shapes be seen as less important, when structural factors operate within these
same parameters?
17
Booth has suggested that culture provides "discerning tendencies not rigid
determinants".18 Thus, it might not be useful to consider how cultural variables
cause, or explain outcomes. Yet, culture might provide the context in which
actors operate, thereby constituting and giving meaning to material factors. As
Herring suggests: if the cultural context is taken as given, then there is the risk
of "underestimating the potential parameters of action and of change".19
The relevance of culture as context can be directly applied to the use of
cultural research within IR as illustrated by Keith Krause and Andrew Latham.
These writers maintain that:
"while cultural forces do not directly determine policy responses, they exercise a powerful influence on the shaping of what might be called 'policy reflexes.' In other words, they can help shape an understanding of what constitutes 'normal', 'appropriate', or 'desirable' practices and responses".20
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15The contextual or "interpretative" framework that culture provides may be
different in each case. Michael Desch has suggested that the "new culturalists
in security studies focus on the particulars of single cases, rather than factors
common to a number of cases, because they assume that each one is sui
generis".21 Without the systematic use of cultural variables across cases it is
difficult to establish a predictive or testable cultural theory. However, this
should not be the aim for strategic culturalists. Rather, the focus should be on
highlighting the relevance of cultural context, which is often absent in
rationalist materialist explanations.
John Duffield has identified three points of reference that are common to
cultural analyses within IR. First, culture is viewed as the property of
collectivities as opposed to the individuals who constitute them; second,
cultures are distinctive and profound differences may exist between different
collectivities; third, cultures are relatively stable in comparison with material
conditions and will change only gradually, if at all, over time.22 Hence, the task
may be to seek to identify distinctive cultural collectives with bounded
systemsof assumption, which will remain relatively static over time.
Strategic Culture and International Relations
There have been numerous attempts to define the concept of strategic culture.
Snyder is usually credited with introducing the term in 1977 and his
understanding has provided a critical benchmark for most later formulations.
Beginning with the premise that the Soviet approach to strategic thinking
during the Cold War constituted a unique strategic culture, Snyder went on to
define strategic culture as :
"the sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses and patterns of habitual behaviour that members of a national strategic community have
21
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16achieved through instruction and imitation with each other with regard to
nuclear strategy".23
Whilst few theorists have attempted to refute this notion, later conceptions
have both expanded and narrowed his formulations. In a narrow sense, writers
such as Yitzhak Klein have defined strategic culture as "the set of attitudes
and beliefs held within a military establishment concerning the political
objectives of war and the most effective strategy and operational method of
achieving it".24 A slightly broader notion is given by Booth when he suggests
that it refers to "a nation's traditions, values, attitudes, patterns of behaviour,
habits, symbols, achievements and particular ways of adapting to the
environment and solving problems with respect to the threat or use of force".25
Johnston invokes an even broader definition in seeking to obtain a notion of
strategic culture that is falsifiable. By this he means that it should not only be
distinguishable from non-strategic variables, it should also capture the
essence of the task, namely to provide decision-makers with a uniquely
ordered set of strategic choices from which predictions can be made about
behaviour. This leads to the following definition: "An integrated system of
symbols (e.g. argumentation structures, languages, analogies, metaphors)
which acts to establish pervasive and long lasting preferences by formulating
concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in interstate political
affairs".26
This diversity of definition is illustrative of the tendency for writers to proceed
at a tangent when discussing strategic culture. Where Klein's definition places
significance on the operational angle of strategy, Johnston seeks a far broader
conceptualisation involving larger security collectives. This raises the issue of
what should be seen as the referent group for strategic cultural research? As
the organizer and exerciser of military force, should states remain as the
essential referent? Macmillan et.al have argued that the state should not be
23
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17seen as the sole referent, because when considering culture, the notion of
"society" has more valid claims than the "state".27 It must not be assumed that
states are culturally monolithic as sub-cultural groupings may exhibit
contradictory cultural tendencies. It is thus important to recognise that "a
dominant culture may not be associated with a particular national group, some
cultural pluralism is possible, even likely".28
The suggestion of multiple referent strategic cultural groupings, may explain
the proliferation of diverse research into strategic culture. Nonetheless is it is
necessary to ask, what the commonalities are within what Hoffman and
Longhurst have referred to as an "atomized research agenda"?29 First,
strategic culture approaches identify specific national tendencies that derive
from historical experience, hence "cancelling out the notion of a universal
assumed rationality".30 Second, strategic culture refers to collectives, be they
military organisations, policy communities or entire societies. Thus, strategic
culture will provide certain enduring attitudes, assumptions, beliefs that are
shared by the collective and will lead to a particular interpretation of material
conditions. Third, strategic culture scholars will look to identify "continuities and
discernible trends across time and contexts rather than change".31 Finally,
strategic culture assumes the existence of a perceptual lens or milieu through
which information is received, mediated and processed into appropriate
responses.
Krause suggests that it might not necessarily be useful to draw sharp
distinctions between different levels of culture, since "all share overlapping
elements".32 This would support the idea that cultures are amorphous and lack
clear boundaries. Krause introduces the concept of "security culture" which he
defines as a "subset of broader political, strategic and diplomatic cultures".33 In
27
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18discussing cross-cultural dimensions of multi-lateral non-proliferation, arms
control and security building dialogues, Krause considers it necessary to "take
a step away from thinking in narrow strategic terms".34 By utilising the concept
of security culture, Krause is able to build upon the work of strategic culture
while moving away from a strict emphasis on military affairs and towards
broader issues of "security, stability and peace".35
Might this downgrade the use or relevance of a strategic culture approach?
This chapter argues that it is useful to maintain a distinct focus on strategy.
The concept of "security" is potentially broad and may embrace a wide range
of threats at multiple levels. Broadening analysis to include more than the
military dimension may lead attention towards political rather than strategic
culture.36 Is it possible to identify strategic decisions that are not in some way
political? Clausewitz suggested that war was "an extension of politics by other
means":37 so might the same dictum be applied to the issue of strategy? Just
as it difficult to envisage strategists as acultural it seems unlikely that they
would be apolitical.
Can strategic, political and security cultures be distinguished? Booth,
Macmillan and Trood have suggested that it might be helpful to think of
"strategy as the military dimension of security and strategic culture as being
the military dimension of political culture".38 However, in using a strategic
culture approach it is important not to maintain an overly narrow military focus.
When considering non-militaristic societies, it may be necessary to perceive of
strategy as more than a purely military phenomenon. Thus, while military
issues might continue to retain centre-stage in any discussion of strategic
culture, it is important not to be "too dogmatic about the boundaries of what
34
Keith Krause, "Cross Cultural Dimensions of Multilateral Non-Proliferation and Arms Control Dialogues: An Overview" in Krause (eds.) op cit, p. 14. 35
Ibid. p. 15
36
John Duffield prefers to focus on "political" as opposed to "strategic" culture in his analysis on German state action. Duffield, "Political Culture and State Behaviour", op cit. See also, John Duffield, World Power Foresaken: Political Culture,
International Institutions and German Security Policy After Unification (Stanford University Press, 1998).
37
C. Clausewitz, On War, (Translated and edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p.87.
38
Booth, Macmillan and Trood, "Strategic Culture", op cit, p.11.
19might be discussed in order to understand behaviour and attitudes within a
particular state and society".39
Applying Strategic Culture : Earfy Formulations
As noted earlier, in the late 1970's, some American defence analysts
embraced the view that the Soviet Union did not share many of the ideas that
were central to the "American idea of international order".40 Anglo-American
strategic theory at this time was seen as having become obsessed with the
preservation of international order according to Western perceptions. This led
to the Soviet Union being viewed as a "mirror image" of the United States in
strategic terms. At the forefront of this re-assessment of Soviet strategic
thinking was Jack Snyder. Snyder introduced the concept of strategic culture
in 1977 in what was to become a path-breaking analysis of the Soviet Union.
He argued that Soviet decision-makers were being socialised within a
distinctive Soviet mode of strategic thinking, and that as a result, "a set of
general beliefs, attitudes and behavioural patterns with regard to nuclear
strategy has achieved a state of semi-permanence that places them on the
level of 'culture' rather than mere 'policy'".41
Snyder's introduction and application of the concept of strategic culture was
designed to offer an alternative account of the differing approaches towards
nuclear strategy of the Superpowers. However, the significance of his thesis is
to be located at a broader level. Snyder, made the explicit link between culture
and strategy in a way that appeared acceptable to the American strategic
community. Equally, he confirmed that Soviet decision-makers did not tailor
their behaviour to American notions of strategic rationality. More importantly,
Snyder's work provided the catalyst for other writers that formed what
Johnston terms the "first generation" of literature on strategic culture.
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20The greatest challenge facing first generation scholars, was to provide
evidence that the technological dictates of the nuclear era were not as
universal as had previously been suggested. The domination of the technical
aspects implicit to the superpower arms race, ensured that mainstream
strategic thinking in the West largely ignored the significance of the cultural
determinants of nuclear strategy. As such, culture was seen as providing a
secondary explanation to strategic issues and was thus rendered meaningless
in the face of swift and decisive technological development.
But not all analysts saw it this way. Gray has argued that "many of the
western policy errors of the past forty years could have been avoided if a
proper respect had been paid both to the uniqueness and to the plain facts of
local Soviet conditions".42 Gray was among those who saw a need for an
American nuclear strategy that acknowledged the relevance of the Soviet
Union's world-view. To accomplish this he also needed to establish that there
was a discernible American strategic culture that might be different from
that of the Soviet Union.
Gray's approach has been supported by others who have written on American
strategic culture. William Kincade, for example, agrees with Gray that
American strategy is determined to a considerable degree by its "geo-strategic
situation, resources, history, military experience and political beliefs".43
These early attempts to analyse the nature and importance of national style in
strategy, helped establish the academic credibility of the concept of strategic
culture. In many ways, this research appealed to sound logical foundations: it
seemed credible to argue that the historical and geographical conditions
confronting states lead to defence issues that were "uniquely defined".44
Furthermore, a strategic culture approach appeared to offer a guard against
ethnocentric mannerisms, which had led to numerous misperceptions and
mistakes and to the traditional practice of treating an adversary who adopts an
42
Gray, "National Styles in Strategy", op cit, p.65. 43
William Kincade,"American National Style," in Jacobsen ed., Strategic Power, p. 10 44
David Jones, "Soviet Strategic Culture," in Jacobsen (eds.), Strategic Powerp.35.
21alternative strategy to the analyst as irrational and eccentric. As Gray suggests
when discussing Soviet policy, strategists had short-sightedly likened the
Soviet Union to a "loose gun canon on a rolling ship", when, in reality it merely
differed from the American way.45These developments served as a call to
strategists to embrace diversity and to accept that the international strategic
realm was not monolithic and homogenous. Rather, strategy was/is culturally
and nationally determined.
The Emerging Debate: Initial Problems, Broader Questions
While the work of Snyder, Gray and others was invaluable in awakening
strategists to the importance of culture in the strategic realm, there were many
problems associated with these early attempts to develop a workable concept
of strategic culture. First, as Johnston suggests, there is the issue of
definition.46 In 1990, David Jones' analysis of Soviet strategic culture
suggested there were three levels to a state's strategic culture: a macro-
environmental level involving geography, history and eth no-cultural
characteristics; a societal level, referring to the socio-economic and political
structure of society; and a micro-level consisting of military institutions and the
nature of civil-military relations.47 This conception of strategic culture involves
an extremely wide range of variables, and implies that cultures are multi-
layered and all-encompassing.
Problems have been identified with Jones' approach. First, as Johnston has
commented, each of the many diverse variables employed such as
technology, geography, political psychology and national characteristics can
stand as separate explanations in themselves. Second, the use of such a
wide-range of explanatory variables, makes it extremely difficult to test this
model against non-strategic culture approaches since there is little explanatory
space for other models, which use different variables to account for strategic
choice.48 Put simply, there is nothing that is not strategic culture.
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22Recently Colin Gray has specifically addressed Johnston's criticism of the first
generation.49 For Gray, "strategic culture as context", is that which surrounds
and gives meaning to strategic behaviour.50 Hence strategic culture is "out
there", but also within us; "we, our institutions and our behaviour are the
context".51 The point here is that there is nothing within the realm of strategy
that is not cultural since strategy is made by individuals that cannot fail but be
cultural. Thus the behaviour of a strategic community is affected by culturally
shaped or enculturated individuals, organisations, procedures and weapons.
Johnston's mistake, in Gray's eyes is to conceive of culture as distinct among
conflicting explanations for strategic choice. According to Gray, this is not
credible simply because there is no conceptual space for explanations for
behaviour beyond strategic culture, because all strategic behaviour is effected
by human beings who cannot help but be cultural agents.
Johnston draws attention to an inconsistency in Gray's analysis.52 Despite
suggesting that behaviour should be seen as part of strategic culture, Gray
implies elsewhere that one will from time to time see a disjuncture between
strategic culture and behaviour and that behaviour can be triggered by many
factors in addition to strategic culture. As Johnston asserts, by conceding that
behaviour may be distinct from an apriori strategic culture, it becomes obvious
that there are other, non-strategic culture variables that explain this "deviant
behaviour".53
Theo Farrell has argued that both Gray and Johnston's approaches have a
degree of merit.54 Gray's notion of strategic culture as context is of value in
considering the cultural context of strategic action. However, Johnston's thesis
allows for an investigation into whether culture is useful as an explanation of
49
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23state action.55 As will be shown, Johnston's work is indicative of attempts to
provide a positivist account for how strategic culture can explain cases which
materialist models cannot. The emphasis is thus on testability, researchability
and methodological sophistication. This is only possible by invoking a
distinction between cultural/ideational and materialist variables and in
Johnston's eyes "you can never know any of this
... if you accept Professor
Gray's definition of strategic culture".56
It would seem therefore that there are problems associated with the first
generation of research into strategic culture. The suggestion that one can
identify a deeply rooted, persistent, consistent and unique strategic culture
in a state, ignores three main issues. First, it ignores both the nature and
diversity of the strategic problems faced by a state in the international realm.
This should not be seen as a move towards systemic explanation, rather it is
an acceptance that a state culturally adapts to prevailing international
conditions. Second, there is failure to give credence to the heterogeneous
nature of modern societies. Strategic choice generally reflects an amalgam of
diverse and often competing cultural traditions. As Johnston has observed, "it
seems somewhat muddled to argue that a single strategic culture emerges
from its multiple inputs when each of these inputs could arguably produce
alternative, even contradictory strategic cultures".57
Third, it is important not to over-state the "slow-to-change" nature of culture.
Cultural theorists tend to agree that cultures remain relatively static and
resistant. The more simplistic first generation literature thus analyses strategic
choice by identifying a cultural trait and establishing it as a timeless constant.
Whilst it would be self-defeating as a strategic culture advocate, to argue that
culture is constantly changing and is entirely dependant on exogenous factors,
56
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24it is important not to be too deterministic: cultures evolve and take on new
meanings over-time.
As Johnston concludes, the first generation of strategic culture literature is
both over-determined in the sense that it takes a large range of variables to
indicate the existence of a unique and persistent strategic culture that will
effect strategic choice, as well as under-determined in the way that it seeks to
identify one strategic culture to explain all choices. Inevitably, this has led to
charges of over-simplification. Having initially introduced the concept of
strategic culture, Snyder has since sought to emphasise the limitations
associated with its usage.58 While he re-asserts his earlier claim that strategic
culture is useful in averting the dangers of ethnocentrism, he is keen to stress
that it should not be used to exaggerate differences, and can in many ways be
used too casually.
On a broader level, Snyder also asks some searching questions about the
utility of cultural approaches. Snyder is sceptical of the value of using cultural
approaches since they tend to be vague and are often used to account for
outcomes "that cannot be explained in a concrete way".59 Snyder's aim is to
stress the importance of structural and situational explanations in providing a
sharper, more specific and quantifiable method. What he refers to as "different
factor endowments or comparative advantages" may give rise to different
strategies.60 Snyder does not distance himself entirely from cultural
explanations as he intimates that it might be possible to explain strategic
doctrine in terms of elite political culture and from the way in which strategic
patterns take on a cultural persistence as a result of socialisation and
institutionalisation. However, with regard to the latter, which he sees as far
more significant, Snyder emphasises that this may involve an analysis of
organisational theory of doctrinal preferences, rather than strategic culture.
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25Other first generation scholars have been more inclined to re-assert their
original position. Booth for example, has re-affirmed his conception of strategic
culture by stressing that it does not lead to a strategic preference
automatically, and instead we should look for cultural tendencies that will
influence policy outcomes.61 The argument here is that while culture is indeed
a "shadowy region", there are ways of using it to provide more subtle
explanations to strategic outcomes. This would imply a role for culture as an
influence rather than as a determinant. The perceptual lens provided by
cultural conditions will thus be powerful in some circumstances, weaker in
others, but should not be ignored altogether.
Delimiting the "Second Generation": The Relationship
Between Strategic Culture and Behaviour
As Johnston has argued, the most fundamental issue raised by the early work
on strategic culture is the relationship between attitude and behaviour. Most of
the early literature implies a direct link between strategic thought and
behaviour. The literature assumes that "strategic culture has a measurable
effect on strategic choice, that it exists 'out there', a monolithic, independent,
and observable constraint on all actors' behaviour".62 The inability to account
for the possibility of a disjuncture between strategic culture and behaviour has
thus been regarded as a distinct weakness in first generation analysis. The
suggestion is that strategic culture may be manipulated for the purposes of
creating a strategy which upholds or promotes particular interests. Strategy
can be used to justify the competence of decision-makers, divert criticism and
channel the terms of debate. But while this may be regarded as a more critical
appraisal of the workings of the decision-making process, the first generation
literature is forced to conclude that "if a link between strategic culture and
behaviour is not found, then strategic culture does not exist, a conclusion that
strategic culture is loath to make".63
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26The issue of instrumentality also became a key factor in later writings on
strategic culture as a number of theorists began to look at the way the rhetoric
employed by elites and decision-makers often did not correspond with
underlying intentions. The work of Bradley Klein is a good example of this
research's orientation. For Klein, strategic culture refers to the way a modern
hegemonic state depends upon the use of force to secure its objectives.
According to this view, it is necessary to look at the infrastructure of the
technology and armaments sector in order to locate a strategic
culture.64Furthermore, to study strategic culture is to study the "cultural
hegemony of organised state violence".
65
Klein concentrates on the way the US has sought to project its social, cultural
and military power on a global level. Deterrence doctrine during the Cold War
functioned perfectly for American needs by combining two contradictory
modes, one operational and one declaratory. On the one side, was a strategy
based on defence, retaliation and deterrence, and on the other an active
counter-force, war-fighting policy. Declaratory strategy was used purely in an
instrumental manner by elites to establish a cultural justification for operational
strategy. This had the dual purpose of suppressing dissent and garnering
support for overtly aggressive foreign policies.66
In a similar vein, Robin Luckham has identified the existence of an "armament
culture" and a "weapons fetishism" which, he argues, is instrumental in
maintaining the importance of a weapons culture which serves to perpetuate
the hegemony of western interests.67 Luckham maintains that the influence of
the armaments culture follows directly from the repressive apparatus of the
state and from the consolidation around the armament complex of a class
alliance within the dominant bloc. Furthermore, because the alliance has
access to state power, "it can influence the ideological state apparatus ...
notably the media and the educational system ... and use them to spread it's
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27own values and to legitimise it's hold over authority"-68 This theme of
instrumentality is particularly salient with respect to the West where the
armaments culture rearranges symbols and meanings in order to harmonise
opposites and to justify war through the symbols of peace.69
Writers such as Klein also emphasise the capacity for elites to rise above
strategic cultural constraints which they manipulate.70 However, more
contemporary research suggests that elites too can be socialised within
the myths that they themselves create. Snyder discusses the idea of "blow-
back" or "echo-effect" whereupon elites become internalised by the strategic
culture symbols that they themselves manipulate.71 Similarly, Charles
Kupchan has indicated the constraining and constricting role of strategic
cultures on elites.
From the outset, Kupchan states that his aim is to move away from an
extensive focus on material notions of power and relax assumptions of state
rationality. Instead the emphasis is on probing the beliefs that inform elites and
the domestic forces that constrain how elites react.72 Kupchan's hypothesis
involves the contention that great powers pursue self-defeating behaviour
because state vulnerability causes elites to become entrapped in a strategic
culture of their own making. Three time periods are used to plot this scenario:
In time period one, elites are pushed towards extremist and overly competitive
policies as a result of prevailing uncertainty and vulnerability. In time period
two, elites propagate images and conceptions within the body politic that will
generate support for these aims. As a result, attitudes and perceptions are
instrumentally altered. However, by time period three, the state is experiencing
the ill-effects of its extremist stance and is faced with strategic over-expansion.
While a rational strategic response to this situation would be to follow a policy
of retrenchment and diplomacy, elites find themselves entrapped within the
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28strategic culture that they themselves initially created and which restricts
strategic adjustment. Kupchan thus identifies a situation where the
instrumental use of strategic culture leads to adjustment failures and the
creation of an intellectual paradigm that overrides strategic logic in the long
term.
One observation that can be made from the work of those interested in the
issue of instrumentality is that while states appear superficially to speak
different strategic culture languages, operation is essentially similar. For
Klein, this operation merely reflects the interests of the hegemonic political
order. However, this does raise a number of interesting questions: First, does
strategic culture operate simply at the level of myth, that merely serves to
legitimise policy-making or can we identify instances where there is no
disjuncture between attitude and behaviour? Second, do elites make a
conscious decision to act instrumentally or is this a semi-conscious, culturally
dependent act in itself? Finally, where does this leave the issue of cross-
national comparison?
Luckham's analysis appears to suggest the existence of an armament culture
in all globalised industrial countries. Equally, it could be inferred from Klein's
analysis that as the western strategic project attempts to extend it's influence
on a global level, then there is a potential for more states to be regenerated by
accentuating the "other-ness" of adversaries and through a culture of violence
that leads to a wholesale adoption of realpolitik policies. Johnston suggests,
that while the potential for cross-national comparison appears strong here, no
real efforts have been made within the literature to fulfil this task. This is
because "most of this work has not looked enough at comparative cases to
trace whether certain discourses and symbolic languages have actually
narrowed debate".73 Nevertheless, this second generation research into
strategic culture raises some important questions about the relationship
between strategic culture and behaviour.
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29Locating a Third Generation of Research?
Johnston has identified a "third generation" of research on strategic culture
that shows an awareness of the inadequacies of earlier work in this area. The
research of scholars in this wave is said to be both more rigorous and eclectic
in its approach, and more narrowly focused on the case of particular strategic
decisions.74 These writers are united in their challenge to realist theories, but
they do this by invoking a more diverse set of cultural variables including
organisational, military and political culture. Johnston suggests that while in
terms of definition, the third generation differs little from earlier expositions,
there is a distinction in the way this generation of writers look to more recent
cultural factors. As he points out, their preference has been to concentrate on
those variables that effect contemporary experience and practice.
A good example of third generation research is provided by Elizabeth Kier,
who has undertaken an analysis of the relationship between culture and
military doctrine, with specific reference to the case of France between WWI
and WWII.75 Kier's research is based on the premise that neither civilians nor
the military behaves as hypothesised by structural or functional analysis.
Instead "changes in military doctrine are best understood from a cultural
perspective".76This will "provide us with a better understanding of how states
choose between offensive and defensive military doctrines".77 Kier's work acts
as a challenge to writers who have argued that military organisations
inherently prefer offensive doctrines.78 Instead military organisations differ in
how they view the world, with organisational culture constraining choices
between offensive and defensive doctrines. Kier's thesis places particular
emphasis on the way organisational culture effects how the military responds
to the limitations imposed by civilian decision-makers; "domestic politics set
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30constraints; the military's culture interprets these constraints; the
organisational culture is the intervening variable between civilian decisions and
military doctrine".79 It is therefore necessary to consider the importance of
"political-military subcultures".80
How does Kier's discussion of organisational culture relate to the broader
notion of strategic culture? Kier describes organisational culture as "the set of
basic assumptions, values, norms, beliefs and formal knowledge that shape
collective understandings".81The idea of organisational culture shaping
perceptions and constraining interpretations appears compatible with
definitions of strategic culture. However, Kier argues that just as this is not a
reference to military mind and does not refer to a general set of attitudes that
all militaries share, we should not confuse organisational culture with strategic
culture. The former refers to particular military organisations, not to the beliefs
held by civilian policy-makers.
Kier suggests that while the military can be influenced by some aspects of the
wider culture, its powerful assimilation process can displace the influence of
the civilian society. This is not to suggest that the same military culture is
universal and homogenous across states. Rather it is necessary to consider
the idea of national military cultures, whose doctrinal preference will depend
on particular national circumstances. It would appear therefore that Kier is
attempting to move the focus away from strategic culture and towards the sub¬
culture of civil-military relations. This forces a return to the issue of definition.
Whereas Yitzhak Klein refers to strategic culture as the "attitudes and beliefs
held within a military establishment",82 Kier's definition deals with the attitudes
and assumptions prevalent in the civilian sector. Thus it would seem that what
is organisational military culture to Kier is strategic culture to Klein.
Elsewhere Jeoffrey Legro seeks to account for the role of military culture in
accounting for inadvertent escalation in WWII. Again, this is an attempt to
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31promote the importance of organisational culture. While the main theories
explaining inadvertence such as Clausewitz's theory of friction, the security
dilemma or organisational theory provide good predictions, Legro suggests
that organisational culture provides a better one.83
Legro also suggests that where specific means of warfare are compatible with
the dominant war-fighting culture of a state's military branches, then that state
will be more inclined towards actions that contribute to escalation. However,
when a type of warfare is antithetical to a state's military culture, then that
state will exercise restraint even in the event of provocative enemy activity.
Thus, "organisational culture leads to dynamics in use and restraint that are
not predicted by the randomness of friction, the security dilemma, or traditional
organisational theory".84 Legro's conceptualisation of organisational culture is
certainly not dissimilar to that of Kier. Furthermore, both stress the importance
of looking at culture as a collectively held phenomenon that cannot be reduced
to the level of the individual either in terms of those who guide military
organisations, or the belief systems of elites within the broader strategic
culture.
What does this "so-called" third generation literature contribute to research into
strategic culture? An obvious implication of Kier and Legro's research is that it
is better to glean cultural evidence from the empirical realm and through an
analysis of organisational culture. However, this approach has a limited
potential in accounting for society-wide, culturally inclusive, civilian attitudes
towards the issue of military strategy. A more comprehensive account could be
given by examining socio-cultural influences on civilian policy-makers before
assessing how they interact with the military establishment in formulating
doctrine. Having done this it is then possible to establish when it is appropriate
to consider the impact of organisational culture at a purely military level.
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32A broader cultural analysis is provided by Thomas Berger who has
investigated the cases of Germany and Japan in relation to political-military
cultures.85 While realist theories may have predicted that Germany and Japan
would pursue large, defensive military forces having re-emerged as major
powers in the 196O's and 197O's, neither has sought to develop the military
capability commensurate with their burgeoning economic power. On the
contrary, Berger states that "they are profoundly ambivalent about any
increase in military power".86 He argues that this anti-militarism can be
explained by analysing the significance of the creation of national identities,
historical experience and domestic-institutional cultural context. Hence
although Germany and Japan have faced contrasting structural conditions and
appear socially distinct, similarities in their respective political-military cultures
result in similar strategic choices.
However, a fundamental problem remains: what about instances where
individuals or small groups of individuals appear to make the decisions that
guide strategy? Are these individuals socialised within the broader culture? It
is conceivable that the relevant individuals within a military organisation or as
part of the wider community will not be culturally reliable as units of analysis.
The prospect that these individuals may not reflect the prevailing culture,
downgrades the relevance of strategic and organisational culture.
Again it is necessary to return to the issue of definition. Elkins and Simeon
refer to culture as characteristic of groups, but not individuals: the latter have
ideas, values and beliefs and personalities rather than cultures.87 Kupchan
distinguishes between inference based suppositions (or beliefs) and image-
based conceptions. Strategic culture refers to popular attitudes, embedded
conceptions and national self-image. Thus we need to look at images and
symbols that shape how a polity conceives of national security to ascertain
societal strategic culture, before we deal with the intricacies of material
suppositions held by elites. It is important to investigate whether elites are
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Elkins and Simeon, op cit, p.127-145.socialised within the broader strategic culture and whether this is translated
into strategic beliefs that take root within the elite community.
Research that fails to distinguish between images and suppositions held within
the elite community and the conceptions held within the broader polity, will
according to Kupchan, be rendered analytically useless. Without
acknowledging this distinction it is impossible to ascertain whether a strong
and persistent strategic culture exists, to infuse the elite community with an all-
encompassing conception of national security or whether there is a disjuncture
between the two, suggesting a degree of instrumentality. By ignoring the issue
altogether, the third generation of strategic culture might deprive itself of some
valuable insights.
Much of the third generation research outlined above, can also be found in
Peter Katzenstein's edited volume, The Culture of National Security.88 Its
contributors are in agreement that the dominance of realist theories in the
study of national security is unwarranted. They argue that ideational, rather
than material factors explain particular national security policies. As Kier,
Rosen and Legro indicate, this research provides a fresh impetus towards
explaining old empirical puzzles and in a way that re-asserts the centrality of
culture in explaining trends in international relations. However beyond this
initial premise, the contributors do not appear to advance an alternative theory
of national security, and have no agreed theoretical framework on which to
base their work.89 This leads to questions about how much can be expected
from strategic culture in terms of analysing strategic outcomes and whether
such research can actually provide better insights than those that have
previously taken as given.
The Katzenstein volume provides evidence of the distinct lack of coherence
within the culturalist programme, which may undermine its potential as an
alternative to realist theories. While Kier examines organisational culture,
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34Johnston and Thomas Berger identify national cultural trends while Martha
Finnemore, Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald look at the way global cultural
norms affect state behaviour. Distinct ontological differences are evident here.
Hence, as Desch argues, the new strategic culturalists have been so pre¬
occupied with their challenge to realism that they have largely ignored very
important differences within their own camp.90 It is also apparent that some
cultural approaches are closer to realist theories than they are to other cultural
accounts. For example, some globalist cultural accounts bear closer
resemblance to structural realist approaches than to cultural accounts that
stress domestic cultural and ideational factors.
The question this raises is whether these cultural assessments, based at
different levels of analysis, are as "potentially contradictory" as Desch implies.
Farrell argues that there is a similar trend in realist discourse, which he
suggests exhibits many "contradictory predictions about state behaviour".91
Farrell suggests that it is "perfectly legitimate for a research program to contain
theories that make contradictory predictions".92 The concept of strategic
culture offered in this chapter refers to that at the level of the state. This is
based on an assumption that military strategy is still the preserve of states and
their respective security communities. However this should not lead to a
neglect of trans-national or global cultural norms, which undoubtedly will have
a marked effect on state behaviour. Rather, the aim should be to uncover the
processes by which global cultural norms are internalised by particular states
and how states and societies subsequently reconstitute these external
cultures.
It is this inter-subjective, mutually constitutive relationship between cultures at
different levels that requires the attention of culturalists in IR. By accepting that
strategic cultures exist within states, but that these strategic cultures have a
mutually constitutive relationship with external cultures, scholars can become
more attuned to the enduring relevance of culture at a multiplicity of levels.
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35Desmond Ball provides an account of strategic culture in the Asia-Pacific,
where he lists a number of regional strategic cultural tendencies.93 While there
is a danger in making regional generalizations that restrict the possibility of
national differences, research should progress through exploring the
relationship between regional, global and national cultures.
The Issue of Methodology
Devising a workable method for identifying the existence and possible
influence of a strategic culture in effecting strategic outcomes is not a simple
task. Because of the many competing conceptualisations of strategic culture
there is minimal agreement within the literature on how to devise a framework
for analysis. Nevertheless, Macmillan and Booth have sought to provide an
analytical framework, which they use to identify strategic cultures in the Asia-
Pacific region.94 From the outset, the authors state that they do not perceive
cognitive orientations as determining strategic behaviour. Rather these are
thought to play a role in "shaping" the margin of choice that is left for the
structure of the situation. This suggests the authors are searching for a
modest role for strategic culture. However, by using sophisticated theorising,
they argue that there is a potential for strategic culture to describe, explain and
forecast strategic behaviour.
Macmillan and Booth do not appear to advance an explicit theory of strategic
culture. In contrast Johnston seeks to develop a sophisticated theory of
strategic culture in order to investigate whether culture (at least in the realm of
strategy) can be rescued from its traditional status as a residual variable.95ln
order to attain this goal, two issues require attention: first, it must be
established whether strategic culture exists across time and across actors
within a society, in such a way that it may constitute a dominant variable in
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36decision-making; second, one must determine whether strategic culture affects
behaviour.
To be successful, Johnston acknowledges that at the very least he needs to
show that strategic culture limits in some way the options considered. The best
way of achieving this is to trace strategic culture "from its sources, through the
socialisation process, to the values and assumptions held by particular
decision-makers".96
This involves establishing exactly what objects are to be used in order to
identify a strategic culture and how to analyse them. The amount of potential
objects of analysis that could be used is enormous, even when examining a
short historical period. Johnston suggests that the most useful objects are
likely to be writings, debates, thoughts and words from so-called "culture
bearing units" such as strategists, military leaders, security elites, weapons
designs, media images of war, military ceremonies and military literature.97lf
the preference rankings are congruent across these objects of analysis and
across time, then strategic culture is strong and persistent.
How might these strategic cultural objects of analysis be analysed? Johnston
pursues the use of cognitive mapping which is "designed to capture the causal
assertions of a person with respect to a particular policy decision and generate
the consequences that follow from this structure".98By using this method, the
researcher is then able "to uncover deeper causal arguments that may be
obscured by the surface logics and perfunctory language."99 Ultimately these
cognitive maps might be compared across texts, in order to establish the
possibility of congruence.
To supplement this methodology, Johnston looks to incorporate symbol
analysis. The importance of symbols is widely acknowledged in the field of
political science. Charles Elder and Roger Cobb suggest that symbols may be
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37regarded as "important and characteristic elements of a political culture" by
giving "definition to a political community, indexing common understanding and
relatively stable patterns of reference".100 Symbols are important to an analysis
of strategic culture, simply because they are socially recognised objects of
more or less common understanding.101 What sort of symbols might the
researcher seek to identify? Johnston suggests that we should look for
"frequently used idioms or phrases which are axiomatically accepted as valid
descriptions of a strategic content, (e.g 'if you want peace, prepare for
war')".102 Equally, it is important to look for key words which take on a
behavioural meaning, for example "diplomacy", or "deterrence".
Johnston concludes that a methodology which is inclusive when choosing
symbols, and corroborates these findings through the use of cognitive maps,
will reveal much about the existence of strategic culture.103 However, caution
is urged in assuming a direct link between strategic culture and strategic
behaviour. Johnston prescribes three steps for testing the relationship
between strategic culture and behaviour. The first is to test for the congruence
between preference rankings across objects of analysis in the formative time
period; second, it is necessary to compare preference rankings in a sample of
documents (for example) taken from the decision process in the period of
interest and then to compare these with the original objects of analysis. Third,
it is necessary to test for the effects of elites' preference rankings on politico-
military behaviour.
This final step raises a number of issues. It is necessary to control for the
effects of non-cultural variables. Strategic culture may simply provide a range
of tendencies, but another intervening variable "determines which tendency
kicks in and when".104Thus exogenous conditions determine when and how a
certain strategic culture becomes dominant. It would be possible to test the
importance of the strategic culture by holding the exogenous variable constant
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38across all cases and varying the strategic culture to determine the
independent effects of the latter.
As indicated earlier, the issue of separating cultural and non-cultural variables
is a problematic one. Johnston remains resolute on this point, because he is
concerned with developing a coherent method with which to show that
strategic culture can determine strategic choice. This can be gleaned from his
reply to Gray's "strategic culture as context" argument: "if my definition of and
methodological approach to strategic culture are so flawed, so utterly
mistaken, then my empirical findings must surely be wrong?.... but how would
Professor Gray know if they were wrong empirically if not by testing for the
effects of an alternative strategic culture on behaviour ?"105
The ultimate objective of Johnston's strategic culture methodology, is to move
towards cross-national comparison. If states share common strategic
behaviours then this is not a result of structural forces but rather because
states share similar historical and cultural experiences that lead to a common
process of identity creation.106
The implication of this conclusion is that in order to establish how a strategic
culture is created it is necessary to consider the way in which states are
socially constructed. It is within this context that Johnston considers the
construction of group identities, or "in-groups" and "out-groups". Those states
exhibiting strong "in-group" identification will be inclined towards realpolitik
characteristics. In contrast, states which exhibit relatively weak in-group
characteristics will be more pacific in their external relations. These
observations are supported by Alexander Wendt's argument that anarchy is
shaped by the way that states identify themselves, with realpolitik strategic
cultures being a product of the way in which states are constructed socially.107
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39In Johnston's case, the example of China is used to illustrate how state
formation biases strategic cultures towards realpolitik strategies. However, he
maintains that within Chinese military thought there are two strategic cultures.
The first derives from the Confucian-Mencian paradigm, which places non¬
violent, accommodationist grand strategies before violent offence or defence.
This train of thought can be identified with those classic Chinese military texts,
which reflect this stress on harmony, virtue, order and righteousness. The
second strategic culture, as identified by Johnston, derives from the
parabellum paradigm which places an emphasis on the use of forceful and
offensive strategy. This paradigm "characterises the environment as
dangerous, adversaries as dispositional^ threatening, and conflict as zero
sum".108 It is this second strategic culture that has mostly dominated Chinese
strategic thinking according to Johnston, as illustrated by a high frequency of
state violence in Chinese history. In effect, the operative element of Chinese
strategic culture does not differ radically from the Western realpolitik
tradition.109
A Theory of Strategic Culture?
Most writers appear to embark upon theoretical research into strategic culture
with an assessment of where it might be situated vis-a-vis realist theories. This
might be inevitable given the continuing predominance of realist theories in
strategic studies. Many culturalists have been looking towards empirical
casework to refute realist explanations and re-assert the centrality of culture in
explaining national security policy.110 Yet critics such as Desch consider this a
wholly inappropriate endeavour: Desch argues that,
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40"when cultural theories are assessed using evidence from the real world, there
is no reason to think that they will relegate realist theories to the dustbin of
social science history. The best case that can be made for these new cultural
theories is that they are sometimes useful as a supplement to realist
theories".111
Desch suggests that part of the reason why cultural theorizing will not supplant
realist theories is that it typically involves a selection of cases that "do not
provide crucial tests that enable us to distinguish which theories are better".112
This has led to a debate between Desch and a number of writers from within
the culturalist programme, as to whether culture provides the researcher with
more explanatory potential than realist theories.113
How fruitful are comparisons between strategic culturaiism and realism likely
to be? Three issues need to be addressed when answering this question.
First, attempts to assess the relationship between strategic culturaiism and
realism must confront the difficult question of what constitutes a realist
explanation. Within the realist camp there are significant differences such that
it is impossible to identify any one explanation as typical of a "realist" account,
to then be compared against strategic culture explanations.114 Furthermore,
many realist approaches might be seen as offering accounts, which are not
necessarily acultural.115
Second, the conceptualisation of strategic culture offered in this chapter does
not refute a realist ontology: strategic culturalists focus on states as the main
organisers and exercisers of power in the form of military force, in international
politics. As a result many strategic culturalists might also consider themselves
to be realists. Colin Gray pursues a strategic culture approach while
simultaneously attaching significant importance to material factors such as
geography and weapons technology in a way that is likely to satisfy many self-
professed realists.116 Thus, there might be some considerable overlap
between strategic cultural and realist approaches.
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41Third, realist theories typically use a positivist epistemology, which implies that
truth is pre-existent and that it is the task of the researcher to
uncover it. Positivists seek to arrive at an objective truth through reason and
with the use of scientific evidence. Realist theories thus seek objective truths
about international relations through the accumulation of empirical evidence,
which can then be used as a causal theory to universally explain and predict
state behaviour.
A strategic culture approach seeks to identify the collective ideas that shape
states' understanding of objective material conditions. The principal concern
therefore is to show how strategy is culturally constructed. Considerable
attention has been given to the emergence of "constructivist" research in IR
theory, although there is broad disagreement as to what it should involve.
Richard Price and Christian Reus-Smit argue that in general, constructivists
advance three propositions. First, the importance of normative and ideational
structures as well as material structures; second, the role of identity in the
constitution of interests and action; third, the mutual constitution of agents and
structures.117
However, beyond the slogan, "ideas and discourse matter"118 there is a lack of
consensus as to how constructivism should be used within IR research.
Considerable attention has been given to the many different variants of
constructivism advanced, with a number of writers attempting to categorise
various strands of research. For the purposes of this chapter it might be useful
to invoke Ted Hopfs distinction between "conventional" and "critical"
constructivist approaches, while acknowledging the potential pitfalls of
rigorously attempting to bracket and label particular accounts.
Hopf suggests that, to the extent that constructivism distances itself
epistemologically from its origins in critical theory, it becomes "conventional"
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42constructivism.1 ^Conventional constructivists deny an interpretivist
methodology, preferring instead to commit themselves to "mainstream",
"conventional" or "normal" social science academic research. John Ruggie
refers to a similar category of research when discussing "neo-classical
constructivism" which he suggests maintains a "commitment to social science-
albeit one more plural and more social than that espoused in mainstream
theories".120 An example of this sort of research might be found in The Culture
of National Security where it is suggested that the contributing authors deny
"any special interpretivist methodology".121 Writers such as Johnston, Kier,
Legro and Berger appear to use positivist research methodologies and
epistemologies in their cultural accounts. Johnston in particular seems eager
to devise a methodological framework that would satisfy the stipulations of
positivist social science.122
In contrast, "critical" constructivist approaches use a constitutive epistemology
and reject a positivist methodology. For these critical theorists the aim is not to
ascertain how certain identities imply certain actions, but rather to elucidate
the myths, which underlie this identity formation, hence challenging the notion
of a naturalized truth. At the extreme end of critical or "radical" constructivist
discourse are post-positivists, who seek to deconstruct the notion that there
are any foundations for knowledge. For post-positivists the task is to
deconstruct and "de-naturalize" the proposition that there are universal
truths.123 Hence these writers shun the sovereign stance of judgement in
favour of "unmasking" the power relations that are integral to discursive
practices.
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43are certainly at pains to distance themselves from conventional constructivist
research which are considered to be nothing more than masked rationalism
and positivism.125 As Mark Neufeld suggests, "the debate within the camp of
(constructivists) may prove to be as vigorous as that between (them) and their
positivist critics". However, Bradley Klein's discussion of strategic culture
indicates that post-positivist constructivist approaches provide some valid
insights that should not be ignored.
Klein's concern is with the realist assumptions on which strategic studies is
based, namely that states are taken for granted as the prime and legitimate
actors in the strategic realm. For Klein, the notion of the "states-system" and
"the West" are not universal truths but are cultural constructs. The important
question to ask is: how have they acquired their meaning? Klein's strategic
culture approach is therefore concerned with how strategic concepts are
constructed by elites for their own ends, thereby uncovering the cultural use of
power by hegemonic states.127
It might be possible to apply the conventional/critical dichotomy in
constructivism to strategic culture research. Hence there are conventional and
critical strategic culturalists. Johnston's conventional strategic culture
approach is geared towards offering a positivist cultural challenge to realist
theories.128 The critical strategic culture approach of Klein is geared
specifically towards exposing the distinction between ideas and behaviour in
strategy and more generally towards deconstructing the notion that there are
universal truths and explanations as implied by realist theories.
Most strategic culture approaches appear to share a common dissatisfaction
with realist theories, yet differ in how they seek to make comparisons. The
approach favoured for this thesis is a modest one, which cuts a middle path
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44between conventional and critical conceptions of strategic culture.129 How
suitable would such a conception of strategic culture research be in providing
a theory to challenge realist explanations? Emanuel Adler suggests that
"constructivism, unlike realism or liberalism is not a theory of politics per se".130
Ted Hopf argues that if constructivism is a theory, then "it is a theory of
process, not substantive outcome. In order to achieve the latter, constructivism
must adopt some theory of politics to make it work".131 Hence constructivist
strategic culture might provide insights, and can illuminate important features
of strategic decision-making, but it cannot provide a theory to universally
explain the causes behind identity constructions. Strategic culture might
therefore be considered as an approach rather than a theory.
In utilising a constructivist approach, it is possible to question a number of
assumptions often made by realist theories. Constructvism has frequently
been used to deconstruct the notion of "rationality" commonly employed in
realist explanations of state behaviour which assume states to be unitary
actors with fixed preferences that are exogenously determined.132 A
constructivist would seek to understand how preferences are formed by
uncovering endogenously constructed identities. These identities are based on
inter-subjective beliefs and shared or collective understandings that mutually
constitute agents and structures.
A constructivist strategic culture approach also allows the researcher to
dispute explanations that rely exclusively on a rationalist materialist ontology.
States are not identical and do not respond to material constraints in the same
way. To assume they do is to ignore the relevance of national distinctiveness
and cultural context which shape the way in which material factors are
interpreted. States may possess different identities such that strategies cannot
be pre-supposed simply by considering material factors.
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45By rejecting a materialist ontology, strategic culture can offer us little more in
terms of explanatory theory. This is because one cannot use a causative
theory to explain the construction of particular identities and strategic cultures.
To establish strategic culture as a substantive explanatory theory of strategic
culture, it would be necessary to identify the causal mechanisms that give
social structures constitutive effects and to account for the process whereby a
cultural identities are translated into strategic outcomes. What is missing here
is a cover-all general theory that is applicable in all states at all times, and that
will satisfy the "if-then" stipulation implicit to positivist social science.
Realist theorists might argue that although ideational approaches may have
described what a strategic culture might look like, they are unable to establish
that these ideational factors are more than epiphenomenal to anarchical
material structure. Those focusing on strategic culture can offer responses to
this argument. Johnston promotes the use of a critical test between material
and ideational explanation, whereupon one derives additional but opposite
empirical predictions from these alternative explanations and then investigates
which additional predictions can be proved empirically. An alternative
response, (and one advocated in this chapter) is take the emphasis away from
the issue of causality and consider the way in which cultural and ideational
factors constitute the material structure.
Wendt suggests that constitutive approaches account for the property of
things by reference to the structures in virtue of which they exist: "the
relationship between the factors constituting the social kind 'Cold War' and a
Cold War is one of identity in the sense that those factors define what a Cold
War is, not one of causal determination".133 Thus the factors which constituted
the Cold War, did not exist independent of it, nor did they precede it in time,
rather when they came into being, so the Cold War came into being.134 In
other words, material factors in themselves tell us nothing about states'
strategy, unless we identify the constitutive ideas that condition them.
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46Ruggie supports the case for constitutive analysis. He suggests that ideational
factors simply do not function causally in the same way as brute material
factors: ideas fall into a category of "reasons for action, which are not the
same as causes for actions".135 Ruggie continues, "thus the aspirations for a
United Europe has not caused European integration as such, but it is the
reason causal factors (presumably bipolarity and economic interests) have
had their specific effect".136
Hence strategic culture as constitution should be seen less in terms of
supplementing or supplanting realist theories, and more in terms of
constituting its materialist assumptions. The importance of strategic culture
comes in challenging realist explanations of choice that describe ahistorical,
acultural calculations of interests by states that act purely in response to
material constraints. The principal aim should thus be to explore the "cultural
conditions of possibility" for realist theories.
Realist theories typically predict that inter-state relations are inherently
conflictual. Kenneth Waltz argues that "in the absence of an external authority,
a state cannot be sure that today's friend will not be tomorrow's enemy".
This reference to the causal effects of international anarchy and the propensity
for states to pursue "self-help" strategies, can be found in many realist
explanations and implies that strategic preferences are determined by
immutable external forces.
A strategic culture approach opens up the possibility that states may well
interpret the external environment in culturally similar ways, such that
strategies are ultimately similar. Johnston has used social identity theory to
show how group identities rest inherently on differentiation with outgroups.
This differentiation forms the basis for competition and mistrust that leads to
realpolitik behaviour as illustrated by the Chinese parabellum and the Afrikaner
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47laager strategic cultures. For Johnston, these socially generated effects of
uncertainty provide the link, frequently made by realists, between anarchy and
arming. Hence anarchy leads to realpolitik strategic behaviour because of the
production of "fear and loathing" between groups, not because of anarchy
itself. As Wendt suggests,
"the distribution of power may always affect states' calculations, but how it
does so depends on the inter-subjective understandings and expectations, on
the 'distribution of knowledge,' that constitute their conceptions of self and
other".138
Hence states may engage in hostile relations as a result of the construction of
domestic group identities which are inherently "oppositional" or
"confrontational". Peaceful inter-state relations may emerge in the event states
possessing cooperative, "non-oppositional" identities. As identities and
strategic cultures change, so the potential boundaries of strategic behaviour
are liable to change. Theories that assume strategic outcomes to be
determined by immutable external forces such as international anarchy may
therefore be insufficient.
Conclusion
The appeal of a strategic culture approach appears obvious. As Colin Gray
has emphasised, states will confront "distinctive geo-strategic problems
through the prisms of their individual historical circumstances, and with unique
sets of assets and liabilities, will make somewhat individual choices".139 Hence
this chapter has sought to re-assert the relevance and value of strategic
cultural research.
However, this chapter has advanced the proposition that it is unlikely that a
strategic cultural theory can be devised in order to explain how strategic
culture causes particular strategic outcomes. Having conducted a review of the
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48strategic culture literature it appears that writers differ in how to approach this
issue and as a result offer a diverse and non-cumulative body of research.
Consequently this thesis does not seek to provide cumulative and causal
knowledge of the case studies through the use of a theory of strategic culture.
Instead an attempt will be made to offer broad or "thick" strategic cultural
descriptions of each case by highlighting particular tendencies and pre¬
dispositions.
At a minimum, a strategic culture approach should be used to expose the
inadequacies of explanations of strategic choice, which fail to account for
culture. Typically this involves confronting the assumptions of realist theories.
Many strategic culturalists take this as a starting point, but then proceed at a
tangent, with some writers offering ambitious predictions about strategic
culture's potential as an alternative to realist theories.
Strategic culture allows the researcher to uncover the cultural assumptions
made by realist theories, which focus on the primacy of material factors.
Without attending to the cultural context in which strategic communities
approach the material environment, few meaningful insights can be gleaned.
Equally, states should not be seen as undifferentiated rational actors as many
realist theories assume. States are potentially comprised of multiple cultures
and sub-cultures which lead to distinctive strategic preferences. A strategic
culture approach should not seek to overly focus on any one cultural level or
undermine the possibility of significant cultural overlap.
A number of the analyses discussed in this chapter treat strategic culture as
referring to military doctrine and style and as a result, equate strategic culture
specifically to military organizational culture. While this may be an integral
element of strategic culture it is necessary to also consider broader cultural
influences. Strategic communities do not operate in a cultural vacuum.
Broader national and/ or societal cultural influences may reflect military
strategic decision-making. Furthermore, while this thesis is concerned with
49national strategic cultures, it does not preclude the possibility of external
cultural influences.
The next step for strategic culturalists might be to draw comparisons between
different strategic cultures. For Johnston, the possibility of making cross-
national cultural comparisons may strengthen the case for arguing that a
strategic culture account can be used in all cases to explain outcomes. If
strategic culture could be used to universally explain cross-national cultural
differentiation then its credentials as a theory may be enhanced. Yet the
question remains: how can a theory be devised to explain the emergence of
different cultures across cases?
Elsewhere, cultural comparisons have been used to explore the possibility of
cross-cultural dialogue. For example Krause has investigated the importance
of cross-cultural dialogue in promoting multilateral non-proliferation, arms
control and disarmament (NACD) policies and practices. However, as Krause
acknowledges, "any attempt to frame general conclusions runs into the basic
point about security culture (and cultural influences in general): all
achievements in NACD and security building are contextual and all policy
initiatives must be tailored to local circumstances and requirements".140
Making cultural comparisons can thus be difficult. The issues and questions
that arise in different states (or organizations, societies, regions) are liable to
be culturally contextual, such that comparisons become problematic. Equally,
the overlapping nature of cultural boundaries makes it difficult to identify a
culture, as distinct from another, and then to compare the two. Equally, the
capacity for cultures to undergo change and transformation should not be
underestimated. Yet at a minimum, strategic culturalists should seek to identify
persisting or recurring cultural trends that do not change without major
disruption. Having done so, the task will be to investigate the interaction of
multiple cultures as different levels.
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50As a result of particular historical experiences and cultural development, states
may exhibit distinctive military strategies, which might allow the researcher
tomake subtle comparisons. Yet this should not preclude the possibility that
the strategies of different states may be similar, since states may be socially
and culturally constructed in similar ways. The point is that strategy is not
universally explained by material factors alone. Instead, it is necessary to
consider the cultural dimension. Krause suggests that "between the poles of
'culture is everything' and 'culture is irrelevant' lies a wide middle ground in
which a whole host of 'cultural' factors may be at work".141 It is in this 'middle
ground' that a strategic culture approach may be best situated.
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51Chapter Three: Australia
Introduction
Research into examples of states that have disavowed nuclear weapons options,
typically focuses on a series of well-documented cases. The case of Australia, as
a possible nuclear proliferant, is virtually unknown amongst proliferation analysts
and has attracted almost no theoretical attention. Three possible reasons might
be presented for this: first, a belief in the enduring significance of political,
technical and strategic barriers to proliferation; second, a scepticism as to
Australian motivation to acquire nuclear weapons and third, a lack of documentary
evidence on which to base a proliferation story. Furthermore, Australia's current
international standing with regard to non-proliferation matters and its public
disapproval of nuclear weapons as a feature of global politics, might explain the
minimal regard shown to the Australian case.
However, with the recent release of historical nuclear policy documents in
Australia, and the emergence of research into the so-called "surprise down
under", fresh impetus has been given to the need for a more rigorous analysis of
the Australian case.1 Indeed, there is every reason to suspect that, for a time, a
number of key decision-makers within the Australian elite advocated the
acquisition of a nuclear deterrent against perceived strategic threats in the Asia-
Pacific region. This chapter seeks to confirm the belief that the pursuit of an
Australian nuclear weapons capability remained an open issue throughout the late
195O's and 1960's, with a number of prominent individuals pushing Australia
towards a weapons option. Crucially, an attempt will be made to gain insights into
the question of why a weapons option was rejected and remains a closed issue
today.
1
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52Recent analyses offered by Jim Walsh and Jacques Hymans offer encouraging
insights into the role of ideas in accounting for Australia's nuclear restraint and in
a manner which challenges realist theories which focus purely on external
material factors.2 This chapter seeks to confirm the relevance of culture to
Australian strategic decision-making. The focus will be on identifying the strategic
culture that shaped and gave meaning to material conditions facing decision¬
makers and which eventually led to a rejection of nuclear weapons. Ultimately, an
attempt will be made to identify the weaknesses of traditional explanations, which
account for the Australian decision-making by focusing purely on material
conditions. By utilising a strategic culture approach, the aim will be to outline the
cultural conditions of possibility that constitute the material structure which realists
rely on for explanation.
So what comprises Australian strategic culture? Identifying the cultural milieu
which underpins how Australia perceives itself in the world involves an
investigation into formative historical experiences and cultural development.
Specifically, it is necessary to consider the cultural prism or lens through which
the Australian elite came to view its strategic environment and which shaped the
contours of nuclear decision-making. In Alan Renoufs words, Australia has
traditionally been a "frightened country", suffering a sense of isolation as a
Western colony within an Asian theatre. Australian strategic culture has thus
shaped a need to remain close to "Great and Powerful Friends" in order to
guarantee its security.3 The need for Australia to retain its position within a
Western strategic alliance reflects a broader "dependency", which has inhibited
the relative development of a distinct national consciousness and cultural
distinctiveness. Australian nationalism and cultural independence are far more
prevalent as we enter into the 21st Century, yet this should not disguise the slow
and stumbling process whereby Australia has sought to establish its own identity.
In terms of locating the relevant period during which Australian nuclear weapons
2
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53were considered, it is necessary to focus on the 195O's and 1960's. Yet as will
become clear, it is possible to identify a number of cultural themes that have
prevailed both before, during and after this period. Whilst an argument will be
advanced as to the changing nature of Australian strategic culture during the
197O's, it is still possible to identify a set of core cultural pre-dispositions which
have been influential in shaping strategic perceptions and assumptions from the
18th Century to the present-day.
Three interlocking themes will be investigated here: first, the notion of Australia as
a "frightened country"; second, the Australian need for "great and powerful
friends"; third, the development after 1972, of a distinct and independent
Australian national identity. Attention to these sequential themes will provide a
good understanding of the ideas which shaped how Australia viewed its nuclear
options and in a way that challenges accounts which rely exclusively on rational
responses to material conditions. Undoubtedly, Australian threat perceptions
which led to a consideration of a weapons option correlated to its international
and regional situation. Yet these externalities tell us almost nothing without an
investigation into the culture and ideas that make them meaningful. In this sense,
strategic culture can provide us with some valuable new insights into the 'surprise
down under'.
Australian Nuclear History
Nuclear Energy and British Atomic tests
Following WWII, subsequent Australian governments became interested in the
opportunities presented by atomic energy and the possibility of contributing to a
Commonwealth atomic project. Atomic energy was considered important, "not
only because of its military applications but because of the vast industrial
possibilities, so important to a country which was believed to have no indigenous
54oil and limited coal".4 Australia possessed large deposits of natural uranium and
thus the establishment of a uranium mining industry quickly became a priority,
with the dual aim of selling uranium abroad and of exchanging uranium for foreign
nuclear technology. Roy Macleod argues that it is possible to consider Australia's
early interest in atomic energy "in terms of the optimism and opportunism of a
small group of political leaders, mining interests, scientific administrators and
nuclear physicists".5 The latter included the so-called "nuclear knights"
- Sir Leslie
Martin, Sir Philip Baxter, Sir Ernest Titterton and Sir Mark Oliphant.6 Wayne
Reynolds, suggests that Prime Minster Chifley received crucial advice from
Oliphant in 1946, which prompted work on a nuclear power project in Australia
with British assistance.7
The Federal Government established a number of nuclear advisory bodies and
promoted limited research into nuclear physics at the Australian National
University, which was close to the projected centre of the nuclear power industry,
the Snowy Mountains scheme.8 In 1947, the government co-opted State
assistance to prosecute a vigorous uranium search resulting in the discovery in
1949 of substantial uranium ore deposits at Radium Hill and Rum Jungle in the
Northern Territory.
In 1952, the Australian Atomic Energy Commission (AAEC) was established as a
statutory body responsible for operations in all fields of nuclear energy. As Jim
Green suggests, this constituted part of an attempt to reorganise scientific and
nuclear institutions and advisory bodies in anticipation of nuclear co-operation
with the UK.9 Essentially the AAEC was "entrusted with the task of promoting the
4
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55discovery, mining, treatment and sale of uranium; operating and constructing
plant for the liberation and conversion of atomic energy; and the training of
scientific researchers".10 With funding from the federal government and the
support of the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Agency (UKAEA) the AAEC began
construction of a research reactor at Lucas Heights in 1954. The reactor was a 10
MW heavy-water, high-flux materials testing reactor (HIFAR), with enriched fuel
rods supplied by the UKAEA. The HIFAR reactor, located at Lucas Heights, went
critical on "Australia Day" in 1958 and was in operation by 1960.
Australia hoped that it could offer a genuine contribution to a Commonwealth
atomic project, thus strengthening the imperial alliance. This was to be pursued in
conjunction with a high level of co-operation in defence planning, referred to as
the "Joint Project", which began with the testing of rockets at Woomera in
February 1946.11 Britain's desire to co-operate with the Australians appears to
have been genuine, but was ultimately frustrated by British commitments to the
United States, specifically the Quebec Agreement (1943) and later the modus
vivendi of 1948.12 Furthermore, the US appears to have been concerned about
Australian security arrangements with regard to nuclear information.
Nonetheless, Australia continued to strengthen her strategic partnership with
Britain as was illustrated in the early 195O's by Prime Minster Menzies' agreement
to British proposals to conduct nuclear weapons tests in Australia. The first atomic
test was held in 1952 on Monte Bello Island, off the coast of Western Australia,
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56with subsequent tests conducted at Emu Field and Maralinga in South Australia.
The British continued with nuclear weapons tests at Maralinga until 1963.13
Why did Menzies consent to British tests in Australia? For "traditionalists" such as
Menzies, Australian and British security policies were inextricable: one was
merely an extension of the other. The hosting of British nuclear weapons tests
was thus seen as a demonstration of Australia's support for the British crown as
well as a commitment to inter-Commonwealth co-operation. But Australia's loyalty
to Britain also possessed an element of self-interest: with the emergence of
regional communist threats in the early 1950's, most notably in China, Australia
came to rely on "great and powerful friends" for defence. By hosting the weapons
test in addition to continuing defence co-operation at Woomera, Menzies sought
to perpetuate the Anglo-Australian defence alliance.
Was Australian co-operation in this area motivated by a desire to gain access to
nuclear weapons information and technology? There does not appear to be a
definitive answer to this question. Green argues that Menzies acquiesced to the
British tests partly out of a hope that Australia would gain some nuclear expertise
in return; Cawte suggests that the Australian government saw the tests as part of
an intuitive if not contractual reciprocal arrangement; Reynolds on the other hand
argues that Menzies decision to allow the tests was driven by a desire to obtain
nuclear weapons.14
Procuring Nuclear Weapons
Material now released indicates that calls for the acquisition of nuclear weapons
first arose in Australia during the mid-195O's.15 Weapons proponents anticipated
that nuclear weapons would spread in a similar way to conventional weaponry
13
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57and would therefore soon become a standard feature of modern defence. Support
for the nuclear option was evident within conservative Democratic Labour Party
and Liberal Party circles; defence officials, especially within the airforce and the
ministry of supply and personnel within the AAEC.16 Walsh suggests that the
actions of NATO countries appear to have had an impact on the nuclear issue in
Australia: "at the time the Australian Defence Committee made its original
recommendation to seek nuclear weapons, the United States had begun
stationing tactical nuclear weapons in Europe and a number of American allies
-
including Britain, France, Italy and West Germany
- were declaring their interest
in gaining greater access to nuclear weapons".17 Whilst it seemed highly unlikely
that the US would transfer nuclear weapons to Australia, the potential for some
form of "nuclear sharing" with its Western allies remained a possibility.
Nuclear advocates considered that if nuclear weapons were to become part of the
regular armoury of modern, advanced industrialised countries, then Australia
would need to keep pace in order to participate and contribute to its collective
security arrangements. Central to this equation was the suggestion that nuclear
weapons could be used in conflict situations. Reynolds points to an Australian
defence review conducted in June 1956 whereby an indication is given of the
need to prepare for both global and local wars and that "in such limited wars the
potential use of nuclear weapons cannot be excluded".18 This notion of "usability"
held added significance for Australia as its Western nuclear allies appeared to be
less inhibited in planning for the use of nuclear weapons in Asia as they did in
Europe.19
Faced with what it perceived to be an encroaching communist threat and with the
prospect of regional nuclear outbreak looming large, the Australian government
began to consider the possibility of gaining access to a nuclear capability. The
18
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58main thrust towards nuclear acquisition was provided by the defence
establishment, most notably the Royal Australian Airforce (RAAF), the AAEC and
the Ministry of Supply. In September 1956, Athol Townley, the minister for air
wrote to Defence Minister Philip Mcbride requesting nuclear weapons for the
RAAF. This was followed in November, by a Defence Committee meeting in which
it was suggested that "the effectiveness of all three Australian, services would be
considerably increased if they were equipped with low-yield kilo-ton nuclear
weapons".20
The suggestion was that Australia approach the British in the hope of securing
nuclear weapons transfers. Under pressure to investigate this possibility, Menzies
discussed the issue of the transfer of nuclear weapons with British Prime Minster
Harold Macmillan in a meeting in 1958, whereupon it became clear that the
United States wanted no new nuclear powers and therefore Britain could offer
information only.21 It is unclear how enthusiastic Menzies was on the question of
weapons acquisition. Both Cawte and Walsh remain doubtful about whether
Menzies was genuinely enthusiastic about a nuclear project. As a staunch
traditionalist Menzies preference was for the maintenance of the nuclear status
quo. However, according to Reynolds, Menzies became increasingly concerned
about nuclear weapons in the mid-1950s and as a result, "wanted nuclear
weapons for Australia".22
Walsh has suggested that British archival documents reveal that "the United
Kingdom was favourably disposed to Australian requests for assistance with
Nuclear Weapons".23 British sympathies might also have been a consequence of
more parochial interests including a desire to sell Australia British aircraft as
20
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59delivery systems.24 Britain was keen to strengthen its Commonwealth ties
wherever possible, however, it was also keen to avoid confrontation with the US,
and thus damage the potential for nuclear information sharing with its American
allies.25 As Arnold suggests, the British were constrained in supplying information
from the tests as a result of the "unquenchable hopes of renewed Anglo-American
partnership".26 If they felt they could not provide information on reactor
technology, then it was "impossible to tell them anything on atomic bombs".27
This situation was probably as frustrating for the British as it was the Australians:
Britain wanted to ensure access to supplies of uranium and was concerned about
the prospect of being excluded by closer Australian-American co-operation in this
area. Equally, Britain felt indebted to Australia for its assistance with weapons
testing. Having assisted with the Australian research reactor and with the joint
project proceeding at pace, Britain negotiated the Maralinga tests in 1956 on the
understanding that it would provide data on "the effects of atomic weapons for
both civil defence and military purposes".28
However the principal objective for Britain was to re-ignite Anglo-American
nuclear co-operation. The successful development of a British nuclear deterrent in
1956-1957 opened up the possibility of a renewal of nuclear relations with the US.
Following the Bermuda summit in March 1957, Britain was offered a limited
atomic partnership with the US which brought to an end the joint project and
began to limit its transfer of atomic information to Australia. The US was not
favourable towards Australian nuclear weapons. With the Soviet Union producing
and stockpiling its own nuclear weapons, the US were keen to begin non-
proliferation discussion with the Soviets, which involved confronting the problems
associated with the global diffusion of nuclear weapons technology. In July 1957,
24
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60Australia signed a defence agreement with the US and re-asserted its
requirement for the maintenance of a nuclear defence. The US agreed to assist
Australia with "passive" defence measures against atomic weapons, but made no
commitment to provide Australia with nuclear weapons.29
Nonetheless, by the late 195O's a small, yet committed "bomb lobby" had
emerged in Australia. In addition to sections of the Armed services, a number of
parliamentarians including liberals such as William Wentworth and the future
Prime Minster, John Gorton began offering support for nuclear acquisition.
Furthermore, the chief of the AAEC, Philip Baxter, was emerging as an
enthusiastic nuclear advocate. Baxter was frustrated in his efforts to promote a
reactor capable of producing weapons-grade piutonium. Weapons advocates fed
on Australia's Cold War paranoia concerning security threats, most notably the
prospect of a Chinese and an Indonesian nuclear capability.30 However, by 1959,
the Australian government appears to have succumbed to political reality and
recognised the intractable difficulties in acquiring nuclear weapons.31
Hymans has suggested that Menzies position changed somewhat in 1961,
following Macmillan's request for Australian support in pursuing a global nuclear
test ban. Menzies recommended to cabinet that Australia offer support only in
return for "recognition now of the United Kingdom's obligation to provide Australia,
if ever necessary, with a nuclear capability".32 In a subsequent letter to Macmillan,
Menzies offered a reminder that a "nuclear tests treaty" could prove to be a
"serious limitation on the range of decisions open to a future Australian
government".33 Hence Britain should agree to "the supply of ready-made
weapons".34
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61This represented a distinct change of approach: Australia was now seeking to
acquire "weapons on demand" by drawing on the UK's nuclear weapons stockpile
in the event of a deterioration of Australia's security environment. Can this be
seen as an explicit attempt to acquire an independent deterrent? Hymans argues
that this should be seen more as an indication of Australian concern and paranoia
over the credibility of the nuclear guarantees of Australia's allies.35
Hymans also raises the question of why Australia did not re-iterate its demands
when signing the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) in 1963. For Hymans this is
directly related to changing perceptions as to the existence of a Chinese nuclear
threat. Whereas in 1961, the Australian government acted upon pessimistic
predictions as to Chinese nuclear intentions, these fears had slightly receded by
1963, which would explain a lessening of Australia's nuclear demands on its
allies.36
An indigenous Nuclear Weapons Programme?
The testing of a Chinese nuclear device in October 1964 prompted a resurgent
paranoia amongst Australian defence analysts. Communist China was considered
to be potentially hostile to Australia. Chinese nuclearisation was thus used as a
strong argument by Australian weapons proponents, to justify nuclear acquisition.
Australian insecurities were further compounded in 1965, with suggestions of
Indonesian nuclear ambitions.37Australia's strategic position was to deteriorate
further with the British decision to withdraw all troops from East of Suez and
American disengagement from Vietnam. Australian sensitivities were also
accentuated by discussions in UN committees of arms control and non-
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62proliferation proposals. This presented the prospect of greater restrictions on
Australia's nuclear option.
From an Australian perspective, the prospect of British withdrawal coupled with
non-proliferation proposals, represented a severe double-blow. Following the
Chinese nuclear test, Australia turned once again to the question of acquiring its
own nuclear weapons. With the prospect of nuclear weapons transfers
floundering, certain sections within the Australian elite began to think in terms of
an indigenous nuclear programme.38 With Australia's security situation
deteriorating by 1965, the AAEC, together with the Department of Supply were
commissioned by the Government to investigate all aspects of Australia's policy
towards nuclear weapons and the possible costs of establishing a weapons
programme.
In 1966, the US requested that its safeguards arrangements with Australia be
submitted to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The then Prime
Minister Harold Holt, offered initial resistance to these proposals out of fear that
Australia's nuclear weapons option would be jeopardised.40 From a security
perspective, Australia felt weak and vulnerable and thus was unprepared to tackle
adversaries on its own and with conventional weapons. The traditional response
to this sense of insecurity was to look to "great and powerful friends". However,
with both the British and later the Americans turning their attention away from
Asia, the impulse to develop an independent nuclear capability was gathering
momentum.
The appointment of John Gorton as Prime Minister in December 1967, signalled a
crucial turning point in Australian nuclear policy. Gorton represented a departure
from the "traditionalism" of Menzies by embracing a more independent
"nationalist" outlook. Both Gorton and Baxter epitomised the popular Australian
38
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63nationalist perception of the external environment: paranoia of a resurgent Japan,
anxiety as to Indonesia's intentions and general fear of Chinese and Soviet
imperialism. More importantly, both were firm supporters of nuclear weapons
acquisition and in favour of enlarging Australia's indigenous nuclear capabilities.41
However, in 1968, Australia was asked to sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), thus renouncing all nuclear weapons options. While
conservatives in government urged Australian acquiescence on this issue, Gorton
showed a determination not to sign. According to Hymans, a Defence Committee
meeting in March 1968, "set the tone for a raging battle that was destined to last
for several years".42 David Jenkins notes that Cabinet Ministers had a four-page
costing of a possible nuclear weapons programme before them at this meeting,
which suggested that Australia possessed the independent capability to annually
produce upto thirty (20 KT) nuclear weapons, at an initial cost of $13 million per
annum, within seven years.43
Gorton's negative response to the NPT was supported by Baxter, who argued that
"this treaty could only be ineffective and would place 'non-nuclears', such as
Australia, in economic, technological and military bondage".44 Furthermore NPT
opponents argued that Australia would suffer financially through a retardation of
its nuclear development, its uranium trade and any further nuclear research and
development. In addition much was made of the need to maintain the capability
for peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) for civilian engineering projects.45
Whether there was any substance to these claims is open to debate. Ian Bellany
has argued that "these were arguments of not inconsiderable gall given the
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64rudimentary nature of Australia's nuclear programme".46 The more plausible
reason for Australian intransigence over the NPT was a desire to keep a nuclear
weapons option open. Gorton and Baxter favoured a policy of not signing the
NPT, while constructing an indigenous fuel cycle that would allow for the eventual
manufacture of nuclear weapons. The proposed cornerstone of this policy would
be a 500 MW nuclear power reactor at Jervis Bay on the New South Wales coast.
Baxter was adamant that the reactor should use either natural uranium or that an
additional enrichment facility be constructed, in order to avoid reliance on foreign
suppliers.
In addition, the government initiated a major project whereby PNEs would be
used to excavate a harbour off the northern coast of Western Australia at Cape
Kerauden. Both the Cape Kerauden project and the Government's delay in
signing the NPT, were driven by Baxter and the AAEC. The AAEC maintained a
near monopoly on the relevant technical expertise and thus went unchallenged in
decision-making circles, which remained closed to outside pressure. Officially,
there was "silence and evasion" concerning the prospects for nuclear weapons.47
Yet it seems highly likely that both Baxter and Gorton envisaged a dual-purpose
nuclear programme.
Nonetheless, in February 1970, Gorton announced that Australia would sign the
NPT. Officially, Gorton was still unfavourable towards the Treaty. At the time he
insisted that "we wish to make it plain that our decision to sign is not to be taken in
any way as a decision to ratify the treaty".48 Why did Gorton sign the NPT?
Numerous answers are possible.
Walsh suggests that particular provisions within the NPT, may have allowed for a
continuing nuclear option.49 This might imply that Gorton believed he could sign
48
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65but not be bound by the treaty, hence allowing for the further progression of the
nuclear programme. In effect Gorton's signature of the NPT may simply have
been a change of tactic which would allow for the continuation of the construction
of the new reactor at Jervis Bay.
However, the most likely explanation for Australia's NPT signature is the influence
exerted by the US. Gorton suggested to the British High Commissioner to
Canberra, Charles Johnston, that "he expected that both [the US and UK]
governments would try to "twist his arm off to get him to sign and ratify".50 Hymans
suggests that in reality there was very little American "arm-twisting" and that
President Nixon "resisted private entreaties for his intervention by Australian
government NPT supporters."51 Nevertheless, an Australian rejection of the NPT
raised the possibility of jeopardising US-Australian relations and thus the
availability of a nuclear guarantee. For many, this may have presented an
unacceptable risk.
Gorton was deposed as Prime Minster in March 1971, which effectively doomed
the development of the nuclear reactor. Gorton's successor, William McMahon
favoured a policy of non-acquisition and supported the NPT. In effect, McMahon
"put the brakes on" Australian nuclear ambitions, prior to the arrival of Gough
Whitlam's Labour Government in December 1972. The Australian Labour Party
(ALP) had been firm opponents of weapons acquisition in opposition. Having
reached office, Whitlam therefore sought a swift end to lingering suggestions of a
nuclear option. The decisive turning point came with the ratification of the NPT in
January 1973, after which the issue of nuclear weapons rarely arose. From 1973,
successive governments appear to have followed a relatively consistent policy of
nuclear restraint.
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The debate within Australia over the NPT forced the Government to consider
once and for all the issue of nuclear acquisition. What were the main issues at
stake? Nuclear weapons proponents focused on Australia's deteriorating security
environment, which by 1968 was perceived as threatening. Jenkins suggests that
the Cabinet papers point to China as the country that gave Australian ministers
the most pause for thought.52 The fact that China had acquired nuclear weapons
may have accentuated the belief that the region could descend into a condition of
nuclear anarchy, with Australia as a possible target for communist attacks.
Equally, Australia is likely to have remained fearful of possible Indonesian
aggression, despite the fact the Suharto's government appeared to be less
threatening than its predecessor.
Australian perceptions of insecurity were further exacerbated by the late 196O's
with the apparent retraction of British and US strategic commitments to South-
East Asia. The government feared that this would leave Australia "home alone"
and therefore vulnerable to attack from Asian communist forces. The crucial
question was whether this military retraction would affect nuclear guarantees. In
relation to Anglo-Australian relations, questions remain: Did the Australians have
reason to believe that their security was guaranteed by British nuclear weapons
stationed in East Asia and/or that they could secure access to these weapons "on
demand"? In the absence of answers to these questions, it is difficult to ascertain
the degree of insecurity that Britain's military retraction may have stimulated within
the Australian Government.
The dominant assumption, as favoured by realist theories, appears to have been
that it was in the US' interest to maintain the strategic balance with the Soviets
and the Chinese and hence to retain a commitment to defend Australia against
52
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67communist expansionism.53 Australia may therefore have concluded that given
this security guarantee, Australian nuclear weapons were strategically
unnecessary. However, this leaves open an important strategic cultural question,
which is typically left unanswered by realist theories: What were the ideas under¬
lying assumptions about the threats to be addressed, and the allies to be trusted?
This question will addressed later.
It is worth considering the possibility that the US' nuclear commitment may not
have been as unequivocal in a situation where US vital security interests were not
at stake. In the event of a dispute between Australia and a regional adversary,
which was not allied to the USSR (or China), it is unlikely that the US would have
offered nuclear (or military) support, especially given its experiences in Vietnam.
For weapons proponents this provided a case for arguing for the acquisition of an
independent nuclear capability with which to deter local threats. Yet how
strategically advantageous would an Australian nuclear force been in any
scenario?
The sort of nuclear force which Australia would have been able to construct would
almost certainly have had a negligible.second-strike capability against the Soviet
Union (and possibly the China) by virtue of its lack of size and sophistication. It is
doubtful therefore whether Australia could have produced a comprehensive
deterrent against its communist adversaries. Nonetheless it would have afforded
Australia some measure of retaliatory capability that could have been more
decisive in deterring smaller non-nuclear powers in the region.
Ian Bellany has identified two categories of military situation in which Australia
might have deployed a small tactical nuclear force with the minimum requirement
of range, invulnerability and flexibility: first, for use against an invading fleet on the
high seas; second, against troop concentrations of an invading force before, or
53
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68while embarking or after disembarkation on Australian soil. In both instances the
aim would be to redress any conventional imbalances that Australia may face
while in conflict with a more capable adversary.54
Considerable attention was paid to the potential for an Indonesian attack, possibly
with nuclear weapons. However, as has already been suggested, it is doubtful
whether Indonesia possessed the capability to acquire nuclear weapons. Any
Indonesian aggression is therefore likely to have taken the form of low-level
subversion, insurgency and confrontation. An Australian nuclear defence would
have been of negligible tactical utility in such as scenario.
What would have been the costs of Australian nuclear acquisition? The likely
repercussions of Australia acquiring nuclear weapons can be considered
according to financial, strategic and political costs. Financially, there is little doubt
that Australia could have afforded to acquire nuclear weapons, either by
purchasing externally or in initiating an indigenous programme. In 1957, Menzies
told Parliament that Australia could not develop an independent nuclear capability
"because of the prodigious costs involved", yet by the 197O's this argument held
much less weight.55 However problems may have resulted from the diversion of
limited scientific and technical manpower towards a weapons programme.
Australia's deficiency in this area may well have led to economic dislocation.
Strategically, the costs of acquiring nuclear weapons were likely to have been
severe. While it is difficult to predict with any great accuracy it is likely to have
precipitated an acceleration in China's nuclear programme as well as setting off a
possible proliferation chain within the region and further afield, that would have
seriously undermined Australia's security position. Consequently, this may have
facilitated a further acceleration of its programme towards a more sophisticated
capability, in spite of limited access to the relevant technologies.
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69The Australian government appears to have given consideration to the likely
political consequences of acquiring nuclear weapons. A Defence Committee
memorandum in 1958 suggested that "the acquisition of a nuclear capability by
Australia, if it could not be concealed, would no doubt be exploited by Communist
propaganda and result in some loss of sympathy for Australia on the part of the
neutralists".56 However it was also suggested that "the United States and the
United Kingdom have already publicly revealed their nuclear capability in the
event of war in Asia, so the acquisition by Australia should materially increase
Asian fears".57
How would the US have reacted to Australian nuclearisation? The Australians
reasoned that much depended on the manner in which it presented its case for
nuclear weapons and the political and military circumstances at the time of the
acquisition.58 Nonetheless, the US appears to have maintained a consistently
negative policy with regard to the Australian nuclear option, in line with its policy
of insuring against the emergence of new nuclear weapon states (NWS). That
Australia considered a nuclear option is evidence that doubts may have surfaced
about the credibility or wisdom of nuclear guarantees. The US withdrawal from
Vietnam may well have unsettled the Australian government by raising questions
about where US priorities lay. This came at a time when new NWS were emerging
in Asia, which raised the issue of whether nuclear weapons would actually be
used in the region: could nuclear war be played out in South-East Asia?
Ultimately Australia appears to have relied on the assumption that it possessed
nuclear guarantees from its allies. This may have been based as much on
assumptions about the costs of not adhering to American wishes as to the
potential advantages of being under the nuclear umbrella. Equally, an Australian
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70decision to proliferate while facing no major threat to its security, would most likely
have stimulated widespread condemnation by the international community and
would have seriously compromised Australia's standing as a "good international
citizen". Thus, Australia opted to remain non-nuclear in adhering to the NPT and
has retained a firm and active non-proliferation stance subsequently.
Crucially one must ask whether Australia's nuclear restraint was, and is, based on
the strength of its alliance relationships and the lack of a serious threat to its
security. It would seem plausible to argue that, given the likely costs of
proliferation, Australia's security-material circumstances did not warrant the
acquisition of nuclear weapons and that ultimately it was in its security interest to
remain non-nuclear. However, there are a number of problems with relying purely
on security-materialist factors for explanation. As Walsh maintains, the level of
security threat does not correspond to interest in nuclear weapons in this case:
Australia made its most strident attempts to procure nuclear weapons during a
period of relatively low insecurity.59 Equally an attention to technological material
arguments fare little better: as an advanced, industrialised country with plentiful
natural resources there were few technological barriers to Australian proliferation
and yet the technological imperative does not appear to have been decisive.
There are however more general problems in relying on rationalist materialist
explanations. This chapter will highlight the need to look beyond simple cost-
benefit equations and to highlight the way in which material circumstances were
constituted by a distinct Australian strategic culture, which shaped nuclear
decision-making. The claim here is that it is not sufficient to consider Australia's
nuclear restraint purely according to rational responses to external material
conditions in the way that realist theories invite. Rather we need to consider the
cultural pre-dispositions that constitute how decision-makers interpreted their
environment and arrived at a non-nuclear decision.
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71It is not the aim to undermine the importance of the material factors. However,
these material factors tell us nothing without an identification of the ideas that
constitute them and give them meaning. Thus it was Australia's strategic cultural
perceptions which shaped how threats were assumed, why allies were deemed
important and why nuclear weapons were considered and then ignored. Without
these insights it is impossible to gain a fuller picture of the Australian case.
In discussing Australian strategic culture, two main avenues will be explored.
First, the notion of Australia as a "frightened country", both paranoid and fearful;
second, the reactive need for "great and powerful friends" to secure Australian
security. This is in line with Graeme Cheeseman's assertion that Australia's
strategic culture is centred around the twin pillars of "fear and dependence".60 By
attending to these themes it will possible to establish how and why Australia
deliberated over the nuclear question. More importantly, by identifying the
changing nature of strategic culture into the mid 197O's, it is possible to gain
valuable insights into why ultimately, Australia restrained its nuclear intentions.
Australian Strategic Culture
The aim here will be to divide the discussion of Australian strategic culture into
two parts. First, it will be necessary to consider the essence of the strategic
culture, which constituted strategic perceptions during the period when nuclear
weapons were under consideration. This will involve, on the one hand an
examination of the culture of fear and anxiety that has pervaded Australia's view
of the world, and on the other, attention to the culture of dependence, which has
driven Australia into the arms of "great and powerful" friends. As will be shown,
these two strategic cultural tendencies are mutually re-enforcing.61 Second, it will
be necessary to consider the emergence of a new strategic culture from the mid-
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721970's, which shaped a new conception of Australia's role in global and regional
affairs.
Attention will therefore be focused on these changing trends in Australian
strategic culture and their influence on the nuclear debate. Subsequent analysis
should contribute to a further questioning of dominant realist accounts which fail
to acknowledge the role of cultural factors at multiple levels and rely exclusively
on materialist analysis. It is Australia's strategic culture that constitutes the
materialist assumptions upon which realist accounts of Australian strategy are
based.
The "Frightened Country"
It was Alan Renouf who first introduced the notion of Australia as a "frightened
country": isolated from its European origins and experiencing a constant fear of
attack from Asian adversaries.62 These themes of isolation, vulnerability and
endangerment are a persistent feature of Australian strategic culture and have
been instrumental in shaping strategic policy, particularly the reliance on
alliances. Australia's strategic culture owes much to its rather unique position as a
large South Pacific Island with a numerically small population of Western origin.63
Xavier Pons has suggested that Australia's European identity has traditionally
made it very difficult for it to feel at one with its Asia-Pacific environment,
especially during the colonial period, when the British empire was its only real
source of identity.
Originally established as a penal colony for "British miscreants",64 White Australia
quickly developed a distinct sense of isolation within its regional environment. As
Valerie Hudson suggests:
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73"few in number, an awfully long way from the protective power of the home state,
adjacent to regions being colonised, or already colonised by other and potentially
hostile European empires, and fearful of a very foreign Asia, the British colonists
in Australia developed attitudes which were re-enforced rather than questioned by
successive generations of migrants from Britain".65
The early Australian settlers thus developed a sense of estrangement,
remoteness and alienation; "out of place, awkward and extremely vulnerable", in a
region dominated by hostile Asian hordes.66
The fear and anxiety which pervaded Australia's perception of its external
environment, was driven by distinct racial considerations. With the influx of
considerable numbers of Asians in 19th Century, Australia's sense of "whiteness"
was quickly re-enforced, with notions of racism gradually coming to the fore.
Increasingly, Australia came to see itself as a "white island in a sea of colour".67
With the introduction of the Immigration Restriction Bill in 1901, a distinct "White
Australia" policy emerged, which informed Government policy with regard to other
Asian races and became embedded in Australian strategic culture. A clear
illustration of the racial attitudes which informed discussion at the time is provided
by J.C Watson, first national leader of the ALP, who proclaimed that "the objection
I have to the mixing of these coloured people with the white people of Australia
...lies in the main in the possibility and probability of racial contamination."68 Just
as Asians were seen to be insidiously intent of assimilating themselves into
Australian society, so the external menace of the "Yellow Peril" became the
"spectre haunting the Australian imagination," presenting an ever-present threat of
invasion.
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74Until WWII, Japan was perceived as the "chief and almost only source of Asian
threat to the national ideal".69 While there were fears concerning the prospect of
an "awakening China", it was not seriously seen as a threat. However Japan's
modernisation and its military predominance of the Western Pacific represented a
real threat in the minds of many Australians. With the Japanese defeat of Russia,
the first victory of an Asian nation over a European one, "all Australia's fears
about Asia and the 'Yellow Peril' came to be focused on that country".70
In the minds of many, Japan's aggression during WWII provided justification for
Australia's preoccupation with the "peril from the North". Subsequently, efforts
were made to guard against future Japanese imperialism through regional
collective defensive arrangements. With the disappearance of the Japanese
threat, Australia's threat perceptions became focused on the spread of
communism in South East Asia. As the Japanese yellow peril evaporated from the
Australian consciousness, so the "red peril" of Chinese communism came to
dominate threat perceptions. Thus, in addition to the racial distinction of colour,
Australia attached another category to its perceptual scheme: the ideological
division between communism and anti-communism.71 In the case of China, the
double fear of the yellow and red perils combined very neatly.
Cheeseman has argued that racial and ethnocentric concerns have informed
most of the perceived threats to Australia: "initially invasion by yellow hordes,
followed by the fear of communist reds, and then following the collapse of the
Soviet Union, Arab and Muslim terrorists and religious fanatics".72 Australian
identity thus developed according to them/us, self/other orientations based on an
accentuation of the difference between white Australians and "Asian others".
Richard White describes the manner in which Australian identity can be seen as
continuously besieged by foreign evils. White's investigation of dominant images
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75and identities in the 192O's presents a picture of the Australian people attempting
to retain their integrity whilst being "assailed by foreign evils".
73
James Camillieri argues that the notions of white Australia and the yellow peril
were not accidental developments: "these ideas were fashioned, whether
consciously or unconsciously in order to accommodate Australia's organic links
with Britain".74 As long as Australia viewed itself as part of the British Empire, it
would continue to emphasise its racial and cultural differences with its Asian
neighbours and the maintenance of a close link with Britain. Australian strategic
culture thus came to reflect a requirement for the maintenance of the status quo
or "things-as-they are", involving a constant attention to possible threats and
radical changes in the external environment, which in turn was based on a distinct
racial prejudice. This in-built "traditionalism" within Australian identity, exemplified
by the post-war Government of John Menzies, stressed the need for consistency
and continuity.
These were the ideas which informed threat perceptions prior to the end of the
White Australia policy in the 1970's. With the Whitlam and Fräser governments
embracing without reservation the notion of Australia as a "multicultural and
multiracial society", a new, more accommodating attitude permeated the
prevailing strategic culture. Nonetheless, throughout the period when nuclear
weapons were considered, successive governments were guided by a distinct
racial outlook, which shaped the perception of threats and the consideration of
responses.
As the Japanese threat receded, so it was quickly and effortlessly replaced with
the fear of the Communist menace. In addition to concern as to Soviet influence in
the region, the focus switched to the threat posed by Communist China. Despite
having supported each other against Japan during the Pacific War, the Australian
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76Government initially refused to recognise the establishment of the People's
Republic of China in October 1949. By 1950, increasing American influence
ensured that anti-communism had become a cornerstone of Australian foreign
policy as well as emerging as an electoral necessity. The virulently anti-
communist stance exhibited by the Menzies Government ensured that Australia
retained a negative attitude towards China throughout. The Korean War (1950-
1953) merely served to strengthen this anti-Chinese resolve. The despatch of
troops to Vietnam in 1965 was considered to be part of Australia's effort to contain
communism in South East Asia. Menzies himself argued in 1965 that the strength
of the radical left in South Vietnam would present a "direct military threat to
Australia and all the countries of South and South East Asia" and should be seen
as "part of a thrust by communist China between the Indian and Pacific
Oceans".75
This anti-communist, anti-Chinese posturing was supported by a majority of the
population, as evidenced by the landslide victory attained by the Holt Government
in the 1966 elections.76 These perceptions were undoubtedly accentuated by the
initiation of China's nuclear weapon programme from 1964, which accentuated
fears as to Chinese intentions. Whether the reality of the Chinese threat ever
corresponded to the level of fear driving Australia's threat perceptions is open to
question. As long as China retained co-operative relations with the Soviet Union,
thereby presenting a united communist front, then the threat may have been
genuine. However, with the Sino-Soviet split and domestic instability resulting
from the "cultural revolution", this threat may have receded.
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77Australia's other great fear was Indonesia. As Meaney suggests, Indonesia
remained the only unpredictable element in Australian strategic thinking,
unpredictable both as to where it stood in the East-West conflict and how the
Western allies would react to Australia becoming involved in hostilities with its
near neighbour.77 By the end of WWII, the South East Asian region was facing
deep instability. Only Australia, New Zealand and Thailand could claim to be
independent and free from either foreign military intervention or civil war. While
Indo-China, Malaya and the Philippines all experienced a progression towards
independence, Australian attention turned to Indonesia, which was emerging as a
major security concern.78
By the early 196O's Indonesia began to mount a campaign to "liberate" West
Guinea, a move aimed at destabilising the Dutch colony and laying the
foundations for an Indonesian take-over. Alan Dupont suggests that New Guinea
was considered to be of vital strategic interest to Australia's defence: "a lesson
burned into collective consciousness by the Japanese advance through the island
during World War II".79 Ultimately, Menzies was forced to acquiesce to the
incorporation of West Guinea into Indonesia, mainly as a result of a lack of
support from Australia's allies. However by 1963, Sukarno's Indonesia was
actively opposing the formation of Malaysia, with the assistance of Soviet military
equipment. Menzies responded in 1964 by providing Malaysia with military
support.
As Coral Bell suggests, "this was the period of President Sukarno's doctrine of
'new emerging forces' which were allegedly predestined to sweep away 'the old
established forces'".80 This represented a genuine source of insecurity for
Australia, an insecurity accentuated in the early 196O's with suspicions about
Indonesia's nuclear intentions. The fear uppermost in the minds of most
77
Meaney, op cit, p.181.
78
David Homer, "The Security Dimension of Australian Foreign Policy" in F.A Mediansky (eds.), Australia in a Changing
World: New Foreign Policy Directions (Macmillan, 1992) p.89
79
Dupont, op cit, p.51.
80
Coral Bell, Dependent Ally: A Study in Foreign Policy Oxford (University Press, Melbourne, 1988), p.8O.
78Australians revolved around the prospect of an alliance between China and
Indonesia: a so-called Beijing-Jakarta axis".81 This would present the prospect of
danger on all fronts: areas of tension and conflict, both communist and nationalist
inspired had moved closer to Australia, fuelling the national neurosis which
revolved around external threats.
By the 1960's, Australian strategy was geared to addressing a fear of "falling
dominoes" in South East Asia. It was this concern that precipitated Australian
involvement in Vietnam. In November 1961, President Kennedy requested
assistance from Australia in the form of equipment and advisors, which was
followed a year later with the deployment of troops. Dupont suggests that
Australia's initial involvement in Vietnam was shaped by its conflict with
Indonesia.82 However despite an improvement in relations with Indonesia from
1965, Australia found itself heavily involved in Vietnam, ostensibly in defence of
American interests.
Thus, the culture of fear contributed to a succession of strategic engagements
culminating in the involvement of Australian troops in Vietnam. Prior to the
evolution of a new strategic cultural mentality in the 197O's, Australian threat
perceptions and strategic assumptions have been governed by a profound anxiety
and obsession with threats. Australians have believed themselves to be
"threatened" at one time or another by France, Russia and Germany in the 19th
Century and more recently, by Japan, China, the Soviet Union and the
proliferation of communism, most especially in Korea, Vietnam and Indonesia.83
Thus, be it a focus on particular states or a fear based on ideological or racial
aversion, Australian strategic culture has been characterised by an all-
encompassing attention to threats. To this end, Renouf seems quite accurate in
referring to white Australia as "the frightened country".
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79'Great and Powerful Friends': The Strategic Culture of
Dependence
The retarded development of individuality and independence from the imperial
core had direct ramifications on the nature of Australia's defence and security
policy and thus the development of its strategic culture. Much of the following
analysis will emphasise how Australia came to rely on the British for defence, thus
illustrating the almost holistic nature of Australian dependence on its imperial
benefactors. More significantly, the way in which Australia switched to a reliance
on the US following the retraction of the British empire, indicates the existence of
a "dependence mentality" which is a central feature of Australian strategic culture.
The historical Australian tendency to assume the constancy of threats from Asian
adversaries, coupled with a lack of belief in its own ability to defend itself, led to a
need to rely on "great and powerful friends" for security. Hence there is an
inextricable link between the culture of fear that has pervaded Australia's
perception of its external environment, and a culture of dependence, which has
arisen as a response. To use Cheeseman's words, "Australia has become a
'dependent ally', borrowing from, and ever supportive of policies and practices of
its principal benefactors and ready to dispatch its military forces overseas in
support of their imperial objectives".84 Until recently, there has been little attempt
to develop independent strategic doctrines, or to devise indigenous solutions to
the insecurities, which have pervaded threat assessments.
The culture of dependence can easily be attributed to material factors such as the
geographical remoteness of a numerically small population on a large land mass,
together with the dictates of economic necessity, military inferiority and the
attraction of abundant natural resources to potential adversaries. Each of these
factors might be used by realists to explain why Australia was dependent on
Britain. However, these factors must be considered within a cultural context.
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80Australia's geographical remoteness and military insufficiency would have been
an irrelevance had it perceived its external environment to be co-operative and
non-threatening. In such a situation, Australia may have quickly divorced itself
from its imperial protectors and embraced more co-operative relations with its
Asian neighbours. Instead, the early settlers quickly acquired a strategic culture
which led to an accentuation of distance, an exaggeration of threats and a
"demonization" of Asian neighbours. This perceptual prism led to distorted
assumptions concerning the need to remain dependent on others: if not Britain,
then America.
Much of the fear present in the Australian consciousness throughout the 19th and
early 20th century was based on a lack of individuality and independence from
imperial protectors. The early colonists were essentially British, and looked to
London for governance, support and security. For most of its early period,
Australia's fate was thus decided overseas, creating in the process, a sense of
reliance that did not disappear following the creation of an autonomous
Commonwealth state. As Hudson argues, the early colonists lacked the
intellectual and material resources to go their own way, and were content to adapt
British institutions in their politics, law and religion.85
Stephen Alomes has attributed Australia's historical inability to develop a sense of
independence to the nature of its colonial experience. Alomes suggest that the
roots of deference to "traditional centres of power whether described as 'provincial
respect' for metropolitan expertise or as contemporary neo-colonial servitude" are
specifically related to a sense of colonial inferiority.86 This is based on the idea
that Australian life was both culturally and socially inferior to its British equivalent,
an idea compounded by the English elite which perceived Australians to be the
very antithesis of all things cultural and sophisticated. Alomes suggests that the
over-bearing dominance of imperial culture both stunted Australian self-
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81confidence and retarded the development of a distinctly Australian character.
Equally however, this might be seen as in inevitable feature of the "colonial
experience" with the "denigration of Australian language, culture and history...
comparable with imperial-colonial relations elsewhere".87
Throughout the 19th Century, Australia viewed the imperialist ambitions of Britain's
European rivals as the principle threat to Australian security. Australia's first
official threat assessment provided by General Hutton in 1901, suggested that
while its geographical remoteness offered it a degree of protection against
Britain's imperial enemies, it was necessary for Australia to "defend those vast
interests beyond her shores upon the maintenance of which her present existence
and future prosperity must so largely depend".88 With the outbreak of WWI in
1914 there was little question of Australia's commitment to the cause: Prime
Minister Fisher confirmed that Australia would "stand behind the Mother Country
to help and defend her to our last man and our last shilling".89 This commitment
proved to be costly, with 59,000 Australian troops losing their lives; a heavy
sacrifice for a country with a population of five million.90
The rise of Japanese militarism in the 193O's resurrected the fear of the "yellow
peril" that had first arisen in the 189O's. Japan's aggression in Manchuria, and its
withdrawal from the League of Nations set alarm bells ringing in Australia and
raised questions as to Britain's ability to offer defence against Japanese
expansionism. Until WWII, Australians perceived Japan as the principle Asian
threat to Australian security. Nonetheless, Australia continued to look to Britain
and its Western allies to act as a cordon sanitaire between Japan and Australia
and "to provide a guarantee against the swarming hordes of Asia".91
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91This trust proved to be mis-placed: the Japanese were to overrun the colonial
powers in Australia's neighbourhood, including the British, and struck at Australia
itself by bombing Darwin, Broome and even penetrating Sydney Harbour. With
Britain no longer able to provide security, Australia turned to the United States.
John Molony states that the failure of Britain to come to Australia's aid following
the fall of Singapore and subsequent turning to America was of unparalleled
importance in the history of Australian foreign relations, "the result was another
form of dependence, which given the long record of reliance on great powers for
protection, was inevitable".92
This is not to suggest that the transition of reliance from the UK to the US
proceeded smoothly with universal acceptance. While the strategic culture of
reliance was strong, there were many conflicting responses to Australia's security
situation. WWII undoubtedly turned Australia's attention away from Europe and
towards South East Asia. This provided the impetus for much debate throughout
the 195O's and 196O's concerning how Australia should strengthen its security.
Nationalists advocated self-reliance and independence, in many cases providing
a case for nuclearisation. Others called for Australia to remain neutral and non-
aligned, and to concentrate on its own forms of self-defence. For those
advocating an "Asianization" of Australia's foreign policy, a case was put forward
for regional defence arrangements distinct and separate from external powers.
The persistent theme throughout was a reliance on "collective security".
Australia's security interests following WWII were firmly located within South East
Asia. Initially, the focus was on containing the potential for a resurgent Japanese
threat. Having accepted a softer peace treaty with Japan than it had wanted,
Australia managed to secure an "Australia-New Zealand-United States" alliance,
referred to as the ANZUS treaty (1951), which effectively guarded against future
Japanese aggression. The advent of the Cold War in the late 194O's, dictated the
future of Australian foreign policy. Its commitment to the defence of South Korea
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83during the Korean War (1950-1953) and its contribution to the British campaign
against communist insurgents in Malaya set the tone for what would become a
staunch anti-Communist strategy.
Central to Australia's response to external threats during the Cold War, was a
policy of "forward defence".93 This might be defined as the deployment of forces
along the approaches to Australia to prevent a potential enemy from reaching
Australian territory, based on the notion that it was better to fight potential
opponents in advanced theatres than on Australia's own shores. According to this
definition, Australian military deployments to Malaya, Timor, New Britain and New
Guinea in WWII indicated forward defence. Following WWII, this policy became
synonymous with that of collective defence, or security through alliances. This led
to a succession of Australian military commitments alongside Britain and the US.
Australian forces participated in the Malaysian Emergency, the Korean War, the
defence of Malaysia against Indonesia and ultimately the Vietnam War. Forward
defence in conjunction with defensive arrangements with its allies, was
considered to be a useful mechanism whereby Australia could demonstrate its
importance to American interests in the region and thereby ensure US protection
in the event of a direct threat.
Thus, by the early 196O's, it was clear that Australia saw the US and not the UK
as its principal protector. This transition of reliance was not without its problems.
In the minds of many Australians, the situation had been forced upon them
because of strategic circumstances, rather than chosen as a desirable policy
option. As Pons argues, this transition proceeded with "much foot-dragging, for in
the eyes of many Australians, Britain was still 'home'".94 Menzies continued to
place his faith in "our great and powerful friends", meaning the UK and the US,
emphasising Australia's role as a bridge in the Asia Pacific region between "those
two great Atlantic powers". In reality however, it was the United States that
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84provided the security guarantees, as Britain sought to retract its interests in Asia,
as evidenced by its "no forces East of Suez" decision. This was demonstrated by
Holt's suggestion in 1966 that Australia should go "all the way with LBJ".
The alliance with the US was underlined by the purchase of American planes,
ships and other military hardware. Furthermore, Australia's agreement in 1963 to
allow the Americans to establish a naval communications station at North-West
cape in Western Australia, followed by further facilities at Pine Gap and
Nurrungar, re-emphasised the close nature of this alliance. From an American
perspective, these developments provided valuable strength to its anti-Communist
strategy in the Asia-Pacific. From an Australian perspective, the hosting of these
bases served to perpetuate American interest in safeguarding its security.
And yet there was a price to pay for hosting American bases. Would this policy
invite unwelcome and unnecessary attention from the Soviet Union? Equally,
such a high profile contribution to the anti-Communist effort in South East Asia
may well have provoked hostile reactions from the Chinese. Nonetheless,
Australia retained a firm belief in the ability of the American alliance to safeguard
its security. Australian strategic culture shaped an enduring perception of a
requirement for external military protection. This part had been played by the
British until WWII, and subsequently by the US.
Certain sections within Australia maintained an ambivalence towards the US. As
Pons suggests, the US was seen as familiar because of the similarity in language
and attitudes, as well as being different because, unlike Australia, it had divested
itself of its original Britishness.95 However, it was difficult to ignore America's
military power, which effectively helped push the Japanese away from Australia.
As well as heightening Australian sensitivity to regional threats, this experience
re-enforced the strategic cultural tendency to assume absolute reliance when
facing attack. However, for some, this reliance was more problematic. By
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85maintaining a high profile alliance with the US, Australia was both elevating and
drawing attention to itself as a bastion of anti-Communist resistance, which, in
turn, further accentuated its reliance on its ally. Furthermore, the policy of forward
defence in support of alliance commitments, appeared to be drawing Australia
into costly military commitments. Having provided military assistance to the British
in numerous instances up to and including WWII, Australia found itself
contributing forces to the American effort in Korea and Vietnam. For David Horner
this is evidence of what is referred to as a "expeditionary force mentality" which
has pervaded Australian strategic culture.96
Superficially, the contribution of Australian troops in support of US operations
during the Cold War were seen as part of an overall effort to contain communism
in South East Asia. In reality, this had more to do with the desire to protect and
perpetuate US-Australian relations by demonstrating how ready Australia was to
subscribe to US foreign policy, irrespective of its content. This requirement for
reassurance and protection had become deeply embedded within Australian
strategic culture, thus inhibiting the development of an independent spirit.
Competing tendencies were in evidence. For some, Australia needed to pursue a
policy of neutrality and non-alignment with a reliance on self-defence, while many
nationalists called for strength through independence. Others stressed the need
for a more co-operative relationship with other Asian states, regardless of political
affiliation, and the benefits of regional economic inter-dependence.
The importance of these competing strategic cultural tendencies should not be
under-stated. As will be shown, by the mid-197O's, Australian society and its
foreign policy was undergoing a process of transformation with a new strategic
culture emerging which would challenge both the dominant perception of Asia and
the requirement for "great and powerful friends". However, one should not under¬
estimate the enduring nature of the cultures of fear and dependence. The
instantaneous support offered by Australia to the US during the Gulf War (1990-
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861991) provides one indication of the continuing predominance of these strategic
cultural tendencies.
It was the strategic cultures of fear and dependence which shaped Australian
perceptions and assumptions in the debate over nuclear weapons up to the
signing of the NPT in 1973. Initially, it was the culture of fear that stimulated a
desire to obtain nuclear weapons as a means of defence. Subsequently it was
Australia's culture of dependence that shaped a belief that Australia's security
could and should be provided by other NWS. The Australian approach to the
British for nuclear weapons, followed by a consideration of an indigenous nuclear
programme, may have reflected a fear experienced by decision-makers of
regional threats. However, the additional strategic cultural tendency to rely on
alliances for security, ensured that Australia was determined not to jeopardise its
relationship with the Americans.
There were many other competing strategic cultural tendencies which, if stronger,
may have over-ridden those outlined above and thus shaped an entirely different
outcome, possibly involving the acquisition of nuclear weapons. However, the
strategic cultures of fear and dependence were decisive in constituting the non-
nuclear outcome and shaping the nature of debate in the crucial period upto the
early 197O's. Australia considered a nuclear weapons option out of fear as to the
intentions of its perceived adversaries but opted to refrain from nuclearisation
because of the likely responses of these adversaries. Equally, Australia believed
itself to protected by its alliances and saw little additional benefit in pursuing an
independent path through a nuclear deterrent. Australia's nuclear restraint could
thus be seen as a response to the material constraints of the external security
environment, as well as driven by self-interest. But why did Australia perceive
threats in the way that it did? What shaped its perceptions of nuclear weapons
and the likely strategic consequences of obtaining them? Why was Australia so
ready to rely on its alliances? Only through attention to ideational, historical and
87cultural context can we gain answers to these questions and thus gain fuller
insights into this case.
By the mid 197O's Australian strategic culture became infused with new ideas as
to Australia's regional circumstances and international standing, and in way that
ensured the perpetuation of nuclear restraint. The new strategic cultural pre¬
dispositions towards Asianization, internationalism and the cultural norm of non-
proliferation merely re-confirmed a policy of non-nuclearism shaped by the earlier
strategic culture.
Fear, Dependence and Nuclear Weapons
The strategic culture of fear, which ensured a threatening Australian vision of its
Asian neighbourhood, was decisive in generating interest in nuclear weapons.
Mindful of the encroachment of communism in Southeast Asia, Australia sought
nuclear weapons as a deterrent to possible aggressors, namely Indonesia and
China. After the Chinese nuclear tests in 1964, it was clear that China possessed
a nuclear threat, while Indonesia was suspected of going down the same path.
For many strategic analysts in Australia, this provided a clear case for the
acquisition of nuclear weapons.
Whether the Chinese actually intended to use force against the Australians is, in
terms of Australian strategic perceptions, largely irrelevant. This fear of China was
based more on the strategic cultural tendency to search for potential threats and
exaggerate the possible dangers than it was on a. The experience of Japanese
aggression during WWII, ensured that the Yellow Peril would remain the principle
menace in the minds of Australians whether it came in the form of Japanese
fascism or Chinese Communism.
A similar equation can be used to account for Australian fear about Indonesian
intentions. It is unlikely that Indonesia possessed the conventional superioritynecessary to overrun Australian forces. A more serious issue, was the suggestion
that Indonesia might seek nuclear weapons.97 Given this scenario it seemed
imperative that Australia be in a position to nuclearise before the Indonesians, or
risk pre-emption. Again, such a strategic forecasting would be based on the
assumption that it was Indonesia's intention to challenge Australia, which was
constituted by the strategic cultural predisposition to assume the constancy of the
threat and the vulnerability to it, rather than the material existence of such a
danger.
These were the pre-dispositions that drove the nuclear issue onto the agenda.
How should Australia go about acquiring nuclear weapons? The answer to this
question was shaped by the dependence mentality. The first impulse was to
approach the ßritish and seek access to its nuclear weapons.98 With the transfer
of nuclear weapons appearing to be politically unfeasible, attempts were made to
secure "weapons on demand", thereby testing the integrity of nuclear
guarantees.99 The question of the credibility of Australia's nuclear guarantees
was at the heart of the Australian debate over nuclear acquisition.
The dependence mentality was challenged by the arrival of the nationalistic
Gorton as Prime Minister. Unlike his predecessors Menzies and Holt, Gorton held
a different vision for Australia, one based on strength through independence.
While Gorton maintained Australia's anti-Communist stance, he believed that
Australia could meet this threat on its own and should strengthen its security by
independent means. The development of a nationalist sentiment was strongly
influenced by increasing resentment at Australia's involvement in Vietnam, which
by the late 1960's was becoming a costly burden. Inevitably, this nationalist drive
involved a change in policy emphasis with regard to nuclear weapons: away from
weapons transfers and towards an indigenous programme. Thus, while the
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89culture of fear was still very much shaping perceptions of desired outcomes, a
new nationalist impulse was challenging the strategic culture of dependence.
Ultimately, Gorton and Baxter failed in their bid to establish Australia as a NWS.
In narrow, political terms, the drive towards weapons acquisition met with
considerable resistance, most notably from within Gorton's cabinet.100 Gorton's
nationalist revolution was forced to confront a strong "traditionalist" element within
government, which favoured a preservation of the status quo through the
retention of strong alliances and a non-nuclear policy. With the replacement of
Gorton by the conservative McMahon, Australia entered a period of stalemate
over the nuclear issue, with the fate of Baxter's proposed reactor project and NPT
being the main focus of discussion. The eventual victory of Whitlam's Labour
Party in December 1972 provided the decisive thrust towards an acceptance of
the NPT and an end to nuclear aspirations.
This might provide an indication of the predominance of an Australian strategic
culture which favoured conservatism, alliances and a preservation of the status
quo. Equally, we might suppose that the nationalist impulse was insufficiently
strong enough to take Australia away from a reliance on Britain and America, and
towards an independent strategic posture. An independent Australia, without the
protection of security guarantees, but remaining fearful of its external situation,
would have presented a genuine proliferation prospect. This leads to an
interesting question: did the emergence of Australian nationalism automatically
equate to a requirement for nuclear weapons?
The answer to this question may lie in Hymans discussion of Australian identity
and the nuclear weapons question. Hymans points to the significance of the
national identities of various.Australian leaders that have been crucial in shaping
their perceptions of national security requirements and thus the debate over
nuclear weapons. Menzies' Australia was characterised by an "oppositional" but
90not nationalist identity, based on the assumption that Australia was facing a
hostile environment, but that it should not approach threats independently.101
During this period, Australia expressed interest in acquiring nuclear weapons in
opposition to Australia's adversaries, but does not appear to have sought an
independent, sovereign nuclear deterrent.102
Gorton's Australia was dominated by an "oppositional nationalism" which shared a
similar perception of threat to its predecessor, but implied that Australia should act
independently and should acquire its own nuclear weapons through an
indigenous programme. The arrival of Whitlam's Labour Party to power in 1972,
signalled the development of a new identity based on "non-oppositional
nationalism", which combined an independent, self-assured stance with a less
threatening perception of Australia's regional environment. This would involve an
institutionalisation of a policy of nuclear restraint together with an active
participation in international non-proliferation and disarmament initiatives. It is
through reference to these ideational categories that Hymans makes the link
between Australian identity and nuclear decision-making.
It might be assumed from this that there is not a direct link between the rise of
Australian nationalism and the quest for nuclear weapons. Both Gorton and
Whitlam were guided by a nationalist impulse, but only Gorton considered nuclear
acquisition. Equally, while pursing a non-nationalist policy, Menzies investigated
the possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons albeit in the form of a transfer. The
case for nuclear weapons did not therefore depend on a nationalist sentiment.
Rather it would appear that the drive for nuclear weapons was at its strongest
during periods of extreme "oppositionalism", in other words, when the perception
of the threat was at its greatest. Throughout the 195O's and 196O's Australian
decision-makers appear to have perceived the external environment as both
hostile and threatening: the case for nuclear weapons arose as a response. With
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91a new "non-oppositional" strategic culture emerging in the 1970's, based on a less
threatening vision of Asian states, Australia abandoned its nuclear pretensions. It
was thus the strategic culture of fear, which constituted the terms of the debate
relating to nuclear acquisition.
Equally, however, it was the strength of the dependence mentality that ensured
that Australia would remain non-nuclear. Initially, the strategic culture of
dependence ensured that Australia under Menzies considered the transfer and
not the production of nuclear weapons. These proposals were rejected because
of pressure exerted by the US and its non-proliferation policy. Australia chose not
to challenge this equation. The development of an indigenous weapons
programme under Gorton, might have entailed a severance of the US-Australian
relationship. Faced with this prospect, Australia opted for a non-nuclear policy.
These decisions were shaped by a particular conception of national interest that
stressed the enduring requirement for alliances. Ultimately therefore, the strategic
culture of dependence proved decisive in counter-balancing the culture of fear
which may have mediated in favour of nuclear acquisition. The dependence
mentality slowly evaporated under Whitlam, but with a diminution in fear, there
was little need for nuclear weapons.
Inevitably, questions need to be asked about the relevance of broader cultural
tendencies and ideational influences in a situation where nuclear decision-making
appears to have been guided, ostensibly by a succession of prominent
individuals. Ultimately, it might be concluded, as Hymans does that Australia's
non-nuclear weapon outcome was shaped by the "identities of various Australian
statesman".103 This might lead to a questioning of the relevance of broader
cultural collectives or groupings. Given the apathy shown by the Australian public
towards foreign policy issues and the relatively closed nature of security, and
nuclear decision-making in particular, it might seem pointless to look beyond the
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92identities of significant elites. The task for a strategic culturalist is to investigate
the possibility that individuals may reflect cultural influences.
Menzies strategic decision-making generally reflected the strategic cultural
mentality of both fear and dependence, with Gorton epitomising the cultural
evolution of an independent pre-disposition. Whitlam, in contrast, provided an
indication of the development of a less oppositional strategic culture. Personal
idiosyncracies and individual beliefs cannot be denied, yet nor can the impact of
broader ideational and cultural developments, which at times constitute strategic
perceptions and assumptions.
In addition, it is important to recognise the influence of external cultural and
ideational factors. This research seeks to focus on cultural influences at the level
of the state, yet there are other external cultures, which at various times may
compete or compliment these domestic cultures. One example of an influential
external/ international culture is the tendency, which arose following 1945,
whereupon states came to regard nuclear weapons as a desirable military asset.
Certainly, Australian strategic analysts began debating the issue of weapons
acquisition at a time when the development and transfer of nuclear technology
and armoury was becoming a regular feature of international security. Equally,
although driven and inspired by US and Soviet interests, an alternative culture of
non-proliferation was emerging, which may have shaped Australian perceptions
concerning the desirability of weapons acquisition as opposed to NPT
acceptance. Australia's strategic culture of dependence may have shaped an
easy intemalisation of ideas emanating from US sponsored non-proliferation
efforts.
It is also important to consider the impact of Australian military organizational
culture. As a result of Australia's close association with Anglo-American strategic
policy, it is difficult to elucidate a distinct Australian military culture with a distinct
national doctrinal discourse. As Cheeseman suggests, Australia has relied heavily
93on "allied military concepts and practices".104 Military strategy and force structure
have thus been heavily influenced by the practical experiences of military
personnel whose doctrinal preferences have been shaped by Anglo-American
concerns.
A reliance on "great and powerful friends" has led to an Australian military history
founded on expeditionary military forces.105 Before WWII, Australia deployed
troops in support of British global interests; following 1945, support gradually
switched to US interests in the Asia-Pacific. In effect, many of Australia's core
strategic interests have been abrogated to the US: with Australian defence
decision-making relegated to dealing with "2nd level questions". Contemporary
Australian military history has been characterised by the debate between those
advocating a policy of forward defence and those preferring defence self-reliance.
Beyond these doctrinal categories, Australia has "generally eschewed alternative
or unconventional military strategies".106
The organizational culture of the military does not appear particularly unique in
the Australian case. Inevitably there are traditional inter-service rivalries, with
each of the three services stressing the importance of land, maritime and air
power to Australian national security. In terms of the debate over nuclear
weapons, the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) appears to have been most
prominent in attempting to utilise a nuclear deterrent as part of its doctrine of
"Independent Strategic Warfare".107 Again, contemporary strategic debate over
Australia's regional security partnerships, reflects the preferences of particular
services which devise their own solutions to these issues.
The Australian defence decision-making process itself has traditionally been of a
closed nature, with the military playing virtually no political role. Millar has
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94suggested that if one was to put a scale on the extent to which the military control
of Government, Australia would be almost at the bottom of the scale, which might
suggest that the military has been marginalised in strategic decision-making.108
Nonetheless the long-standing pre-occupation with the fear of invasion has
ensured that Australia has always maintained a interest in military forces and
capabilities.
A predominant feature of emergent Australian nationalism was a sense of military
prowess, commitment and honour which emerged from WWI. The experiences of
the Australian Imperial Force and the New Zealand Army Corps (together known
as ANZAC) became a celebrated part of Australian military history. Equally the
image of the "digger", (a name given to Australian soldiers who fought in WWI)
generated a sense of patriotism and pride and came to "stand for all that was
decent, wholesome and Australian".109 For many Australians the reaction to WWI
was more extreme as illustrated by Geoffrey Serle's statement that "two
generations of Australians have had it drummed in from the rostrum and pulpit
that we became a nation on 25 April 1915 or at least during the First World
War".110 Australia achieved a sense nationhood based on pride and self-belief
that had not been experienced following its establishment of as an independent
state and which became etched into the national psyche.
Thus, Australian military organisational culture appears to have reflected the
broader strategic culture of dependence. This has shaped a series of
conventional doctrinal preferences that have been geared to the needs of
collective security. Australian society has traditionally relied heavily on the military
in order to sedate its own anxieties. With the emergence of new conceptions of
security, the predominance of military concerns has receded in the public
consciousness. Nonetheless, the continuing requirement for access to state-of-
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95the-art weaponry provides evidence of an enduring belief in the need for military
solutions to core security threats, as well as ensuring that Australia remains
reliant on the US for technical support.
The role of organisational military culture in Australia therefore plays an important
though not crucial role in terms of strategic outcomes. Equally, there may be other
organisational and bureaucratic cultures which might be worthy of consideration.
Hence a range of cultures, operating a multiplicity of levels, often offering
contradictory tendencies, are of relevance when considering the Australian case.
The Evolution of Australian Identity
The preceding analysis has sought to identify the dual strategic cultural
tendencies of fear and dependence, which are considered to have shaped the
debate over nuclear acquisition. However, this chapter is predicated on the notion
that Australian strategic culture underwent a transformation following the victory of
the ALP in the elections of 1972. Under the instruction of Prime Minister Gough
Whitlam, Australia fundamentally re-interpreted its strategic interests based on a
new set of threat perceptions and assumptions. Whitlam's term in office was a
short one (1972-1975) and yet he succeeded in promoting and nurturing a new
Australian identity based on a less fearful perception of Asia and the need to
remain self-reliant and independent. More significantly in terms of this research,
the ALP moved swiftly to end Australia's interest in nuclear weapons and thus
forge a future based on nuclear abstinence. It is therefore important to consider
the new strategic cultural dynamic, which emerged under Whitlam, when
analysing Australia's long term (and contemporary) policy of nuclear non-
acquisition.
Whitlam's vision of Asia was based on a re-interpretation of the threat posed by
China and Asian communism in general. In effect, the Whitlam government came
to recognise that the threat of the "red menace" and the "yellow peril" had been
96exaggerated. Australia's experiences in Vietnam had forced a fundamental rethink
of its relationship with its Asian neighbours and its involvement in regional military
conflicts, of negligible interest to Australian national security. To a degree, the
changing balance of power within the region towards the end of the Vietnam War
"favoured Australia's benign view of its new position".111 The emergence of an
anti-Communist regime in Indonesia, divisions between Vietnam and China and
the Sino-Soviet split all contributed to a highly divided region, thus presenting less
of a unified communist threat to Australia. However, it was a changing strategic
cultural perception of Asia, rather than a change in the existential threat, that
facilitated the emergence of a new strategic outlook.
The changing perception of Asia was accompanied by a repudiation of the White
Australia policy and an end to racial discrimination in immigration procedures.
Whitlam's aim of creating a new "multicultural" and "multiracial" society,
represented a radical departure from previous policy and culminated in the influx
of large numbers of Northeast and Southeast Asian migrants into Australia. This
new racial regard went beyond immigration policy, as Australian national identity
came to be less guided by racial imagery, and more by the need for economic co¬
operation, political compromise and cultural assimilation. The cultural prism
through which Australia had traditionally viewed its Asian environment was thus
replaced with a new, less frightening and anxiety-inducing one.
The embracing of a new "Asian" identity, was accompanied by the further
development of a nationalist consciousness. The emergence of a "non-
oppositional" nationalism under Whitlam, led to a fundamental re-orientation of the
Australian political landscape, away from traditional alliances and towards new
regional relationships. Thus, Australia should "no longer view itself as an Anglo-
American outpost, a transplanted European nation in Asia. Rather, Australians
should come to terms with their geography, and admit their country was part of
111
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97the Asia region".112 This would engender both freedom and self-reliance, together
with a capacity to redefine Australian identity according to its own historical, social
and cultural experiences, rather than those imposed by its imperial protectors.
This is not to suggest that the development of Australian nationalism, was unique
to Whitlam's Australia.113 The nationalist spirit was both strong and influential
under Gorton, who shared Whitlam's commitment to independence and self-
reliance. The significance of Whitlam's nationalism was that it assigned a new
individual and independent role for Australia, without an oppositional view of its
external environment. This ensured a swift and decisive re-orientation of
Australian interests and commitments, away from "great and powerful friends" and
towards its Asian neighbours.
The reorientation of Australian identity under Whitlam, thus entailed a revisionist
foreign policy. In contrast to the virulent anti-communism exhibited by previous
administrations, Australia officially recognised the People's Republic of China,
North Korea and North Vietnam. Whitlam also brought to an end Australia's policy
of forward defence which "sat uneasily with the conciliatory, internationalist image
the Government wished to cultivate".114 After Australian troops were brought
home from Vietnam, Whitlam signalled further retreat by withdrawing ground
forces from Singapore. In sum, Whitlam sought to disengage Australia from its
imperial commitments and its unequivocal support of American foreign policy.
With the emergence of a new independence, individuality and maturity in
international affairs, the ALP "shattered the pattern of Australian politics and Cold
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98War thinking about foreign policy in Australia".115 A year into office, Whitiam
proclaimed, "we are no longer a cipher or a satellite in world affairs. We are no
longer stamped with a taint of racism. We are no longer a colonial power".116
Despite a relatively short term in office, the ALP under Whitiam succeeded in
fundamentally transforming the essence of Australian identity. The ideologies of
"Australianization" and "Asianization" that emerged under Whitiam became
imbued within Australian strategic culture, such that succeeding administrations,
irrespective of political persuasion, did not seek to question its primary
assumptions. Without doubt Australia's new regional orientation was based on
economic imperatives. With the economic success of the East Asian economic
model becoming obvious by the 198O's, there was a clear case to place a more
regional emphasis on Australian economic activity. Inevitably this would dictate a
more "constructive contact" with Asian powers throughout Asia, through a range
of confidence and security-building initiatives. The emergence of a policy of
"defence self-reliance" which came out of the Dibb report in 1986 and the
subsequent defence White Paper, The Defence of Australia 1987, ensured that
Australia would look to refrain from dispatching troops in support of alliance
commitments, as well as establishing closer defence links with its nearer
neighbours.117 The Strategic Review of 1993 proposed a "strategic partnership"
with Southeast Asia in order to "enhance that region's capacity to exclude
potentially hostile influences that could also threaten Australia's security".118
The improvement in Australia's relationship with Indonesia from the mid-196O's
can be seen within the context of this policy of "constructive contact". Under
general Suharto's military dictatorship Indonesia formed a crucial bulwark against
communist expansionism and social unrest, and particularly in the 198O's and
199O's, became a conduit for Australia in its growing economic ties with the Asia
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99region. The solidity of this relationship was demonstrated in March 1994, when
Prime Minister Keating described Australia's relations with Indonesia as "a model
for partnership between developed a developing partnerships".119 However, this
arrangement may have come at a price. Australia's decision to ignore Indonesia's
invasion of East Timor in 1975 and subsequent violent suppression of the
Timorese could be regarded as one of the more controversial episodes in
Australian foreign policy. Despite Australia's contribution to humanitarian
intervention in East Timor in 1999, it has received much criticism for its lack of
support for plight of the Timorese people.120
Perhaps the most significant and enduring theme to have emerged after 1972
was the redefinition and re-conceptualisation of Australian security. As Higgot and
Nossal contend, throughout much of the 20th Century, concern has focused on the
threat to sovereignty presented by those who might challenge or invade
Australian territory, "most palpably seen in the invasion scares of the early
194O's".121 The tendency to think of security in primarily political-military terms still
remains in some quarters. However, from the early 197O's many Australians
began to define security according to broader categories, with threats seen as
located in the economic realm than in the military sphere. Former Australian
Foreign Minister Gareth Evans has suggested that these new trends represent a
significant departure from traditional Cold War thinking of security against
potential adversaries in favour of seeking security with others.122
However, Australian strategic culture has continuously exhibited a tendency to
seek collective responses to security threats. The change has come in its choice
of security partners and its definition of threat. As Cheeseman suggests, by the
early 199O's official documents relating to Australian defence and related issues
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100began discussing "security communities, confidence and security building
mechanisms, multi-lateralism and so on".123
Australia has thus sought to promote a regional security dialogue as a means of
containing intra-regional tension and promoting stability and development. The
Asianization of Australia's security policy in conjunction with defence self-reliance
has entailed a greater independence from the US. However, it would be wrong to
assume that Australia has completely disengaged itself from US security interests.
Most of Australia's regional security initiatives have involved attempts to
perpetuate America's continued commitment to the region and to minimise any
effects of American military withdrawal. Thus, while Australia has liberated itself
from the constraints of traditional alliance commitments and pursued a new,
broader security agenda, based around the idea of collective regional security, its
reliance on US military power to protect core interests in the event of a breakdown
in regional relations, is still in evidence. In a region experiencing distinct economic
disparity, cultural and religious cleavages, territorial disputes and high levels of
militarization (potentially including nuclear weapons), Australia has remained
reliant on American security guarantees as a last resort. Thus, while Australia has
acquired many elements of a new strategic culture since the early 197O's there
are still competing traditional tendencies in evidence.
The Emergence of a Non-Nuclear Strategic Culture
The ALP entered office in 1972 with a "well developed and unequivocal policy on
nuclear proliferation".124 Whitlam took little time in ratifying the NPT and cancelling
the Jervis Bay reactor project. In addition, Baxter and Titterton, two of the most
prominent nuclear weapons advocates, were removed from various technical
advisory committees.125 In effect, this signalled the end of Australia's interest in
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101nuclear weapons. While Whitlam retained an interest in the economic benefits of
uranium mining and exports, the issue of nuclear weapons remained closed.
Nonetheless, there are a number of references in the literature to the weapons
option remaining open up for some time after. The Strategic Basis of Australian
Defence Policy in 1975 argued that Australia should make sure that it maintained
enough technical capability to reinvigorate a nuclear weapons option in the event
that the "country might be forced to consider turning to them for protection at
some indeterminate time".126
In his autobiography, Bill Hayden, (Foreign Minister to Prime Minster Bob Hawke)
has suggested that in 1984, he proposed the maintenance of limited activities
designed to reduce the lead time in acquiring nuclear weapons, should the need
arise.127 Hayden indicates that he was concerned as to the intentions of
Australia's near neighbours, which led him to suggest that Australia move to the
"threshold of being able to assemble nuclear weaponry... in the shortest possible
time".128 As T.V Paul postulates, this may have been a reaction to Japan's
accumulation of plutonium, yet there appears to have been minimal interest
shown to Hayden's advice within government.129 Nonetheless, this has led to
suggestions elsewhere that Australia had "joined the ranks of the opaque
proliferators".130
It may therefore have been the case that Australia sought the establishment of a
civilian nuclear industry inside the NPT, which could have been harnessed to a
military effort in the event of a deterioration in Australia's security position. This
would have done nothing to improve Australia's access to, or development of
delivery systems or the engineering aspects of weapons development. But as an
NPT signatory, Australia could generally strengthen its civilian nuclear programme
126
Ball, "Australia and Nuclear Policy", p.325.
127 Bill Hayden, An Autobiography (Pymble, NSW: Angus & Roberston, 1996) p. 422,
128 Ibid. pp. 422-423.
129
Paul, op cit, p.77
130
Reynolds, "Rethinking the Joint Project", op cit, p.867.
102thus shortening the weaponization process without jeopardising its alliance
relationships.
Whether Australia did retain any genuine interest in nuclear weapons following
accession to the NPT is open to speculation. It could be assumed that Australia
indirectly retained information and technology, through its civilian activities and
research, that would allow it to acquire nuclear weapons in a relatively short
space of time. This might lead to suggestions that Australia has retained a
"virtual" nuclear weapons capability. This raises the question of intentions. While
much emphasis has been placed on the changing nature of Australian strategic
culture into the 197O's, it might be wrong to assume a wholesale and immediate
transition to a new strategic cultural mentality. There were many traditionalists
within Australia who maintained a distrust of Asia and clung to a Cold War
ideological mentality throughout the 197O's and 1980's. In a contemporary sense,
proliferation threats in Northeast Asia and nuclear realities in South Asia, might
lead realist theorists to suggest the enduring nature of Australian nuclear
intentions.
However, these material realities have been interpreted in a progressively non-
threatening way by successive Australian governments. While there has been a
retention of more traditional perceptions of threat, the dominant strategic cultural
mentality since 1972 has been "non-oppositional", resulting in benign nuclear
intentions. While it is possible to identify a number of competing strategic cultural
tendencies which may persuade decision-makers to continue to stress the
importance of military deterrence and possible aggressive intentions of some Asia
states, these have not been sufficiently strong enough to re-open the nuclear
question. In effect, the Australian strategic culture of non-nuclearism has become
strong and enduring. Equally enduring is Australia's apparent reliance on US
nuclear guarantees, which ensures that Australia has no requirement for its own
nuclear deterrent. It would therefore seem far from conclusive that Australia has
deliberately and intentionally retained a virtual nuclear arsenal.
103The "Good International Citizen": Australia's Contribution to
Nuclear Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-proliferation
Having signed the NPT and committed itself to a long-term policy of nuclear
abstinence, Australia began to consider a pro-active role in nuclear arms control,
disarmament and non-proliferation issues. Under Prime Minister Malcolm Fräser,
Australia imposed rigorous safeguards on its uranium exports as well as
continuing its call for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to the United
Nations. However, it was the activities of Hawke's Labour government in the
realm of nuclear and conventional disarmament and arms control, which gave
Australia's its high profile status in this area. Throughout the 1980's, Australia
pressed the US and the Soviets to halt the nuclear arms race; continued its
campaign for a CTBT, and promoted the global norm of non-proliferation.131 In
1983, Australia appointed its first Minister for Disarmament to represent the
country in various international bodies such as the Conference on Disarmament
(CD).132 In 1984, Australia provided the initiative for the conclusion of a South
Pacific Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SPNWFZ), which culminated a year later in
the signing of Treaty of Rarotonga.133
Australia's support of the SPNWFZ was based on resistance to French nuclear
testing in the region. This became a hot issue upon the French announcement in
1995 that it was to resume underground nuclear testing at Muraroa Atoll in the
South Pacific. The strong public reaction which the French tests aroused forced
Australia into a diplomatic stand-off with France and led to the formation of the
Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons.134 The report
produced by the Commission in 1996, proposed a series of immediate and long
term steps for the NWS' to eliminate their arsenals.135
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104Australia's resistance to French nuclear testing, fitted well with its pursuit of "good
international citizenship" based on the belief that "for both moral and practical
reasons" Australia should "actively pursue the rule of law, common security and a
just division of rights and responsibilities".136 In a similar vein Australia sought to
use the Canberra Commission to "establish itself as the 'bridge' between the
nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states".137 Thus, Australian strategic culture had
developed a new dimension which stressed the need for Australia to act as "the
good guy" in international affairs and to take a moral standpoint on nuclear
weapon issues. In one sense this may be a reflection of the development of the
independence mentality which pushed Australia into expressing its individuality
and forging a new, distinctive role for itself.
Equally, however the impact of public opinion cannot be understated here. As
Trevor Findlay suggests, both the Australian and the New Zealand governments
were caught offguard by the severity of the public response to French nuclear
testing. The Australian Foreign Minister was thus forced to "mount more robust
response".138 Public revulsion at the French Tests engendered a vociferous
demand for a tough Australian anti-nuclear weapons policy, which undoubtedly
stimulated the Government into creating the Canberra Commission.
It might be suggested that there is an irony in Australia's creation of the Canberra
Commission and its promotion of a SPNWFZ, whilst continuing to rely on US
nuclear guarantees. This may reflect competing strategic cultural tendencies.
While Australia exhibits a strategic cultural preference for fulfilling a role as the
"good international citizen", and facilitating regional dialogue and cooperation, the
traditional strategic culture of fear continues to influence decision-making. Hence
while Australia is keen commit itself to nuclear arms control and disarmament, it
continues to be mindful of the need for nuclear protection.
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105Conclusion: The Relevance of Strategic Culture to Australia's
Non Nuclear Weapon Outcome
Realist theories would account for Australia's non-nuclear weapon outcome
according to external material factors. A good example is provided by Paul who
explains Australia's "nuclear forbearance" according to the benign security
environment facing Australia and the deterrent effect provided by the ANZUS
alliance.139 According to Paul, the "low conflict environment and the lack of
credible security threats"140 led Australia towards a less intense requirement for
defence. The acquisition of nuclear weapons would thus have encouraged
potential adversaries to acquire their own nuclear weapons. Ultimately, given that
Australia was facing the more likely possibility of low level, insurgency-type
activities, the acquisition of nuclear weapons was seen as offering minimal utility.
Indeed such a policy would likely provoke adversaries and aggravate the US, who
would support a non-nuclear Australia in the event of nuclear hostilities. It was
thus in Australia's interest to sign the NPT and promote the non-proliferation of
nuclear weapons. From a realist perspective the non-nuclear outcome can
therefore be* explained according to cost-benefit reactions to external material
circumstances.
This chapter has brought into question the accounts, which rely exclusively on
security-materialist variables for explanation and ignore cultural factors. It has not
been the aim to bring into question the relevance of material factors. However,
these factors only become meaningful when we consider the strategic cultural
context in which decision-makers approached them.
Australia initially considered, the nuclear option because it felt threatened. This
assumption of threat was shaped by the Australian strategic culture of fear, which
accentuated the perceived danger associated with the "yellow peril" and the
Paul, op cit, p.78.
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Ibid. p.79.spread of communism. Thus, in the minds of many Australian's, the regional
security environment of South East Asia was far from benign. These insecurities
provided the catalyst for a nuclear debate in Australia.
The Australian decision to abstain from nuclear acquisition centred around its
relationship with the US. The proposals for the transfer of nuclear weapons from
Britain to Australia and the idea of an indigenous programme, both fell victim to
US non-proliferation policy. Ultimately, Australia was guided by the belief that the
US would provide it with a nuclear defence and that to proliferate itself, was to
endanger US-Australian relations.
Why did Australia regard the US as an ally and its nuclear weapons as a source
of security? This chapter has advanced the argument that Australia has been
strategic culturally pre-disposed to consider the US as a friend and ally.
Furthermore, the strategic culture of fear and insecurity has driven Australia into a
reliance on the security and protection afforded by its "great and powerful friends".
While the lure of a nuclear option may have been tempting to many, this strategic
culture of dependence ensured that Australia would rely on US nuclear weapons
rather than risk acting alone. The manner in which Australia distinguished
between threats/ enemies and friends/ allies was thus a crucial factor in shaping
the non-nuclear outcome.
This chapter has also illustrated the relevance of other external cultural
influences. Australia's initial interest in nuclear weapons may well have been
stimulated by an emerging international proliferation culture, which suggested that
nuclear weapons were to become a common and integral feature of modern
military arsenals. However, a policy of nuclear restraint might have been shaped
by an international non-proliferation culture, which shaped negative perceptions
concerning the spread of nuclear weapons.
107The recent release of official documentation relating to the Australian case may
stimulate a wealth of new research into the so-called "surprise down under".
Writers may be encouraged to dig deep within the archives in order to provide the
same rigorous empirical research that is available with regard to other
proliferation cases. Yet without attention to strategic cultural context, such
research can offer only limited insights.
108Chapter Four: South Africa
Introduction.
As an example of a non-nuclear weapon outcome, the South African case is
problematic. In March 1993, President F.W De Klerk announced that South
Africa, had previously assembled six gun-assembly nuclear weapons that had
subsequently been dismantled, following a decision, taken in 1990, to
denuclearise. Thus, unlike Australia and Sweden, who restrained their nuclear
ambitions, South Africa crossed the nuclear threshold and acquired a
weapons capability, prior to its non-nuclear decision. Nonetheless, South
Africa has signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT) and established a safeguards agreement with the IAEA which
concluded in 1993 that there was no indication that there remained "any
sensitive components of the nuclear weapons program".1 It is therefore
feasible to conclude that South Africa is a non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS).
As a non-proliferation case the South African nuclear story is both well-
documented and widely researched by virtue of providing the only example of
a state which has voluntarily and unilaterally dismantled its nuclear weapons
capability.2
The focus of this study is to provide a strategic cultural insight into South
Africa's decision to revert to a non-nuclear status. However, the same factors
that underpinned the initial decision to proliferate are relevant when analysing
the decision to denuclearise. South African nuclear history is dominated by a
series of persistent strategic cultural themes, which were as prevalent at the
inception of the nuclear programme as they were at its close. If the
identification of an Afrikaner strategic culture can provide insights into the
nuclearisation process then equally, it will lead towards a
1
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109more comprehensive understanding of the non-nuclear outcome. From a
strategic cultural standpoint, South African nuclearisation and
denuclearisation cannot be divorced. The South African case thus provides a
different, yet no less relevant, example of how a strategic culture approach
can provide new insights into non- nuclear weapon outcomes.
Any analysis of South African strategic decision-making from 1948 must
concentrate on the Nationalist Party which served as the mouthpiece for the
White minority Afrikaner population and governed South Africa until the first
democratic elections in 1994. It is the contention of this research that strategic
decision-making throughout the nuclearisation and denuclearisation process,
directly corresponded to the interests of the White minority Government,
which in turn reflected the historical, psychological, social, political and cultural
development of the Afrikaner nation. The Afrikaner laager3 mentality, which
directly correlates to the Afrikaner obsession with the idea of facing 'total
onslaught', had become deeply embedded in the White South African psyche
by the mid 197O's. The "total national strategy" designed as a response to the
"total onslaught", developed into a comprehensive societal response to this
perceived threat, in a way that illustrates the connection between the Afrikaner
cultural worldview and South African strategic and nuclear decision-making.
However, as will become apparent, the decision to dismantle South Africa's
weapons capability must be seen as part of a broader process of social and
political transformation in South Africa. Central to this process was the growth
of an enlightened, liberal movement within the National Party, which
recognised the failure of the apartheid system and acknowledged the need for
reform. South Africa's nuclear rollback was thus a response by the White
Government to what many within the Afrikaner movement, saw as impending
doom. The non-nuclear decision was very much a product of the same
strategic cultural mentality that prevailed through the period when nuclear
weapons were seen as conducive to the Afrikaner State's survival. This
3
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110research will seek to analyse the cultural pre-dispositions that underlay the
Afrikaner strategic preoccupation with a "total onslaught" and the resulting
"total national strategy". Such was the centrality of strategic and military
matters to the South African state by the 1980's that it is possible to discuss
the notion of "total strategic culture". Inevitably, the role of individuals such as
P.W. Botha and F.W. De Klerk will be important in this process and it will be
necessary to establish how representative these individuals were of the
dominant Afrikaner culture.
It is not the aim of this chapter to provide a new explanation of South Africa's
non-nuclear weapon outcome. Furthermore, no attempt will be made to refute
the centrality of material factors, which realist theories rely upon for
explanation. The aim is to challenge accounts which seek to regard South
African non-nuclear decision-making as a simple cost-benefit equation based
on rational, calculated assumptions as to national interest. The South African
elite acted according to the national interest, but particular perceptions and
assumptions that correlated to an Afrikaner strategic cultural mentality shaped
this interest.
From Acquisition to Dismantlement : The Rise and Fall of
South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Programme.
As Robert Jaster has suggested, South Africa's nuclear weapon programme
must be seen "within the framework of its general nuclear development
program".4 This programme originated in South Africa's abundant uranium
reserves, which were sought by the United States and Great Britain for the
Manhatten Project.5 In 1950, the US and the UK signed a purchasing deal
with South Africa which turned it into one of the World's biggest uranium
4
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Illproducers. According to William Long and Suzette Grillot, by the 196O's South
Africa was the world's third largest producer of uranium and a partner with the
US and the UK on many nuclear energy matters.6 In 1957, the US made a
co-operative agreement with South Africa whereby the US provided a nuclear
research reactor, SAFARI-1, which went critical in 1965.7 The processing of
indigenous uranium and the acquisition of the reactor provided the possibility
of South Africa enriching its own uranium, described by Jaster as "the most
important step toward achieving an independent nuclear capability".8
In July 1970, Prime Minister John Vorster announced that South Africa had
developed a "unique" process whereby it could enrich uranium.9 At the time,
Vorster was quick to stress that this technological breakthrough would be
used only for peaceful purposes and not for weapons acquisition. Having
obtained sufficient quantities of enriched uranium, the South African Minister
of Mines authorised investigations into producing nuclear explosives in 1971.
Following a report by the Atomic Energy Corporation (AEC) in 1974, which
suggested that the development of a nuclear explosive device for peaceful
uses was feasible, Vorster approved plans for the construction of a test site in
the Kalahari Desert.
The highly enriched uranium (HEU) required for a nuclear explosive device
was provided by a pilot enrichment plant, named the Y-Plant, which began
producing small amounts of HEU in January 1978.10 The Y-Plant yielded 45
percent enriched uranium for the SAFARI reactor as well as providing low-
enriched uranium for the Koeberg nuclear power reactors near Cape Town.11
Although these facilities were not involved in the direct application towards
weapons, the South Africa government possessed the necessary materials
and know-how to proceed with the development of an independent nuclear
weapons capability, should the political will exist.
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112Identifying the point at which South Africa actually decided to switch the
emphasis from peaceful nuclear explosives (PNEs) to constructing nuclear
weapons remains contentious. The official explanation offered by de Klerk in
his March 1993 announcement suggests that the decision to weaponize was
taken in 1974 in response to the deteriorating security situation in Southern
Africa. However, according to Waldo Stumpf, the decision was not taken until
1977, with the Prime Ministers approval given in 1978.12 For others, the official
explanation fails to account for the fact that the option of a South African
nuclear deterrent was seriously discussed well before 1974.13
David Albright suggests that following Vorster's approval of construction of a
test site in 1974, the Atomic Energy Board (AEB), which merged with the
Uranium Enrichment Corporation (UCOR) to form the AEC in 1982, spent the
next three years experimenting with the propellants for a gun-type device.14
The development of this device proceeded at a quicker pace than the Y-Plant
could produce fissile material. Hence the planned test in the Kalahari in 1977
was to have been conducted without HEU. The detection of the test site by a
Soviet satellite on July 30 1977, forced South Africa to abandon its testing
programme. A second incident in September 1979, whereby a US Vela
satellite detected a "double flash" over the South Indian Ocean, also alerted
international attention towards the possibility of South African nuclear
ambitions.
By November 1979, sufficient HEU was available for a gun-type device.15 The
design of this device was similar to the US bomb that exploded over
Hiroshima in 1945, whereupon a HEU bullet is propelled through a metal tube
12
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113towards a larger mass of HEU, "thus ensuring high reliability without testing".16
Reiss maintains that having assembled the first device to "see if everything
fitted properly ... the device was then disassembled and handed over to
ARMSCOR, the state-owned arms manufacturing corporation, for
safekeeping".17 The second nuclear device was manufactured in 1982. By this
time, it had been decided that the main task-of designing and building the
gun-type design would be passed to ARMSCOR, with the AEC providing the
HEU and theoretical support.18 A new ARMSCOR building, the Kentron Circle
(later renamed Advena) was constructed near Pelindiba. Subsequently, the
weapons arsenal increased every year and a half, until six were available by
the late 1980's. A seventh device was in the process of being manufactured
when the programme was terminated in 1989.19
There has been much discussion as to whether ARMSCOR was looking to
eventually replace the gun-type devices with advanced gun-type and
implosion devices. The development of an implosion device would have been
the "first step towards more advanced designs using thermonuclear materials
and suitable for warheads".20 However, Albright suggests that although
research into implosion-type devices had been conducted since the initiation
of the nuclear explosive programme, this research was not considered to be a
priority. Albright argues that weapons designers did not believe that an
implosion weapon was necessary unless South Africa was looking to
construct a thermonuclear weapon. Such a possibility was, in Albright's
opinion, never taken seriously.21
The extent to which South Africa proceeded with the development of
thermonuclear devices prior to the decision to terminate the programme in
1989 is open to speculation. A report compiled by the United Nations in 1991,
suggested that, "so far, there is no evidence that South Africa has taken this
16
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114final step".22 However, the revelation of a missile test at Overberg in May 1989
and the subsequent confirmation by the South African authorities of the
successful launch of a "booster rocket", heightened fears of a South African
intention to develop "nuclear-tipped missiles".23
On 14th September 1989, F.W de Klerk was elected President of South Africa.
De Klerk immediately summoned Waldo Stumpf (Chief Executive of the AEC)
and Wynand De Villiers, (Executive Chairman of the AEC) and informed them
of his intention to terminate the nuclear weapons programme and sign the
NPT.24 By July 1990 the Government had begun the implementation of the
dismantlement process. By September 1991, all of ARMSCOR's HEU had
been removed from the weapons, melted down and sent back to the AEC for
storage. Soon after, the Advena building was decontaminated and its
equipment sent to the AEC. Although not all of the HEU had been passed to
the AEC by the time of South Africa accession to the NPT on the 10th July
1991, it had all been sent prior to the establishment of IAEA safeguards on
16th September 1991.25 By the time de Klerk announced the existence of
South Africa's nuclear weapons programme, most of the evidence relating to
weapons construction had been destroyed.
South Africa's Nuclear Strategy
Having sketched the details of the events and decisions that characterised the
birth and death of the South African nuclear programme, it is now necessary
to gain insights into the possible motivations, perceptions and assumptions
underlying this process. Two basic questions require answering: 1) For what
purpose did South Africa seek a weapons capability in the first place? 2) Why,
eventually, was the decision taken to dismantle this capability? The dominant
approach towards addressing these questions has been offered by the realist
theories which seek to explain the nuclearisation process according to the
22
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115hostile international environment, which initially forced South Africa to
increase its own security through weapons acquisition. Subsequently, an
improvement in the international political and strategic environment by the end
of the end of the 198O's, suggested that a conventionalization of South African
military capabilities would be in its security interests.
From a realist perspective, South Africa's acquisition of nuclear weapons
might therefore be seen as a direct consequence of a degeneration in its
external security environment in the 197O's. A nuclear deterrent would be
considered a rational response to an increase in threat. However, as David
Fischer argues, this raises questions as to who the South Africans were
looking to deter with a nuclear capability and how they expected this deterrent
to operate.26 As Fischer notes, the greatest threat to the South African
government came from within its own frontiers and in a manner that rendered
the threat or use of nuclear weapons as irrelevant.27 Equally, it is necessary to
ask how probable it was that Moscow, would have considered South Africa as
a strategic target, worthy of an inter-continental nuclear attack. It might
therefore seem tenuous to stress the deterrent function of a South African
nuclear capability in terms of deterring against a Soviet nuclear attack.
The official and most widely accepted explanation is that the South African
Government sought a nuclear capability as a political bargaining tool in its
relationship with the West. Long and Grillot conclude that "it is within the
context of South Africa's search for a Western guarantee of its security that
the acquisition and dismantlement of nuclear weapons can best be
explained".28 The aim was therefore to develop a limited weapons capability
that would force the West to provide a nuclear guarantee to "offset the Soviet
Union's capacity for nuclear dominance".29 This is a clear indication of the
uncertainty that pervaded South Africa's nuclear relations with the West. As
has already been suggested, South Africa's relationship with the West and
26
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116particularly the US, oscillated during the 1960's and 197O's as the US
struggled to justify its continuing nuclear co-operation with the South African
Government in the face of mounting international condemnation of the South
African apartheid regime. Moreover, Pretoria came to doubt the availability of
a security guarantee from the US. By the late 197O's, the West was
considered, from a White South African perspective, to have abandoned the
South African State to Marxist forces in Southern Africa and thus formed an
integral part of the total onslaught facing the White regime. President Botha
declared in 1986 that South Africa was facing a challenge from the capitalist
West as much as from the Communist West.30
Nonetheless, Pretoria recognised that while the US could not be relied upon
for an explicit nuclear security guarantee, the development of an ambiguous
nuclear capability would heighten US strategic sensitivities in the Southern
African region and force the US Government to recognise the importance of
South Africa to the global strategic equation. A suspected but undeclared
South African nuclear capability to deploy nuclear weapons would thus force
the US to incorporate South Africa into its security sphere and so offset any
Soviet intentions in the region. Through this calculated ambiguity, Pretoria
sought to manipulate the strategic calculations of both the US and the USSR.
The notion of a "catalytic deterrent" perhaps best sums up the aim of a South
African weapons capability designed to play on Western proliferation fears.31
Most commentators agree with the official suggestion that the South Africa
Government never intended to use its nuclear weapons. De Klerk himself
suggested that "it was never the intention to use the devices and from the
outset the emphasis was on deterrence".32 A policy of neither confirming nor
denying a nuclear capability was considered to be the first option open to
defence planners. A second phase was envisaged whereby, in the event of
South African territory being threatened, a covert acknowledgement of South
Africa's nuclear capability would be made.33 If this step failed to illicit a
30
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117response then a third stage, whereby one or more nuclear devices would be
detonated, would become a reality, thereby confirming publicly a nuclear
capability.
The extent to which South Africa's nuclear deterrent was ever conceived by
decision-makers in terms of its usability, is open to discussion. The official
line, as outlined by Stumpf, centres on the notion that Pretoria never reached
a stage where it contemplated the use of nuclear weapons. According to
Stumpf "no offensive tactical capability was ever foreseen or intended as it
was fully recognised that such an act would bring about international
retaliation on a massive scale".34 This would seem to re-assert the notion of a
nuclear deterrent designed to exact political concessions rather than to ensure
a tactical advantage in Southern Africa. For others, the official explanation of
South Africa's nuclear doctrine is evidence of post hoc rationalisation. As
Darryl Howlett and John Simpson suggest, there are grounds for suspecting
rationalisation after the fact when considering the rather "naive, if not
incredible thinking behind this doctrine".35
Kenneth Adelman and Albion Knight have suggested in their list of possible
roles for South African nuclear weapons, that "in a worse-case scenario,
nuclear weapons could help against a large-scale conventional build-up
- to
break-up a concentration of conventional forces against South Africa's
industrial and population centres".36 Yet how likely was a large scale
conventional assault on South Africa and why could this not be repelled using
conventional forces? Equally, who would South African nuclear weapons have
been targeted at and according to what strategic assumptions?
Without small, clean, sophisticated and reliable nuclear devices, it was difficult
to envisage a clear battlefield role for South Africa's nuclear capability. This
would seem to support the notion that the Afrikaner bomb was very much a
politico-strategic tool, by which Pretoria could demonstrate its resolve against
34
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118the Soviet military build-up in the region and the strategic importance of South
Africa to the US. The ambiguity surrounding South Africa's intentions and the
apparent mystery surrounding incidents such as the possible Kalahari nuclear
test in 1977 and the Vela Satellite incident in 1979, provide testament to the
assumption that Pretoria sought to awaken the West to the strategic
importance of South Africa, which would remain defiant as an international
pariah.
It is the contention of this research that the same factors which operated in
favour of nuclear weapons acquisition are of crucial importance in explaining
the decision to denuclearise. The requirement for a nuclear deterrent almost
certainly receded with an improvement in South Africa's external relations. On
the one hand, regional insecurity was alleviated following Soviet retreat from
Angola and a co-operative arrangement, which ensured Namibian
independence.37 Equally, the break-up of the Soviet Union and the ending of
the Cold War suggested a less threatening global geo-strategic environment
for Pretoria. With the alleviation of fears concerning a Soviet sponsored,
assault by a Front-Line State in Southern Africa, the strategic imperative for a
conventionalization of military capabilities was decisive. The decision to
abandon a nuclear weapons programme was thus influenced by the need to
adjust to external developments, which undermined any role for a nuclear
deterrent.
Furthermore by the mid-198O's South Africa was faced with debilitating
economic and political isolation. Between 1985 and 1988, over 100
companies pulled out of South Africa and all Organization for Economic Co¬
operation and Development countries (OECD) imposed sanctions against the
regime.38 By the late 198O's Pretoria began to recognise the economic and
political costs of its racial policies and made efforts to rejoin the international
community. Signing the NPT and asserting a commitment to global nuclear
non-proliferation were seen by Pretoria as an essential part of this process.
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119Thus Pretoria may have concluded that the solution to South Africa's
problems lay in the "political rather the military area and the nuclear deterrent,
along with strategic ambiguity, was becoming a burden rather than a
benefit".39 Subsequently South Africa would look to embrace new conceptions
of security, which suggested a move away from narrow military and strategic
concerns, and towards broader definitions of regional and global security.
This chapter does not set out to refute the argument that by the late 198O's,
South Africa considered nuclear weapons to be less of a help and more of a
hindrance based on assumptions as to likely political, economic and strategic
costs of a nuclear capability. Furthermore, South Africa responded to the end
of the Cold War and an improvement in regional security conditions by
seeking political and economic re-integration into the international community
through internal reform; which included a rollback of its nuclear capabilities.
However, this chapter seeks to challenge the notion that decisions were taken
according to rational, cost-benefit equations that apply to all states facing
these conditions. Rather we need to consider the relevance of the cultural
context. The case presented here seeks to gain insights into these processes
by looking into the strategic cultural context, which constituted how decision¬
makers reacted to material circumstances. To do this it is necessary to
investigate the strategic culture that shaped the perceptions and assumptions
that guided the Afrikaner elite through the nuclear decision-making process.
Afrikaner strategic culture acted as a perceptual prism through which security
and material conditions were observed. It was through this cultural lens that
questions relating to external and internal threats, security arrangements and
nuclear weapons were viewed.
The Strategy Of "Pariah-hood"
For structural realists, South Africa's nuclear weapons acquisition can be
attributed to its position in the international system as a diplomatically isolated
39
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120and strategically threatened state.40 South Africa possessed no security
guarantees from another state and, following the termination of the
Simonstown agreement with Britain, had no formal defence ties with any other
state.41 Furthermore, its apartheid policy had engendered widespread
international condemnation in such a manner as to isolate South Africa from
the international community.
As a diplomatically isolated state, South Africa belonged to a select group of
states, which Robert Harkavy has described as" pariahs. Harkavy defines a
Pariah State as "a small power with only a marginal and tenuous control over
its own fate, whose security dilemma cannot easily be solved by neutrality,
nonalignment or appeasement".42 For this reason South Africa has been
bracketed with states such as Israel, Taiwan and South Korea. Moore refers
to the "league of the desperate" or the "alliance of the disenchanted" when
identifying the tendency for pariah states to establish informal arrangements
between each other for the transfer of supplies, technology and raw materials.
This is used to explain the allegedly close co-operative relationship between
Israel and South Africa in the military field.43
Moore suggests that the common characteristic of these pariah states has
been their "paranoia about being deserted by the West".44 While South Africa
remained close to the United States in terms of nuclear co-operation,
diplomatic relations remained strained throughout as a result of South Africa's
40
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121racial policy.45 In 1975, South Africa, with covert US support, intervened in the
Angolan Civil War in the fight against the Soviet-supported Movimento
Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA).46 The operation itself was a
disaster and proved to be a costly for South Africa.47 US official disassociation
with these events forced South Africa to rethink its relationship with the West.
Prior to the Angolan episode South Africa had viewed itself as a Western
bulwark against Communism in Southern Africa. The Angolan episode "fuelled
a grim determination to wage an anti-Communist crusade alone".48
US-South African relations deteriorated significantly following the Soweto riots
in 1976, whereby thousands of Blacks took to the street in protest at
economic conditions and racial discrimination. Over Six hundred people were
killed and thousands injured as the Government fought to suppress the
demonstrations.49 The Soweto episode led to further international diplomatic
isolation for Pretoria. Prime Minister Vorster concluded in his 1977 New Year's
Day Address that "if therefore a Communist onslaught should be made
against South Africa, directly or under camouflage, South Africa will have to
face it alone".50 By the late 197O's South Africa's participation in the UN
General Assembly and its specialized assemblies was suspended. In addition
the Security Council imposed an arms embargo, which came into force in
1977. In the same year, South Africa was denied its designated seat at the
IAEA Board of Governors.51
Did South Africa acquire nuclear weapons as a result of its international
ostracization? De Klerk has referred to the importance of Pretoria's relative
international isolation and the fact that it could not rely on outside assistance
45
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122in the event of an attack in explaining the requirement for a weapons
capability. South Africa's sense of Western abandonment was exacerbated by
what it saw as a serious Marxist threat in Southern Africa. South Africa's failed
venture into Angola in 1975 resulted in the new Luanda Government's open
hostility toward Pretoria and the arrival of fifty thousand Cuban Troops. With a
pro-Soviet Marxist regime assuming power in Mozambique, South Africa
considered its borders to be at risk, if not in the form of full-scale scale
conventional assault, then through counter-insurgency guerrilla activity.
For realist theorists, such a situation would seem to provide a clear catalyst
for proliferation. Facing what it perceived as multiple strategic threats and
without a security guarantee, South Africa was forced to maximise its security
through the acquisition of a nuclear deterrent. South African nuclearisation
was thus born out of state insecurity. Subsequently, with the break up of the
Soviet Union and signing of the Tri-partite agreement in 1988, whereby Cuban
and Soviet troops withdrew from Southern Africa, the security threat facing
South Africa receded. This presented a clear strategic incentive to
denuclearise and restore diplomatic and political relations with the
international community.
However, it is inadequate to refer to this process as a rational cost-benefit
response to external conditions. Instead, South African's nuclear decision¬
making process must be considered within the context of a distinct Afrikaner
worldview. Hence another state with different strategic cultural pre¬
dispositions, may have interpreted the same external environment in a
different manner. The White South African government interpreted the
external environment according to a strategic culture, which tended to
exaggerate threats and demonize enemies. Central to this strategic culture
was a laager mentality, which characterised the besieged nature of
Afrikanerdom's internal and external relations. It was through the perceptual
lens provided by Afrikaner strategic culture that decisions relating to nuclear
weapons were taken.
123The notion of a total onslaught facing the Afrikaner Government was
predicated on more than just the fear of attack from external attack. The threat
was also real internally, as the White Government sought to maintain the
status quo and defend the apartheid regime against internal dissent. By the
mid-198O's the laager was faced with increasingly violent Black Nationalist
protest, led by the African National Congress (ANC), which sought an end to
the apartheid system. The notion of a total onslaught thus encapsulated more
than the fear of Soviet-led attack from the Front Line African States. It also
came in the form of an internal challenge from a disenfranchised majority,
threatening the overthrow of White minority rule.
Again, it is important to consider the way in which Afrikaner strategic culture
predisposed the White Government to interpret this internal threat. As will be
shown, in terms of the perception of a total onslaught posed by the anti-
apartheid movement, the Government did not distinguish between domestic
and external threats: both were seen as part of the overall challenge to White
South Africa. Equally, the anti-apartheid movement, both internally and
externally was considered to be in collusion with Communist forces throughout
Southern Africa, which sought the revolutionary overthrow of the South
African state. Whether these fears were real or justified is, in terms of
strategic outcomes, largely irrelevant. The Government reacted to the threat
posed by anti-apartheid resistance within its own borders according to a
genuine fear of revolutionary overthrow, which may explain the repressive
counter-measures. This was characteristic of its strategic cultural mentality,
which sought to defend what it saw as the morally correct path for South
Africa: that of "separate development".
This is not to suggest that the strategic threats facing South Africa were in
some way imagined. The threat posed by anti-apartheid resistance was
certainly very real. Rather it is to suggest that the threats that confronted the
Afrikaner government were viewed through a distorted perceptual lens that
tended to multiply the danger in the minds of the Afrikaner elite. Western
estrangement and Soviet imperialism thus struck at the heart of a paranoid
124Afrikaner worldview, characterised with an obsessive fear of its own demise.
South African nuclear weapons provided a means of alleviating these fears.
Afrikaner Threat Perceptions and Strategic Assumptions
Upto the mid-1970's South Africa's security was assured by a "white cordon
sanitaitä' composed of South African occupied Namibia, Ian Smith's
CO
Rhodesia, and the Portuguese dominions of Mozambique and Rhodesia.
However, from 1974 onwards, South Africa's security position seriously
deteriorated. The creation of a pro-Soviet regime in Angola, cross-border
guerrilla attacks in Namibia and South Africa and the collapse of the White
government in Rhodesia, served to create a serious regional threat in the
minds of the Afrikaner Government.53
From the Afrikaner perspective, the threat posed by Communism in Southern
Africa, was defined in terms of a threat to survival in the form of a total
onslaught of South Africa.54 In 1981, Defence Minister Malan described this
onslaught as "Communist inspired, Communist planned, and Communist
supported".55 Equally, the 1982 Defence White Paper suggested that "the
ultimate aim of the Soviet Union and its allies is to overthrow the present body
politic in the Republic of South Africa and to replace it with a Marxist-oriented
form of government to further the objectives of the USSR".56 This threat was
considered to be total in that it challenged South Africa in political, social,
economic and technological areas.
Coupled with this fear of Soviet imperialism was the perception of a genuine
threat posed by Black Nationalist forces in Southern Africa. In Pretoria's eyes,
this threat was a direct result of Communist agitation. It was assumed that the
African Nationalist forces alone would not mount an effective attack on South
Africa. However, the Soviet Union had the means and the motives to mount
52
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125an opportunist campaign in South Africa. As Steven Metz suggests, the belief
in Pretoria was that a Soviet inspired campaign would be waged through low-
intensity warfare, "utilizing elements of the anti-apartheid movement and Black
Nationalism".57
South African insecurity was fuelled by what it saw as Western abandonment
to Marxist forces. Botha spoke of a "paralysis in the mind of the West", which
prevented it from acknowledging the importance of South Africa to Western
interests.58 As a result, the political and ideological of aspirations of the West,
which sought to isolate South Africa, were seen as part of the total
onslaught.59 By pressuring the South African Government, the Western
powers were seen as "handymen of the Communists; indirectly contributing to
the destruction of capitalism and the establishment of world communism".60
The tendency of successive Nationalist Party Governments to group diverse
critics together in this manner was indicative of a strategic culture, which
stressed the "apocalyptic and holistic" nature of the total onslaught.61
Alexander Johnston argues that the concept of total onslaught was both
ethnocentric and global in its focus. The South African conception of security
was based on a world view which viewed itself, as a nation, at the centre of an
international system which was inherently hostile and intent on the overthrow
of the Afrikaner nation.62 This Afrikaner conception of security has strong
historical and cultural roots, which are worth considering.
Afrikaner history is replete with references to the Afrikaans, as the chosen
people with a divine mission, facing persistent hostility and danger. Prime
Minister D.F Malan suggested in 1942 that
"It is through the will of God that the Afrikaner People exists at all. In his
wisdom He determined that on the Southern point of Africa...a People should
be born who would be the bearer of Christian culture and civilisation. He
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126surrounded this People by great dangers...God also willed that the Afrikaans
People should be continually threatened by other Peoples".63
The emphasis on the "divine calling" and special position of the Afrikaner
people has lead to a particular interpretation of Afrikaner history that makes
repeated reference to certain events such as the Anglo-Boer War and the
"Great Trek".64
The notion of Afrikaners as the chosen people can be traced back to the first
European settlers who arrived at the Cape in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries. With Dutch as a common language these Europeans shared a
strong Christian, Protestant, White identity which was distinct from that of the
indigenous population. As Adam and Gilomee note, "in the daily struggle for
survival in the midst of an overwhelming majority of people who were different
in colour and culture, some colonists developed the notion that they were the
chosen people".65 Over time, this group developed a distinctive character and
culture that developed into a sense of independence and individualism. This
identity was perpetuated by the Afrikaner struggle against British imperialism,
which "brought the concept of a distinct white political entity to the fore".66
The development of the Afrikaner volk was based on a strong sense of "in-
group identification" which sought to distance White, Dutch-speaking
Afrikaans from other racial, ethnic and cultural groupings in South Africa. The
institutionalization of the National Party's racial ideology following its election
in 1948 can thus be attributed to the Afrikaner conception of "group-
83
Quoted in T.Dunbar Moodie, The Rise of Afrikanerdom: Power, Apartheid and the Afrikaner Civil Religion
(University of California Press, 1980) p.248.
Vernon February suggests that the image of the Boer was firmly established after the Great Trek, where ten
thousand "god-fearing, hardy, tenacious and resplendent human beings" trekked from the Cape Colony between
1836 and 1840, providing the Afrikaner nation with a mythology that was not easy to discard. See Vernon February,
The Afrikaners of South Africa (Keegan Paul Intl. Ltd. 1991). Equally, Pierre Van Der Berghe suggests that the Great
Trek can be considered as the "starting point of Afrikaner nationalism." P. Van Der Berghe, South Africa : A Study in
Conflict (University of California Press, 1965) p.28. See also, J. Alton Templin, "The Ideology of a Chosen People:
Afrikaner Nationalism and the Ossewa Trek," Nations and Nationalism, Vol.5, No.3 1999; Mottie Tamarkin,
"Nationalism or Tribalism': The Evolution of Cape Afrikaner Ethnic Identity in the Late Nineteenth Century", Nations
and Nationalism yoU, No.2 1995.
85
H. Adam and H.Gilomee, Ethnic Power Mobilized: Can South Africa Change (Yale university Press, 1979), p.89.
65
Ibid. p. 100
127belongingness, group mobilization and the defence of group position" that
justified its distinct place in the social structure.67
Just as the Afrikaner volk believed in its own exclusive position within South
African society, so the South African state, under White control, conceived of
itself as a strategically important to global and regional affairs. The acquisition
of a nuclear deterrent was seen in terms of prompting the global community
as to the centrality of South Africa to geo-strategic affairs. The Afrikaner
notion of life as a constant survival against insurmountable enemies akin to a
Hobbesian state of war was equally applicable in the external realm as it was
to the domestic environment. The fear of total onslaught was governed by a
laager mentality, which emphasised the strategic encirclement of a besieged
Afrikaner nation, facing multiple threats on all fronts. This is well illustrated by
the 1973 Defence White Paper which lists among the threats facing South
Africa:
"Leftist activists, exaggerated humanism, permissiveness, materialism and
related ideologies ... black racism, exaggerated individual freedom, one-man-
one vote... boycotts, isolation, demonstrations...undermining activities and
limited violence".68
This "everything but the kitchen-sink" approach towards identifying threats,
suggests that South African politico-strategic perceptions were intertwined
with a strategic culture which tended to distort dangers and accentuate fears.
The strategic rationale underlying South African nuclear decision-making must
be considered within this context.
Total Strategic Culture
Just as the threat facing White South Africa was perceived to be total in terms
of the apocalyptic danger facing Afrikanerdom, so the requirement for a total
strategy emerged as a response. The enemy was perceived to be ubiquitous,
the threat, all encompassing. South Africa was not only diplomatically isolated,
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128but also territorially threatened. A Total Strategy was designed to awaken the
South African people to the severity of the impending onslaught. Having
championed the doctrine of Total Strategy as Defence Minister, P.W Botha
sought its full operationalization as South African Prime Minister. The 1977
Defence White Paper defined Total Strategy as "The Comprehensive Plan to
utilize all means available to the state". Thus, with a "more efficient use and
mobilization of available resources" and an increased societal tolerance to the
requirements of low-intensity conflict, South Africa could look to defend itself
against the multitude of enemies, both internal and external.69
Johnston highlights the manner in which the doctrine of total strategy sought
to fuse the notion of threats to territorial integrity and internal threats to the
established order as there was no clear delineation between civil violence
within South Africa's borders and the threat posed by external forces.70 Those
threatening the integrity of the state from within were assumed to be
collaborating with outside Marxist, Black Nationalist forces whose sole
purpose was the overthrow of Afrikanerdom. By the mid-1970's, the Afrikaner
Government came to accept the notion that while the level of opposition
facing the apartheid regime would "ebb and flow", the threat was likely to be a
long term one and likely to escalate.71
The Afrikaners perceived themselves as God's chosen people, whose divine
destiny it was to survive in a world with insurmountable dangers.72 As Gerald
Brown argues, the Afrikaner sense of isolation and discrimination had a
lengthy history:
"for almost two centuries the Afrikaner Power Elite has lived in a world they
have perceived
- rightly or wrongly
- as fundamentally hostile to Afrikanerdom.
Although the enemy has changed over the years
.... the trauma and
obsession have not".
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129The concept of a total strategy designed to meet a total onslaught was thus
based on a strong sense of historical and cultural experience, which created a
distinct Afrikaner worldview. The significance of this linkage between strategy
and historical, spiritual and cultural precepts becomes evident when
considering that the ideas underlying total onslaught and total strategy came
to "codify, justify and articulate the entire range of government policy".74 The
principles underlying the doctrine of total strategy and its full operationalization
under the Botha administration, can thus be seen as a cultural response by
Afrikanerdom to the strategic dangers facing White South Africa.
The idea of a total national response to Afrikaner insecurity in the realm of
strategy rather than policy is indicative of the severity of the Government's
threat perceptions. It also accords with an Afrikaner conception of security,
which stresses the zero-sum nature of external relations. In this sense realist
theories are correct in assuming that South African foreign policy would adjust
to the vicissitudes of international anarchy and the need for self-help.
However, this strategic behaviour was constituted by the Afrikaner cultural
worldview rather than being a simple rational materialist calculation. As
Grundy attests, Afrikaners exhibited a combative mentality that came to see
so many issues of public affairs bound up in the defence of the White
regime.75
The politics of South Africa were thus based on what Adam and Gilomee have
termed an "ideology of survival" with the Afrikaner nation as the referent
object. According to Adam and Gilomee, the ideology of survival implies an
unquestioned threat and a universal response.76 South Africa's Total Strategy
thus utilized a "language of survival" which created "respectable code words,
vague enough to allow the leadership to manipulate their specific meaning".77
Metz follows up this theme when suggesting that Pretoria undertook a
concerted campaign to manipulate public perceptions and images of the
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130threat facing White society.78 From a tactical angle this would alert people to
the inevitability of violence, which would toughen the people to forthcoming
dangers. Equally, from a political perspective, total strategy sought to prepare
the public for "the more unsavoury features of low-intensity conflict such as
assassination, torture, sabotage and pre-emptive cross-border strikes".79
The mobilization of the South African people according to the doctrine of Total
Strategy was accompanied by wide-ranging institutional reform. As State
President, Botha sought to instigate an organisational revolution in South
Africa, by streamlining what he saw as an unwieldy bureaucracy, and
centralising political power in the executive branch.80 Whereas the previous
Vorster administration sought a slow building of consensus at all levels of the
Party and supporting organisations, in a fairly uncoordinated, ad hoc manner,
the National Party under Botha became more vanguardist, with the Cabinet
being less responsible to parliamentary caucuses.81 Under Botha's
organizational revolution, the decision-making process became tighter and
more centralized, with power placed firmly in the hands of the State President,
the State Security Council (SSC) and the Secretariat.82
The threat of total onslaught was seen to be a military problem and total
strategy, a military solution. It was perhaps, therefore, inevitable that the
Government turned to military personnel for assistance. Barney Horowitz has
argued that "any analysis of South African politics will remain inadequate,
incomplete and misleading without an understanding of the inextricable and
inevitable role the military is playing in the formation and execution of
policy".83 From the Governments point of view, the South African Defence
Force (SADF) offered personnel with expertise in the control and exercise of
coercion, central to the objectives of the total strategy. The Defence Force
was modernised and given an expanded role under Botha who maintained
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131close personal and professional links with the SADF.84 Domestically the SADF
was committed to the preservation of White rule and thus the suppression of
organised Black resistance. Equally, however it sought to "win the hearts and
minds" of Blacks, Coloureds and Asians, who might be persuaded against
resistance. The SADF thus acted as an instrument of political mobilization as
well as security management.
Philip Frankel has provided an interesting insight into the role of the SADF
and military institutions in general, within the functioning of the Afrikaner
State.85 Two important questions arise: 1) To what extent did the SADF exhibit
its own organizational culture? 2) How did this culture relate to the broader
Afrikaner worldview/ mentality? In this manner it will be possible to identify the
link between military organisational culture and the broader Afrikaner societal
culture, in a manner which justifies investigations into an Afrikaner strategic
culture.
Frankel argues that while the South African military may have derived its own
interests and characteristics as an "exclusive body", from the late 197O's it
became "irrevocably tied to the defence of special sectional interests
associated with the perpetuation of South Africa's racial State.86 This would
suggest that the SADF's organizational culture has developed according to
the role assigned to it by the National Party. Military culture would thus
develop in line with broader Afrikaner cultural trends. Under the auspices of
Total National Strategy, the military occupied a central position within the
strategic decision-making process, such that the division between military
organisational culture and broader societal culture became increasingly
blurred. A strategic culture, which reflected the cultural style of the military, as
well as that of politicians, both of which were guided by a broader Afrikaner
cultural mentality, thus influenced the acquisition of nuclear weapons. In
explaining nuclear decision-making, this might distinguish South Africa from
other states such as Sweden, where the military were marginal in terms of the
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132final decisions over nuclear questions. Nonetheless, in all cases, to discuss
strategic culture is to discuss military organisational culture and broader
national or societal culture, irrespective of whether the military actually has the
final say over strategic decisions.
It is possible to identify a number of specific military historical experiences
which have shaped the development of the SADF and that might be important
in shaping civil-military relations. In order to understand the development of
South African civil-military relations, it is, according to Frankel, important to
understand the role of British imperialism in shaping South African
perceptions of military and social relations.87 Frankel describes British
imperialism as "a mechanism for cultural projection".88 In effect the organising
values and institutions found in the SADF are seen as the result of exposure
to British military traditions.
However, Frankel identifies a distinct Afrikaner civil-military tradition based on
the experiences of the early White Settlers, which developed long before the
implantation of a British civil-military tradition. The "Kommando" or "citizen
soldier" based on the idea of small, lightly armed and highly mobile units
geared to irregular and individual action appropriate to the environment
confronted by the Frontier Boers thus exemplified a distinctive Afrikaner
tradition. The notion of a Kommando was tied in with the idea of individuals
forming their own individual defensive mechanisms, most notably with the
circling of wagons in a laager defence. Frankel suggests that the spiritual
impulse of the Kommando was re-awakened by the international isolation
engendered by South Africa's apartheid policy. This rejuvenated the historical
notion of frontiersman,
"far away from colonial authority, or Trekkers isolated in their fight for survival
in the great interior reaches of South Africa
- the same feelings of distance
and threat have been regenerated as South Africa has been pushed to the
margins of the global community".89
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133The Kommando thus encapsulated the specific historical development of the
Afrikaner people and came to symbolise the distinct character of Afrikaner
civil-military relations.
As Frankel argues, the ethic of the Kommando proved to be influential in the
development of civil-military relations in the way that it came to break down
the boundaries between these two realms. Where the British tradition
suggested a distinct segregation between civilian and military organisations
and personnel, the notion of a Kommando implied the free-flow of influences
across civil-military boundaries, with the distinction between soldier and citizen
becoming more unclear. The development of a Total National Strategy in the
1970's was predicated on this notion of the Afrikaner people waging a
"Peoples War" by integrating the military within the broader society so that
they were united and mobilized behind common objectives. In a sense, this
explains why the Afrikaner elite followed a national strategy rather then a
national policy. Such was the dissemination of a military ethos within the
social fabric of White South Africa that civilians and soldiers were as one in
relation to the problems, challenges and strategies relevant to South African
politics. An appeal to strategic requirements would have the most resonance
among the Afrikaans. Equally, this re-emphasises that a discussion of
Afrikaner strategic culture must involve an assessment of Afrikaner culture
beyond that of simple military doctrinal style. Military strategy thus lies at the
heart of the Afrikaner worldview.
The use of civilians in a people's army through conscription infused military
ideals and attitudes within civil society. Equally, however, the reverse was
true: national service entailed the intrusion of civilians into military affairs, in a
way that may have politicized the role of the armed forces in South Africa.
Much is said about P.W Botha's relationship with the SADF in terms of forging
close relations between civilian and military organisations. As Frankel
suggests, perhaps the most important factor in this respect, was the way
Botha's approach, involving careful planning and a rationalized form of action,
134coincided with the more professionalized elements of the SADF corps.90
There was thus a close assimilation between the civil and military realms in a
manner that may have affected the organizational culture of institutions in
both spheres. Together with a mounting feeling of international isolation and a
fear of a regional attack, Pretoria developed a "Garrison State Psychology" to
address its threat perceptions.91 This involved a total mobilisation of South
African society, with military and security organisations coming to play an
increasing role in the running of the State.
The concept of a total strategy was driven by an Afrikaner strategic culture,
which shaped the perception of a total onslaught facing the South African
State. In terms of actual military operation, Total Strategy draws inspiration
from a wide variety of historical and cultural sources. Military advisors were
influenced by the counter-revolutionary experiences of the US in Vietnam, the
British in Malaysia and the French in Algeria. In terms of identifying a classic
text, the writings of Andre Beaufre are seen by Frankel as pivotal in the
development of South Africa's total strategy. In reading Beaufre's An
Introduction to Strategy it is possible to see a direct correlation between his
conception of a total strategy and that employed by the Afrikaner elite.92
Beaufre discusses total strategy in the sense of "aligning military policy with
political policy, with financial, foreign and economic policy".93 This would
suggest a single, coherent and unitary response of a society to the threats it
faces. Strategy must be based on an exploitation of "the results expected from
military operations by suitable operations in the psychological, political,
economic and diplomatic fields".94 Beaufre also states the need for national
opinion to be politically and psychologically prepared well before the actual
initiation of hostilities and the morale of the population to be kept constant at
all times.95
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135In terms of raising public awareness and mobilising public opinion behind the
Government, a propaganda campaign, which stressed the severity of the
communist threat to South Africa, became more prominent. Equally the SADF
came to utilize the State controlled media and numerous other civilian
organisations to propagate the message of total strategy. This is another
example of the way in which military strategic issues moved towards the
centre of civilian affairs in South Africa. As the internal situation worsened and
the regional threat seemed more prominent, so strategic issues moved to the
forefront of the public policy agenda and military personnel came to occupy
leading positions within the National Security Management System.
The South African elite appears to have embraced the ideas of Beaufre, in
terms of mobilizing the people through a winning of hearts and minds, towards
the needs of counter-revolutionary warfare. This is reflected in numerous and
successive Defence White Papers: in 1973, National Defence is described as
"not a matter for the defence forces only, but also for each department and
citizen: It demands dedication, vigilance and sacrifice".96 Equally, in 1977, the
call is for "interdependent and co-ordinated action in all fields".97 As Frankel
suggests, total strategy was based very much on Beaufre's ideas, but it was
interpreted through the prism of South African conditions. Thus the South
African elite gained insights into Beaufre's universal strategic logic through a
particular strategic culture which provided a perceptual lens through which
South Africa's specific circumstances were viewed. Pretoria adapted
Beaufre's theory and the experiences of the French and US in Algeria and
Vietnam respectively, according to its own historical experiences, and
particular strategic landscape; one based on a fear of revolutionary onslaught.
The South African military consequently borrowed heavily from the tactical
examples offered by the US and France and looked towards the strategic
experiences of other "Pariah States" such as Taiwan and Israel for inspiration.
Frankel also makes the point that prominent Defence personnel, such as
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136Magnus Malan received military training in Defence Colleges in the US (Malan
was a Fort Leavenworth Graduate). This raises the question of whether South
African strategy reflected US notions of military strategy and nuclear
deterrence thinking or whether elites such as Malan adapted his education to
the South African situation. Were such individuals strategically enculturated
through their training elsewhere? It is likely that individuals, such as Malan,
schooled in the West would bring to the South African decision-making a
process Western notions of deterrence. Equally, however, it is likely that
decision-makers would have conceived of the deterrent function of South
Africa's weapons capability through the prism of Afrikaner strategic culture.
Rethinking South African Nuclear Strategy
Afrikaner strategic culture proved to be highly susceptible to the lure of a
nuclear weapons capability. Faced with a fear of total onslaught, the Afrikaner
elite sought to maximise national security through nuclear acquisition. Just as
"Afrikaner strategic culture led the South African Government towards nuclear
weapons acquisition, so a strategic doctrine was devised that correlated with
Afrikaner threat perceptions and strategic assumptions. As part of South
Africa's total national strategy, a nuclear deterrent was most likely to have
been seen as a weapon of last resort, to be used in an ultimate crises. If the
Afrikaner nation was facing a genuine threat of total onslaught then the
deployment of such a weapon could "render a measure of hope, buy time, or
destroy some of the opposition as they destroy the Afrikaner people".98 A
nuclear weapon may therefore have been considered by Afrikaners as a
device for an apocalyptic scenario, whereupon White South Africa was facing
capitulation. This might have then acted as deterrent to those enemies of
Afrikanerdom, which were perceived to be intent on its destruction. Again, it is
open to question as to how and where this last-ditch use of nuclear weapons
would take place.
Adelman and Knight, op cit, p. 15-16.
137A number of other accounts stress the importance of South African's
relationship with the West in determining its nuclear decision-making. For
Long and Grillot, the pursuit of nuclear weapons "only makes sense if one
understands it as a strategy meant to best serve South Africa's preference of
remaining part of the West to ensure its survival"." It was thus South Africa's
ideas about its relationship with the West which shaped nuclear decision¬
making. White South Africa's Western orientation was the "unshakeable core
of its worldview" which led to an "enduring invitation to Western nations to
include South Africa in their collective security arrangements".100 Faced with
international isolation and a deteriorating security environment, the acquisition
of nuclear weapons was, according to Long and Grillot, part of a blackmail
strategy to prevent Western abandonment. This view is supported by Moore
who suggests that South Africa sought to use its nuclear capability "as a
diplomatic lever to extract concessions of a military, strategic or economic
nature from the West or, at worst, prevent relations from deteriorating too
far".101
Why would South Africa identify so strongly with the West? Grillot and Long
suggest that the origins of South Africa's western identity can be located in the
period 1919 to 1945 when it was an active contributor to the predominantly
white collective security arrangements.102 Having supported the allies during
WWII, South Africa made a number of attempts in the 195O's and 196O's to
create a Western defence alliance that would guarantee its own security.
Having failed in its attempt to join NATO, Pretoria succeeded in signing the
1955 Simonstown agreement with the British, whereupon a naval base at
Cape Town would be used by the British navy in return for arms and
munitions transfers to South Africa. However, by the early 196O's, the
international community was becoming increasingly condemnatory of South
Africa's domestic policies. Faced with UN sanctions and diminishing co¬
operation with foreign suppliers of nuclear technology and conventional arms,
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138South Africa opted for a nuclear weapons programme to manipulate Western
interest in South African security.
However, an analysis of the history of white South Africa might suggest a far
less resilient Western identity. While the early white settlers in South Africa
sought to retain and strengthen their European identity, culture and religion,
rather than assimilate themselves with their African neighbours, they also
quickly developed a sense of individuality and independence from their
colonial origins. This manifested itself in a nationalist impulse which came to
challenge British imperialism most violently during the Boer War. Nonetheless,
Afrikanerdom has maintained many of elements of a Western identity and
culture and has utilised this as a source of internal strength and a mechanism
for mobilising support against the total onslaught facing the Afrikaners.
The suggestion that white South Africa has developed a strong sense of
individualism and self-reliance might bring into question the notion of a long¬
standing dependence on the security provided by Western states.
Nonetheless, having established its first Government in 1948, the National
Party perceived an alliance with the West as offering the best means of
guaranteeing South African security. While this policy preference may have
been strengthened and partly motivated by South Africa's cultural affinity with
the West, it was also shaped by the enduring strategic cultural proclivity to feel
insecure and threatened. By the 1970's this fear was becoming accentuated
by Soviet activities in South Africa. An anti-communist, Western alliance was
seen from an Afrikaner perspective as a welcome tonic for the pain of
insecurity. Nuclear weapons acquisition may have been motivated more by a
perception of the threat posed by Soviet sponsored forces, than a need to
attract the attentions of the West. Ultimately this might imply that South
Africa's western orientation was dictated by pragmatic self-interest in
response to a culturally distorted fear, rather than a belief in common
identities.
Whatever conclusion is offered about the cultural premises of South Africa's
policy towards the West, the dominant explanation for its nuclear weapons
139programme continues to focus on Pretoria's intention of cajoling the Western
states. This has led many to conclude that South Africa's nuclear weapons
were ostensibly for political use. As Albright contends, "in essence the
weapons were the last card in a political bluff intended to blackmail the United
States or other Western powers".103 South Africa thus envisaged minimal
military uses for its nuclear weapons and made no concerted attempt to
devise a doctrine for their use.
However, if one accepts the notion of an Afrikaner strategic culture, which
distorted Pretoria's considerations of the strategic environment in which it
operated, then it is possible to envisage a more adventurous role for a nuclear
capability. Just as the idea of a total onslaught was predicated on
exaggerated sensitivities to threats, so a nuclear strategy may well have
followed a similar pattern. Territorially threatened, and diplomatically isolated,
the South African government came to view its survival according to a
particular worldview, which distorted strategic reality. To assume that South
African nuclear strategy was subject to universal standards in the nuclear
sphere is to underestimate the uniqueness of the Afrikaner pre-disposition.
This is not to suggest that South African decision-makers intended to use
nuclear weapons when the opportunity presented itself. Pretoria was aware of
and acted upon the material strategic factors, which faced them. Rather, the
point here is to challenge those who seek to explain South African nuclear
strategy automatically by referring to universal strategic standards, which
would assume nuclear non-use.
Much speculation has surrounded the extent to which ARMSCOR moved
beyond the creation of a simple gun-type device and towards more
sophisticated usable designs. As- has been asked elsewhere, should we
consider the research conducted into thermonuclear weapons by the time of
the abandonment of the programme, as evidence that South African nuclear
intentions may have been more ambitious than the official account would lead
103
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140us to believe?104 Explaining nuclear strategy according to the Afrikaner
strategic cultural mentalities forces the researcher to pose question such as
this.
A clear indication of the centrality of the Afrikaner worldview in terms of
nuclear decision-making is provided by Adelman and Knight who identify the
importance of Lukas Daniel Barnard in the formulation of South Africa's
nuclear strategy.105 Barnard was head of the Department of National Security
and was representative of the views of many within the upper echelons of the
national security apparatus. As is the case with many prominent Afrikaners,
Barnard's worldview was strongly influenced by Christian beliefs and
teachings. Central to Barnard's intellectual development was the work of
Dooyewierd, a Dutch philosopher who "considered all areas of life directly
under the authority of the kingdom of God".106 As a result, Barnard was led
towards a belief that a Christian State such as South Africa had to be militarily
prepared and "must not recoil from waging necessary and just war".107 This
provides a clear indication of the centrality of spiritual persuasion to Afrikaner
strategic culture.
Barnard's writings on nuclear strategy reflect a correlation between the notion
of a total onslaught and the purpose of a South African nuclear deterrent.
While no indication is given that Pretoria would have considered the actual
use of its nuclear weapons, the nuclear debate within the South African elite
seems to have proceeded according to a distinct cultural worldview which
emphasised the politics of survival. The nuclear strategic rationale employed
by decision-makers was guided, to a degree, by a distinct spiritual and cultural
pre-disposition. It would therefore seem misguided to automatically apply a
universal standard when assessing South African nuclear strategy. The official
account of South Africa's nuclear weapons programme suggests that the
tactical use of nuclear weapons in the regional theatre was ill-suited to South
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141Africa's strategic interests, hence the development of a crude, gun-type
device, designed purely as a political statement. However, it is possible that
high-level security personnel, close to the nuclear decision-making process,
had become imbued with a laager mentality, which distorted their strategic
perceptions. The stronger the strategic cultural persuasion of the laager
mentality, the more likely that Pretoria may have considered a positive and
active strategic role for its nuclear weapons to meet the paranoid Afrikaner
obsession with imminent attack.
The Stratification of Afrikanerdom : A New Strategic Culture?
The emphasis for the Afrikaner nation has traditionally been on the need for
unity. The nature of "survival" politics has dictated that the Afrikaner people
close ranks and embrace the laager mentality to deal with a continuing,
encircling threat. As Adam and Gilomee suggest, the entrenchment of racial
laws in the first decade of White Nationalist rule in South Africa was designed
to solidify Afrikaner unity in order to minimize internal stratification.108
Tightening group identity and affinity with the Afrikaner cause, by distancing
White South Afrikaans from other ethnic and racial groupings, strengthened
the unity of the Afrikaner nation. In its purest form, this exclusivism involved
making a distinction between Dutch speaking and English-speaking
Afrikaners. Identity was thus based on lingual association as well as racial
groupings. Increasingly, as the needs of the Total National Strategy became
paramount by the end of the 197O's, Afrikaners were forced to associate
themselves with other racial, lingual, and cultural groups in order to ensure the
defence of the Republic, as evidenced by the SADF's recruitment of non-
whites.109
As Gerhard Mare notes, cultural identity formed the cornerstone of Afrikaner
identity: culture, including language was deliberately used to strengthen a
specific definition of what it meant to be an Afrikaner.110 Through an emphasis
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Gerhard Mare, Ethnicity and Politics in South Africa (London: Zed books, 1993) p.33on Kulturpolitiek (cultural politics) rather than Partypolitiek (party politics), the
Afrikaner movement was able to distance itself from other cultural groups and
strengthen itself through internal mobilisation.111
Much has been written about the importance of the Afrikaner Broederbond in
relation to cultural politics.112 Grundy has defined the Broederbond as a
"closed and self-perpetuating secret debating society that seeks to contain
divergence among Afrikaner leaders".113 Williams and Strydom have
suggested a central role for the Broederbond in the political development of
White South Africa:
"The South African Government is the Broederbond and the Broederbond is
the Government. No Afrikaner Government can rule South Africa without the
support of the Broederbond. No Nationalist Afrikaner can become Prime
Minster unless he comes from the organisation's select ranks".114
The implication of this is that the Broederbond disseminated a unifying cultural
message throughout White South African society. Whilst it is impossible to
gain an accurate measure of the influence of an unofficial relatively secret
organisation such as this, it would seem credible to consider the importance of
organisations such as the Broederbond, the National Party, Church, and
Business amongst others, as part of the Afrikaner volksbeweging (national
movement). These organisations supported each other through an
"independence-through-commitment" process which supported and
perpetuated the development of the Afrikaner state.115
The notion of "Civic Action" as an integral part of the Total National Strategy
was based on the mobilization of a unified Afrikaner community. A total
strategy was predicated on a belief that Afrikaners thought and acted in a
cohesive manner in response to an accepted threat. This would suggest
minimal divergence of attitudes, beliefs and perceptions between the White
111
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143elite and the rest of Afrikaner society. In terms of matters of national security
and foreign policy, decision-making was entrusted to those with the expertise,
on the understanding that these elites would act according to a consensus
within the National Party which in turn directly reflected the needs and
aspirations of the wider polity. Thus, as Geldenhuys suggests, when looking at
the foreign policy process during the Botha administration, public opinion in its
unorganised amorphous form, played a marginal role in the making of foreign
policy.
Equally, political parties, including the National Party played only a marginal
role in the making of foreign policy. Ultimate responsibility fell to the Cabinet
and the SSC which recommended the course of action. There is nothing
particularly unique about this set-up. It is the norm in both democratic and
non-democratic states to refer issues of national security and foreign policy
decision-making to elites within the ruling party. However, the South African
case is distinguished by the long period during which one political party,
namely the National Party, maintained hegemony and what appears to be a
high degree of consensus amongst White South Africans concerning foreign
policy issues. According to a 1982 public opinion poll, 80 per cent of Whites
and 87 per cent of Afrikaans speakers, felt that the Government was not
exaggerating the Communist threat.116 It would appear therefore that in regard
to issues of foreign policy and military strategy, the elite proceeded in tandem
with the broader Afrikaner society. This would add confirmation to the notion
that to identify a South African strategic culture is to uncover the facets of the
broader societal culture as well as military organizational culture.
It is important not to automatically consider the Afrikaner nation as a
monolithic entity. As Grundy argues, the National Party never succeeded in
achieving a wholly unified Afrikaner movement. Whilst the Government was
able to dampen divisions within the Afrikaner ranks, there continued to be
considerable organizational clashes between the National Party,
Broederbond, Press, Universities, Business and Unions. Although successive
116 Deon Geldenhuys, What do we think? A Survey of White Opinion on Foreign Policy Issues. Occasional Paper,
South African Institute of International Affairs, Nov. 1982.
144National Party leaders sought to alleviate the problems caused by ideological
cleavages, the schism within the Afrikaner ranks became pronounced by the
1980's.
In terms of ideology the principal division within the National Party was
between the verligte (enlightened liberal reformist) and the verkrampte
(conservative, anti-reformist).117 It was the verligte element, which proved to
be the decisive factor in the eventual political transition of South Africa
towards the political enfranchisement of the black majority and the collapse of
the apartheid system. Pauline Baker suggests that a significant number of
urban, well-educated and economically secure Whites, began to recognise
the need to break away from the more conservative elements of the National
Party and press for the reform necessary to end domestic instability and
return South Africa to the international community.118 These "New Afrikaners"
had grown increasingly unresponsive to appeals of ethnicity and race and
were more responsive to the notion of identity according to class, which
stressed the need for national economic well being. Underlying this
development was a feeling among many whites that the accumulated
pressures of international isolation, racial turmoil and ethnic factionalism were
destroying the South African State and discrediting the National Party.
Solomon Terreblanche, a leading South African academic epitomised the
attitude of the New Afrikaner when he described the National Party as "a worn
out party, which has to be replaced in order to save South Africa from
disaster".119
It would seem credible to consider the decision to abandon the nuclear
programme according to these cultural and political developments within the
National Party. Where previously it was possible to identify a clear realpoHtik
strategic culture, based on the notion of total onslaught and survival politics,
the ascendancy of the verligte elements within the National Party suggested a
development towards a more idealistic strategic cultural disposition. Thus the
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145notion of a laager mentality may have been overridden by the new priority of
conflict resolution in terms of peaceful co-existence at the domestic level and
diplomatic co-operation in the regional and international sphere. This
dichotomy has parallels with other States such as China, which exhibits both
Confucian realpolitik and Mencian idealpolitik strategic cultural dimensions.120
However, according to another perspective, the decision to denuclearise can
be seen as an integral part of the realpolitik Afrikaner strategic culture and a
re-assertion of the laager mentality. According to this view, the decision to
denuclearise was part of a broader process of political and strategic reaction
to the fear of the collapse of White Power and the spectre of a "Black nuclear
inheritance". Hence this would suggest that rather than view South African
denuclearisation according to a shifting strategic culture which emphasises
new strategic perceptions and assumptions, this process was based on a
reconstitution of the laager, which was forced to adjust or risk capitulation.
Anti-Apartheid Resistance
Despite attempts by the White South African Government to win the hearts
and minds of Black South African's through a Total National Strategy,
resistance to the Government's apartheid policy mounted significantly
between 1980 and 1985. By the end of 1984, "unrest" had become a
"euphemism for a country in turmoil" with violence escalating throughout
1985.121 In contrast to the serious disturbances in 1976-77, these incidents
were co-ordinated by organised Black resistance movements, which sought to
mobilize increasingly large numbers of Blacks behind the aim of undermining
state authority. From the White Government's perspective, the activity of
organisations such as the ANC were conducted within South Africa's borders,
but were inspired by regional Black Nationalist and Marxist forces which
formed the basis of a "revolutionary onslaught" facing the South African State.
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146The deterioration of South Africa's domestic situation had a severe effect on
the South African Government. A belief arose amongst a number of whites
that the country was reaching a point where it was ungovernable. This
exacerbated the split within the National Party; on the one hand, hard-line
conservative elements called for a tougher security measures to quell the
resistance, whilst on the other, liberal elements within the Party identified a
need to pursue wholesale reform, if the State were to avoid total collapse.
Opinions were thus severely divided as to how Pretoria should respond.
As Steven Mufson notes, the Afrikaner people have always regarded
themselves as a moral nation with apartheid originally justified as an
opportunity for people of different cultures to fulfil their aspirations
separately.122 However the harsh measures used to suppress Black
demonstrations between 1984 and 1986 were, in the eyes of liberal
Afrikaners, anathema to Afrikaner morality. Having been forced to increasingly
tighten the security apparatus of the State, Botha was forced to declare a full
state of emergency on 12 June 1986, in order to deal with the severity of the
disturbances.
For many within the National Party, the intensity of the civil unrest signalled
the need to move quickly towards negotiations with the ANC. As Mufson
argues, the White Government's bargaining position was becoming weaker
over time, partly through pressure exerted by the demonstrations, and partly
because of the hostile international reaction to the methods used to deal with
unrest. From the perspective of the international community, the oppressive
measures employed by the State to deal with resistance provided a clear
indication of the inequities of the apartheid system. Furthermore, the prospect
of meeting these challenges through a tightening of the laager, seemed
unlikely given the crumbling consensus in the Afrikaner ranks.
Right-wing elements within the Afrikaner movement were by the late 1980's
amassing support through the Conservative Party. This Party became the
122 Steven Mufson, "South Africa 1990" Journal of Foreign Affairs (1990), p.124.
147official opposition party following the 1989 elections, where it gained
seventeen seats in parliament.123 Nonetheless, the tide was turning towards
reform. The crisis of confidence amongst Afrikaners had spread throughout
the elite institutions of Afrikanerdom. As Mufson notes, by the time De Klerk
was elected, the Dutch Reformed Church had confessed that apartheid was a
sin, while the Broederbond had established contacts with the ANC for the first
time.124
Ultimately liberal-minded personnel within the National Party succeeded in
setting South Africa towards a new course by embracing the need for a new
South African identity. By pursuing a path towards the dismantlement of the
apartheid system, Pretoria sought to reconcile its differences with the
international community and thus normalize its external political and economic
relations. With a diminution of the threat to South Africa in the region, it was
considered important for Pretoria to declare its commitment towards peaceful
relations in South Africa. By dismantling its nuclear capability and
subsequently signing the NPT, a signal would be sent to the international
community that South Africa was ready for a reconvening of diplomatic
relations.
The official explanation given for South Africa's denuclearisation seeks to
emphasise a logical, action-reaction dynamic underlying South Africa strategic
calculations. A nuclear deterrent was seen as superfluous given the
improvement in external circumstance, which persuaded decision-makers
towards international co-operation through a non-nuclear posture. In effect, so
the official account goes, the political benefits that had initially driven the
Government towards a nuclear deterrent, were no longer relevant to Pretoria's
policy agenda, which sought a transformation in its internal and external
relations. There is however another aspect to the policy of nuclear rollback
that is unlikely to appear in any official account of the denuclearsiation
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148process: the notion that White South Africans maintained a deep and
profound anxiety concerning the possibility of a Black nuclear inheritance.
It is important to remember that Pretoria embarked upon a nuclear policy in
response to what it perceived to be the threat of total onslaught. This
onslaught included the domestic pressure exerted by Black Nationalist forces
such as the ANC. It would therefore seem likely that the White Government
would have suffered acute anxiety at the prospect of a nuclear capability in
the hands of the ANC. As Leonard Spector suggests, the fear that nuclear
weapons or nuclear material could fall into the hands of a radical ruling
faction, which might then have used this potential for extremist objectives, was
evident amongst the White elite.125
As the domestic situation worsened in the mid 1980's and the collapse of
White Power became a real possibility, the prospect of a White right-wing
faction seizing control of power and hence a nuclear weapons capability,
concerned many within the National Party. As Hough has suggested, the
possibility of some attempts at "rebellion or 'counter-revolution' by certain
white right-wing groups" could not be excluded.126 The pressure on the
National Party to guard against nuclear weapons falling into the wrong hands
was becoming intense by 1989. Given the highly unstable domestic situation,
a weapons capability had become a burden for a Government struggling to
maintain order. This might explain President De Klerk's swift decision to
denuclearise following his election to office.
Much attention has been focused on De Klerk's role in the transformation of
South Africa and the process of denuclearisation. In terms of this research it is
necessary to address the issue of whether De Klerk was representative of
broader cultural trends within the National Party and White South African
society in general or whether he followed his own individual path according to
his own personal beliefs. An analysis of De Klerk's political career suggests a
125 Leonard Spector, Going Nuclear: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons 1986-1987 (Cambridge, Mass.:Bailinger,1987),
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149distinctly conservative political background. In an autobiography of De Klerk,
written by his brother Willem, he is described as first and foremost an
Afrikaner, with deep national roots. According to Willem De Klerk, F.W. was
"driven by his concerns for the survival of his own people in their
fatherland".127 Equally, as a member of the National Party, De Klerk
developed a reputation as a conservative, a reputation that, from time to time
became "an albatross around his neck".128
This would seem to dispel any image of De Klerk as an enlightened crusader
with a long-standing moral commitment to transform the fabric of White South
Africa. De Klerk's career prior to his election as State President appears to be
characterised by conservatism, remaining in the central ground within the
National Party, while building a firm reputation as a mediator and consensus-
building politician. De Klerk's awareness for the need for reform appears to
have developed as a pragmatic response to the needs of the Government and
the future of South Africa. As De Klerk himself suggested, "by the end of 1989
it had become clear to me that the Government's emphasis had landed it in a
dead-end street. We had to escape from a corner where everything stagnated
into confrontation".129
De Klerk's position was thus indicative of a trend within the National Party
towards wholesale reform. The so-called "New Afrikaner" had come to
recognise the impracticality, unaffordability and unacceptability of an apartheid
system that was tearing South Africa apart. With an economy being slowly
eroded by economic and financial isolation, it was essential for the National
Party to make positive moves towards power sharing with the rest of South
African society. De Klerk's support for this policy did not become apparent
until his first speech as State President on the 8th February 1989, when he
elucidated a need to shift from an accent of segregation to an accent on unity.
Identifying the point at which De Klerk made a political conversion to the
verligte section within the National Party is open to debate. Equally, it is easy
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150to speculate as to whether a different President would have responded the
situation in an alternative manner. It seems that a trend developed within the
National Party towards incremental political reform. Hence it is unlikely that an
ultra-conservative Afrikaner would have succeeded Botha as State President.
The Conservative Party under the leadership of Treuemicht pursued the
interests of the right wing, verkrampte elements of White South Africa
rigorously from 1982. The Conservative Party saw the development of an
enlightened disposition within National Party as an indication that the
Government was bowing down to its enemies and succumbing to the total
onslaught facing Afrikanerdom. Treuemicht's Conservative movement sought
a continuation of the past and a perpetuation of traditional Afrikaner values. In
this sense the realpolitik Afrikaner strategic culture lived on. However, the
Conservative Party failed to disrupt the process of reform undertaken by the
Government. Step by step, the enlightened values gained respectability as the
National Party came to recognise the inevitability of multi-racial co-existence.
This may have represented a distinct cultural development within
Afrikanerdom, which persuaded the Government away from what rapidly
became a morally unjustified political and social system. This would seem to
suggest that De Klerk rode upon on a wave of social and political transition
rather than being the wave himself.
Within this re-appraisal of Government policy, a nuclear weapons capability
was seen as part of an anachronistic worldview that had led to the impasse
which the Government found itself in. The denuclearisation process was
based on a re-assessment of the Government's strategic objectives, the most
important of which was a political accommodation with Black Nationalists and
a rejuvenation of South Africa's external diplomatic relations. A nuclear
weapons capability was seen as detrimental to both of these goals.
The question remains: to what extent did the reformist policies of National
Party, which acted as a driver behind the decision to abandon the nuclear
programme, represent a genuine and fundamental cultural transition within
Afrikanerdom? The development of a verligte disposition within the National
151Party would imply a cultural movement within a politically relevant sector of
Afrikanerdom, away from a laager mentality and a realpolitik strategic culture
and towards a more co-operative, idealistic domestic and foreign policy,
whereupon a nuclear deterrent was seen as a hindrance rather than an asset.
However, it is possible to see the changing policy emphasis of the National
Party as a product of a state under siege, with nowhere left to turn and thus
forced to meet the demands of internal foes by peaceful accommodation.
Equally, the pressure of international isolation was leading to discontent within
the Afrikaner ranks, with the dominant trend being towards a swift ending of
South Africa's status as an international pariah, in political and economic
terms.
According to the Afrikaner worldview, the increasing untenability of the
Government's position by the late 1980's may have represented the
apocalyptic scenario implicit in the traditional Afrikaner notion of an
insurmountable attack by the enemies of Afrikanerdom, intent on its
destruction. Had the National Party progressed towards an ultra-conservative
path during the 1980's then a nuclear weapons capability may have been
considered as a last-ditch expression of Afrikaner resistance.
As it was, the levers of power appears to have rested with liberal-minded
Afrikaners whose response to the total onslaught was based more on the
need for peaceful reconciliation in the face of extreme domestic pressure and
international persuasion, rather than through violent intransigence. The
strategic cultural premise underlying National Party policy continued to be that
exemplified by the laager mentality but it was based on a realisation that the
laager was about to be breached and therefore needed to bargain rather than
fight to protect a lost cause. De Klerk and his liberal compatriots such as
Viljoen, Pik Botha, Du Pleissis and De Villiers, who guided him through the
reform process, were first and foremost Afrikaners and were guided by the
same Afrikaner cultural mentality that had influenced their predecessors.
However, this mentality had embraced new features by the late 1980's and it
persuaded the Afrikaner elite towards peaceful accommodation with anti-
152apartheid resistance and a realisation of the need to rejuvenate South Africa's
relations with the international community.
It is important not to automatically regard the apparently accommodationist
strategy of De Klerk as evidence of a departure from Afrikaner strategic
culture towards pragmatic reactionary politics. De Klerk was a political
pragmatist, basing his policy objectives on the situation as it arose. The fluid
and constantly changing nature of South Africa's highly unstable environment
by the late 198O's precluded a rigid, immovable political style. Nonetheless,
De Klerk's decision to reform and the need to denuclearise, were indicative of
a cultural trend within the ruling National Party away from the ultra-
conservative Afrikaner position and towards a new, more idealistic conception
of South Africa's security interests. This reflected broader trends within the
Afrikaner movement as a whole, which was becoming increasingly
disenchanted with the apartheid system and increasingly unresponsive to
Afrikaner calls for unity on the grounds of ethnic exclusivity. The New
Afrikaner sought an identity based on class rather than race.
The development of the Government's policy into the 1990's can be seen in
terms of the new conceptualisation of security that became predominant
throughout the international community following the end of the Cold War.
South Africa's conception of security was thus moving away from a reliance
on military acquisition in the form of a nuclear weapons capability and towards
new security issues. Hence the same cultural tendencies that operated in a
manner that persuaded the South African Government towards nuclear
weapons, was instrumental in the eventual dismantlement of this capability.
Conclusion: The Relevance of Strategic Culture to South
Africa's Non-Nuclear Weapon Outcome
The arguments offered in this chapter have been predicated on the
assumption that the processes of nuclearisation and denuclearisation in South
Africa have been shaped by the same strategic cultural influences. Hence, the
same factors that shaped the decision to initially acquire nuclear weapons
153were crucial in the decision to abandon the nuclear programme. The dominant
explanation of South Africa's nuclear decision-making, as offered by realist
theories involves the contention that South Africa responded to a
degeneration in its security environment in the 197O's by seeking a nuclear
deterrent to alleviate insecurity. The logic underlying this weapons capability
was to construct a "catalytic deterrent" which would both offset the Soviet
military build-up in the region and heighten US sensitivities to South African
security. The South African nuclear deterrent was thus a political bomb
designed to manipulate and cajole the US and the Soviets. With an
improvement in regional relations and with the ending of the Cold War, a
nuclear deterrent was seen as superfluous to South Africa's political and
strategic requirements; hence the abandonment of the weapons programme.
This was the official explanation issued by the South African government in
1993 and it is that favoured by realist theorists who would look to explain this
process according to security-material constraints.
However, realist theories are unable to account for a wide range of cultural
factors, which constitute the material variables that it relies upon for
explanation. In order to construct a more revealing account of South Africa's
nuclear decision-making, this process must be considered in terms of broader
social and political developments within South Africa. The Afrikaner elite were
imbued with a laager mentality based on the political, social, cultural and
historical development of Afrikanerdom, which forced them to consider
strategic issues through a distinctive perceptual lens. Decision-makers thus
viewed the strategic environment through a strategic cultural prism, which
tended led to an exaggeration of threats and an accentuation of responses.
The Afrikaner notion of a total onslaught facing South Africa was influenced
by a strategic culture, which had historically predisposed Afrikaners towards a
paranoid fear of strategic encirclement and destruction at the hands of
insurmountable enemy forces. The Afrikaner worldview was shaped, in part,
by a particular spiritual belief in the centrality of Afrikanerdom to world affairs
and the inevitable challenges that this status engendered. A Total National
Strategy was initiated in accordance with these threat perceptions and
154strategic assumptions. By the 198O's Pretoria considered itself to be
diplomatically isolated and territorially threatened such that only through a
total mobilisation of the South African people and a militarization of South
African society could the South African State remain intact. The development
of a nuclear weapons capability must be considered within the context.
The critical thrust of this research is to uncover the ideas, and specifically, the
strategic culture, which has shaped nuclear decision-making. Much of the
contemporary literature has approached the South African case through
empirical analysis, which asks familiar and conventional questions. Equally,
the dominant explanation looks to explain the South African case by applying
universal strategic logic and assuming a rational, "ends-means" decision¬
making process. This chapter has sought to offer a more insightful account of
South African decision-making by seeking to uncover ideational factors, which
force the observer to deconstruct generally accepted notions and arguments.
Strategic cultural analysis allows the researcher to ask new questions. For
example, can we be sure that the Afrikaner elite did not intend to develop
usable weapons (as the official account suggests), when considering the
Afrikaner obsession with strategic encirclement and the politics of survival
implicit to the "siege-psychology"? Equally, is it possible that the Afrikaner elite
were culturally disposed to a profound anxiety at the prospect of a Black
nuclear inheritance and hence sought a swift abandonment of the nuclear
programme prior to the democratic elections, based on these fears? These
are questions that the official account fails to address.
That the abandonment of South Africa's nuclear weapons programme came
as a reaction to external developments, is not in question here. The
dismantlement of a weapons capability was a facet of a broader social and
political process of transformation whereby Pretoria sought to re-assimilate
itself within the international community. A weapons capability was therefore
very much superfluous to the future needs of South Africa. In this sense,
realist theories are on firm ground. However, it is important to also look closely
at the nature of the domestic turmoil and the response of Afrikanerdom to
these pressures. The severity of anti-apartheid resistance, particularly during
155the period 1984-86, led many Afrikaners to question the oppressive measure
used by the security forces and to recognise the need for compromise if the
South African State were to survive. For many "New Afrikaners" who were
becoming largely unresponsive to calls for unity based on ethnic affinity, the
domestic unrest was evidence of a need for wholesale liberal reform in South
Africa.
The gradual transition of the National Party from a traditional conservative
position towards new priorities may well have represented a cultural shift in
Afrikanerdom, such that a new strategic culture was emerging by the late
198O's. However, it is important not to overplay this idea. De Klerk and his
liberal, reformist colleagues were first and foremost Afrikaners, interested
primarily in the peaceful development of the Afrikaner nation. The policy of
reform was thus based on a practical realization of the need for change if the
Afrikaner nation was to survive, rather than a wholesale cultural transition.
This process can therefore be seen as a re-assertion of the laager mentality
rather than a movement toward a completely new Afrikaner strategic culture.
An analysis of South African strategic culture also illustrates the importance of
considering the importance of broader societal culture as well as military
organizational culture. Although, there was considerable ideological
divergence within the Afrikaner ranks by the 198O's, it was still possible to
identify a clear Afrikaner worldview based on the perception of an
independent and isolated nation, which pervaded both the civil and military
realms. Thus the distinction between civil and military matters became
increasingly unclear. The Total National Strategy called upon all Afrikaners,
both military and civilians, to think and act as one, in defence of the State.
Whereas analyses of other states' strategic cultures might involve asking
complex questions as to whether decision-makers are representative of
broader national cultures and thus what our referent object of analysis should
be, the South African case is less problematic. Although individuals may well
have acted according to organizational biases and styles, to identify a
strategic culture in a meaningful sense is to look for cultural insights within
Afrikanerdom as a whole.
156In terms of levels of analysis, it is interesting to note the relationship between
South African strategic culture and external cultural developments, in relation
to nuclear decision-making. Initially, the domestic strategic cultural stimulus to
acquire nuclear weapons overrode the emergent international cultural norm of
non-proliferation that was guiding the policy of many other states by the
1970's. South Africa failed to be influenced by a number of external political,
social and moral cultural developments throughout this period. However, by
the late 1980's South African strategic culture was becoming infiltrated by a
number of external cultures, which influenced the pursuit of a non-nuclear
option.
The South African case has often been approached according to the lesson
that can be learnt in terms of non-proliferation policy.130 As the first state to
unilaterally abandon a weapons capability, it is perhaps inevitable that the
South African case attract this sort of attention. This chapter concludes that
any attempt to construct a comprehensive account of the South African case
must seek to gain insights into the Afrikaner mentality, which amounted to a
strategic cultural pre-disposition. Any lessons that are to be extracted from the
South African case must consider the relevance of strategic cultural context.
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157Chapter Five: Sweden
Introduction
The case of Sweden provides an interesting example of a decision not to acquire
nuclear weapons, when technological imperative and international pressure might
suggest otherwise. Following the advent of the nuclear era, it appeared inevitable
that Sweden, as a modern, well armed, technologically advanced state with a
large military establishment and plentiful natural resources, would seek to obtain
nuclear weapons. Furthermore, as Sweden became increasingly concerned
about the danger posed by the Soviet Union to its territory, the pressure to
modernize its military capacity suggested swift and comprehensive nuclear
acquisition. As Jan Prawitz suggests, by the late 195O's it appeared to be a case
of when, rather than if, Sweden would become a nuclear weapon state (NWS).1
Having constructed the capability to become self-sufficient in the production of
nuclear energy, the Swedish military envisaged a dual-purpose nuclear
programme that would allow for the construction of a small tactical nuclear force
by the mid-196O's. Nonetheless, despite pressure exerted by defence officials,
the Swedish Government opted to sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1968, thus establishing Sweden as a non-nuclear
weapon state (NNWS).
It is this strategic decision that will occupy attention in this chapter. In a short
space of time, Sweden moved from being a threshold NWS, to a state basing its
security on conventional defence and the importance of the non-proliferation
regime. Why did Sweden consider nuclear acquisition in the 195O's and early
1
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158196O's? Why did Sweden arrive at a non-nuclear weapon outcome? Research
aimed at addressing these questions has typically focused on security-material
factors, characteristic of realist theorizing. Realists are likely to conclude that the
nuclear debate in Sweden was shaped by a rational calculation of interest based
on cost-benefit assumptions that reflect material considerations, which led
Sweden to prefer a conventional capability.
This chapter does not set out to refute the importance of material factors. Rather,
an argument will be developed to show how security-materialist assumptions are
constituted by ideational influences, such as Swedish strategic culture. This will
not lead to radically new assumptions concerning why Sweden opted for a policy
of nuclear restraint. The conclusion will be that Sweden considered nuclear
acquisition to be against the national interest because of the likely reaction of the
Soviet Union. Furthermore, Sweden appears to have assumed that it was
covered by the US nuclear umbrella. However, what were the ideas shaping
these perceptions and assumptions about threats and allies? By attending to
strategic culture it is possible to give greater meaning to the decisions that led to
a non-nuclear outcome.
An investigation into Swedish strategic culture and its influence on the nuclear
debate involves an investigation into cultural factors at a multiplicity of levels. In
terms of a national identity, Sweden has exhibited a distinctive neutralism which
as been strong and pervasive. At an organisational level, the Swedish military has
displayed a proclivity towards nuclear acquisition. Equally, in terms of political
parties, the culture of the Social Democratic Party (SAP) was highly influential in
shaping ideas concerning the costs and benefits of nuclear acquisition and thus
the course the nuclear debate. It is worth considering the impact of these cultural
trends and their relative impact in shaping the non-nuclear outcome.
159Swedish Nuclear History
The Initiation of a Nuclear Programme
In 1945, the Swedish Government established a study group to investigate the
possibility of a nuclear energy programme.2 Sweden's interest in nuclear energy
arose from concern at its over-reliance on external energy supplies as well an
attempt to provide a cheap alternative to coal or petroleum for the energy-
intensive industrial sector. The study group concluded that it was necessary to
establish a civilian agency for the development of nuclear energy. Consequently,
in November 1947 AB Atomenergie (AE) was established. While the AE was a
strictly civilian institution concerned with the research and development of nuclear
technology, a Swedish National Defence Research Institute (FOA) was given the
task of pursuing military-oriented nuclear research.
From the outset it was decided that the civilian nuclear energy programme should
be based on the development of heavy-water reactors, which allowed Sweden to
utilise its abundant supplies of natural uranium as fuel, thereby avoiding a
reliance on foreign suppliers.3 Mitchell Reiss suggests that while Sweden's use of
heavy-water reactors was rationalized in terms of benefits for civilian purposes,
"Swedish officials were not unaware of the potential military applications of this
choice of technology".4 With a fuel cycle based on heavy water and free of foreign
controls, it was possible that weapons-grade plutonium could be produced.5
Sweden's first research reactor, R1, went critical in July 1954 and was the only
operative Swedish reactor for the next five years.6 Larsson suggests that "while a
2
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160useful research tool, R1 did not supply any plutonium for military purposes".7 The
centre-piece of Sweden's nuclear programme was to be the 65 MW heavy-water
reactor at Agesta, completed in 1958 and producing plutonium and generating
district heat as a by-product.8 Eric Arnett suggests that Agesta reactor was
designed as dual-use facility that "could be used for a small amount of weapons
material in a crisis".9 Plans to build a more powerful reactor at Marviken on the
Baltic coast, capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium, were tabled in
1957.10 However, problems emerged from the outset, resulting in the cancellation
of the project altogether in 1970.11
The Rise and Fall of the Nuclear Weapons Option
The period 1952-1960, was characterised by a realisation within the Swedish
military that the procurement of nuclear weapons was essential if Sweden was to
deter an aggressor possessing a nuclear capability. William Agrell argues that the
origins of purposeful research into nuclear weapons actually began in 1948 when
the Supreme Commander instructed the FOA to investigate the "premises for
developing nuclear weapons or other forms of nuclear warfare and nuclear
propulsion in Sweden".12 Agrell suggests that this can be regarded as the
initiation of weapons research: until this point, the programme had been
entirely of a civilian nature.13
The first public suggestion that Sweden might seek to acquire nuclear weapons
was made by the Swedish Air Force Chief, General Bengt Nordenskiöld in
1952.14 By this stage, a number of military officials had begun to recognise the
potential utility of battlefield nuclear weapons, which could provide a cost-efficient
7
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161means of national defence. The prevailing view by the 195O's was that nuclear
weapons were becoming "desirable as an enhancement of firepower and that
limited war with small 'tactical' nuclear weapons, without an assumption of
escalation, was a likely scenario".15 As a state situated between two powerful,
military power blocs, the case for the acquisition of a small nuclear deterrent as a
means of maintaining Swedish security, was persuasive to many, including the
military high command.
The worst case scenario for Sweden was the possibility of an armed conflict in
Europe between the US and the Soviet Union in which the possession of Swedish
territory would appear advantageous to either side. In such a situation, Sweden,
as a NWS, could potentially raise the costs of aggression, thus ensuring
deterrence through fear of escalation.16Analysts focused on the possibility of
acquiring a tactical nuclear capability based on the assumption that Sweden
would then be in a position to "compel a potential aggressor to disperse his
striking forces and thereby prevent him from achieving a concentration of military
power at a minimum cost".17
How would Sweden go about acquiring nuclear weapons? For some nuclear
proponents, the case for purchasing weapons from the US was persuasive.18 This
would allow for quick and effective access to highly advanced weaponry.
However, there were two problems associated with this proposal. First, it implied
a violation of Swedish non-alignment. Second, the US was reluctant to promote
the emergence of another NWS, which could potentially change the delicate
nuclear balance in Europe. The terms and conditions that any nuclear
arrangement between the US and Sweden would have involved, would have
further contradicted Sweden's independent status.
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162Sweden succumbed to political reality and concluded that if nuclear weapons
were to be acquired, then it would have to be through an indigenous weapons
programme. Paul Cole suggests that the option of purchasing weapons
components from the US was never completely abandoned: Sweden's authorities
considered that if dual-capable delivery systems were obtained, then the US
might sell a nuclear capability to Sweden in order to prevent them from being
bought elsewhere.19
By 1954, the military command had incorporated the resources of the FOA and
AE into a joint plan, designed to modernise Sweden's military capability in line
with the new "nuclear climate".20 Where research up to 1952 appeared to
concentrate on requirements necessary to protect against nuclear effects,
subsequent proposals put to the Riksdag by the military stressed the need for
research into the development of nuclear weapons. As General Svedlund
suggested in the ÖB-54 report, "if a small state lacks nuclear weapons and is not
a member of an alliance having such weapons, it might under certain
circumstances be tempting for an aggressor to attack that state".21 It is probable
that Svedlund had the USSR in mind when highlighting Swedish vulnerability,
particularly given the close proximity of the Soviets' superior conventional forces.
As Eric Arnett suggests, many Swedes feared the prospect of a Soviet invasion,
either over land in the North or by sea in the South. A Swedish tactical nuclear
force could have broken up an amphibious enemy incursion, forcing the
adversary to redirect its conventional effort.22 Equally, the military command
sought to restructure its armed forces by creating smaller units capable of fighting
during a nuclear attack.
In January 1957, FOA declared publicly that Sweden had the ability to produce its
own nuclear weapons within a six to seven year period. A series of reports were
19
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163placed before the Riksdag which stressed the benefits of acquiring a small,
tactical nuclear force, capable of deterring an aggressor from attacking Swedish
territory. Most notable was the ÖB-57 report which Reiss refers to as the "most
articulate and well-reasoned argument the armed services had offered on behalf
of nuclear weapons acquisition".23 ÖB-57 specified how nuclear acquisition would
increase Sweden's defensive capabilities, based on the assumption that any
aggressor would be armed with nuclear weapons and that Sweden would be
disadvantaged if reliant purely on conventional capabilities. This report took on
added significance by virtue of its assumption that nuclear weapons could be
given a traditional battlefield role in much the same way as conventional
munitions. Proponents of nuclear acquisition were keen to stress the evolutionary
nature of nuclear warfare. In line with those Western strategists who advocated
war-fighting strategic nuclear postures, the Swedish military regarded nuclear
weapons as an effective supplement to its existing conventional capability.
The acquisition of nuclear weapons was thus seen as part of an overall strategy
to modernise Sweden's defence in line with the requirements of the nuclear age.
It was considered imperative that Swedish society be prepared to construct a total
defence, capable of withstanding an attack at any level. Having suggested that
Sweden should equip itself with nuclear weapons, the ÖB-54 report stimulated a
lively debate as to the likely economic costs of a nuclear weapons programme
and the potential diversion of resources away from civilian nuclear energy
programmes and conventional defence.24
From the outset of discussions, questions emerged about whether acquiring a
nuclear capability would drain Sweden of the resources necessary for a
conventional defence. The original proposal for nuclear weapons in 1952 was met
with opposition by the army and navy who reasoned that nuclear weapons were
simply airforce gadgets that would leave Sweden's defence exposed in other
Reiss, op cit, p.52.
24
The OB-57 report addressed the issue of financial limitation by suggesting that the acquisition of tactical nuclear
weapons (as opposed to strategic nuclear weapons) could be catered for by the existing defence budget. Ibid.areas.25 If Sweden relied on a nuclear deterrent, then a conventional attack would
present the military with the option of surrender or escalation in the form of a
nuclear strike thus inviting a massive counter-attack. If conflict escalated to a
nuclear level then Sweden's insuperior tactical nuclear force would be swiftly
wiped out by the aggressor.
Throughout this period, the Sweden's Social Democrat Government, chose to
delay any decision on nuclear weapons. Debate was fierce, with opinion divided.
Response ranged from clear support for nuclear weapons at the right end of the
political spectrum, to outright rejection at the left. These divisions were equally
pronounced within the ruling SAP.26 Prior to its changing perception of nuclear
weapons in the mid 196O's, the armed forces held firmly to their demand for
nuclear acquisition.27 They were supported in their cause by the opposition
parties (conservatives and liberals) and a section within the SAP.28 In 1958, the
Riksdag debated the issue of nuclear weapons for the first time, whereupon
approval was given for the so-called "S program" which involved research into
protection and defence against nuclear attack, while a decision on the "L
program", involving research into weapons construction, was postponed.29
Towards the end of 1958, the SAP established a group of party members to form
an Atomic Weapons Committee (AWC) designed to look specifically at the
nuclear issue. The group produced a report, released in December 1959, which
recommended that Sweden need not decide on the question of nuclear weapons
acquisition.30 In addition, it was suggested that Sweden contribute to international
efforts to ban nuclear weapons: the AWC concluded that
"negotiations between the great powers about banning nuclear weapons tests are
presently taking place ... It would be in accordance with Sweden's own national
25
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ibid, p.110interest as well as in the interest of international peace efforts
... if these
negotiations were to be successful. It might have a negative impact on the
disarmament efforts if Sweden now decided to manufacture nuclear weapons".31
The decision "not the decide" allowed the Government flexibility and "freedom of
action" over the nuclear weapons question. Prawitz has argued that the 1959
report may have been interpreted differently by different sections in Sweden.
While nuclear weapons opponents may have assumed that this amounted to
tactful and diplomatic "no" to nuclear weapons, proponents may have interpreted
this as a "yes" for when plutonium became available.32 However, most accounts
suggest this to be a decisive turning point in Sweden's courting of a bomb option.
The period 1960-1968, was characterised by a series of setbacks for advocates
of nuclear weapons acquisition, culminating in the eventual decision not to
proceed with a nuclear weapons programme. Weapons advocates within the
military continued to make calls for nuclear acquisition based on up to date costs
and estimates. However, Larsson points out that while the ÖB-62 report reiterated
the advantages of nuclear acquisition, it also suggested that "no decision was yet
called for" and that it was "desirable to maintain the freedom of action policy".33
The case for nuclear weapons thus appears to have lost momentum by 1962.
Initially, it became doubtful as to whether it was either technically or economically
feasible to proceed with the production of weapons-grade plutonium.
The ÖB-65 report recognised what had probably already been accepted by most
Swedish defence officials: there was no real freedom of action over the question
of nuclear acquisition.34 In early 1968, the Riksdag began a lengthy debate over
the defence budget for the next four year period. The result was a defence plan
which stated that Sweden would not have nuclear weapons unless they became
"a normal component of the armed forces of lesser nations".35 Sweden signed the
31
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166NPT in August, thus officially ending any official interest in nuclear weapons.
An inevitable Outcome?
Could Sweden have produced its own nuclear weapons? Rene Nyberg argues
that the Swedish nuclear option was not based on realistic assumptions because
"Sweden never had an adequate plutonium capacity".36 Reiss agrees that
Sweden never had the technical capacity to acquire nuclear weapons.37 The
technical centre-piece of Sweden's nuclear option was to be the 200 MW heavy
water reactor at Marviken, which would have produced a ready supply of un-
safeguarded weapons-grade plutonium. However, the Marviken project was beset
with technical difficulties from the outset and was eventually cancelled. Thus by
the mid-196O's, Sweden's entire nuclear program was operating under
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.
How insurmountable were these technological barriers? Sweden confronted
difficulties in acquiring the necessary nuclear material in the process of
maintaining a policy of non-alignment, but there is reason to suppose that, given
the political will, Sweden could had pursued alternative paths to proliferation.
Reiss points to the possibility of underwriting a substantial nuclear weapons
research programme, which would have enhanced the credibility of a weapons
option.38 It is also important not to underestimate the importance of economic
considerations. Prawitz has referred to a recognition in Sweden of the severe
economic costs involved in acquiring a nuclear strike force, which made it
on
progressively more unrealistic in the late 1960's.
While technological factors may have contributed in the short term to Sweden's
nuclear restraint, these were largely a function of political and strategic
36
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167considerations. Sweden's initial interest in nuclear weapons derived from a
perception of vulnerability. The principal source of insecurity appears to have
been the perceived threat posed by Soviet conventional and potentially its nuclear
forces. A Swedish nuclear weapons capability may have been considered as a
useful deterrent against the Soviet threat.
However, the central issue in relation to Swedish nuclear planning is likely to have
been the military and nuclear strategy employed by the US and NATO. In 1966
the under-Secretary of State for Defence, Karl Frithiofson stated that
"Sweden is essentially under the nuclear umbrella in much the same way as our
neighboring countries are said to be. In this context our non-alignment and our
objective of neutrality in wartime means little if anything".40
This might suggest that the Swedish government avoided acquiring its own
nuclear weapons because of the defence provided by US nuclear weapons. Why
would Sweden as an officially neutral and non-aligned state, consider itself
protected by the same nuclear guarantees as those extended to other European
members of NATO? Prawitz has rejected the notion that Sweden made any
secret agreements with the US concerning security guarantees. Rather there was
an assumption at the time, that the US could not afford to accept the prospect of
the USSR invading Sweden and advancing closer to NATO territory. Hence,
according to Prawitz, the US would have defended Sweden against a Soviet
attack whether Sweden requested help or not.41
Swedish nuclear proponents may have concluded that a tactical nuclear force
could compliment NATO's strategic arsenal. However, Prawitz argues that
decision-making in Sweden was decisively influenced by the evolution of NATO
nuclear doctrine and specifically the emergence of the doctrine of "flexible
40
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168response" in the late 1960's.42 Quite how the introduction of flexible response
affected Sweden's nuclear decision-making remains unclear. Without
documentary evidence, it is difficult to offer any accurate assessments. However,
if it is accepted that Sweden's nuclear policy was determined by a belief in the
existence of US security guarantees, then it is feasible to suggest that Sweden
may have been affected by the evolution of western strategic doctrine in the
1950'sand 1960's.
In investigating the issue of US-Swedish strategic relations, Cole refers to a
Swedish commission set up in 1994, to investigate the extent of Swedish co¬
operation with NATO.43 The commission found that the US was prepared
throughout the Cold War to come to Sweden's aid in the event of war, although
"no guarantees to this effect were forthcoming".44 Cole concludes that the
commission provided no hard evidence to prove that the US was prepared to
assist Sweden. Furthermore, US documentation reveals that it was
"uncomfortable with any policy language that could be interpreted as evidence of
US intentions".45
However, Ola Tunander offers a different interpretation of the evidence.46
Tunander argues that like other Scandinavian countries, Sweden was covered by
the US nuclear umbrella from early-mid 1960's as specified in the National
Security Council Document of 1960 (NSC 6006/1). In this document it is
suggested that it was the intention of the US to "assist Sweden, without prejudice
42
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169to US commitments to NATO, to resist Soviet bloc attack against Sweden".47
The issue of security guarantees in explaining Swedish nuclear restraint is not
trivial. If Sweden received an explicit nuclear guarantee from the US, then this
could be seen as a crucial factor in explaining the Swedish non-nuclear outcome.
Much depends on the chronology of events: if Sweden was given a guarantee
then it is important to ask whether this came before or after a decision was made
about nuclear weapons. According to Eric Arnett a decision was taken against a
non-nuclear option before the military considered the issue of extended
deterrence, having stated that Sweden "turned decisively away from nuclear
weapons in 1959".48 Thus for Arnett, Sweden's nuclear restraint can be
accounted for by other factors. However, as Cole suggests, "thus far no US
planning documents or other primary source materials have emerged from official
archives that show an American inclination to behave as Sweden anticipated".49
Consequently, it is difficult to make judgements.
Eitherway Frithiothson's statement seems to suggest that Sweden considered
itself covered by the US nuclear umbrella in the same way as Norway and
Denmark did and in a manner which may have rendered the requirement for an
independent nuclear capability as minimal. Effectively, Sweden could enjoy the
benefits of "non-weaponized deterrence" without incurring the political and
strategic costs associated with a nuclear status.50 Defence planners may have
concluded that any use of nuclear weapons by either the US or the Soviets
against Sweden would result in corresponding counteractions from the other.
Hence, Sweden would never be forced to resist nuclear aggression on its own.
The acquisition of an independent nuclear capability may well have jeopardised
this strategic equation, the implication being, that Sweden could offer its own
47
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170defence against nuclear attack.
Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proiiferation
Erlarider suggested in 1957 that "if Sweden managed to produce atomic bombs,
which by their nature are highly offensive weapons
- our territory would become a
more dangerous neighbourhood as seen from the Soviet Union".51 With an
independent nuclear capability, Sweden would be unable to avoid questions of
targeting and threat assessment. Sweden would have been thrust into the
mainstream of the European strategic equation during a US-Soviet arms race.
Such a scenario seemed unattractive to those keen to consolidate Sweden as a
neutral, non-aligned state with marginal relevance to European security matters.
Policy-makers may therefore have concluded that Sweden should not acquire
nuclear weapons as long as such weaponry did not become part of the regular
armoury of small nations. Furthermore, Sweden should do all it could to reduce
the risk that these weapons should ever be used. This would explain Sweden's
dual-policy of refraining from nuclear acquisition and promoting nuclear
disarmament and non-proliferation. Following WWII, Sweden contributed
significantly to the efforts of the UN to limit nuclear weapons. It was considered
that the acquisition of nuclear weapons would damage Sweden's credentials in
nuclear disarmament efforts. Equally, as Reiss maintains, total disavowal of an
interest in nuclear weapons development would eliminate Stockholm's bargaining
leverage.52 This may explain the Swedish Government's insistence to delay any
final decision on nuclear acquisition.
In December 1961, the UN General Assembly decided that the Ten-Nation
Committee on Disarmament should be expanded to an Eighteen Nation
Disarmament Committee (ENDC), of which Sweden should be a part. By this
51
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171time, Sweden was emerging as advocate of nuclear non-proliferation as
illustrated by Osten Unden's (Minister for Foreign Affairs) introduction of the
"Unden Plan" at the UN General Assembly which proposed the creation of a "non-
atomic club" for member states.53 Sweden's credentials with regard to these
matters were enhanced by its technical expertise in the nuclear field, which most
of the other non-aligned, non-nuclear committee members did not possess.
The Swedish Government responded to the Unden Plan in 1962 by declaring that
"Sweden would be willing to participate in the largest possible nuclear free zone in
Europe, including non-nuclear states in Central and Northern Europe".54 Little
came of this proposal mainly as a result of disagreement between the Nordic
countries concerning the geographical scope of a nuclear weapons free zone
(NWFZ).55 On the 20th November 1963, Sweden signed the Partial Test Ban
Treaty (PTBT). The Swedish Government suggested that whilst this would not
make nuclear tests impossible it should serve as an indication of the centrality of
international disarmament and non-proliferation to Swedish nuclear weapons
thinking. Throughout the 196O's Sweden played an active and prominent role in
the NPT negotiations, signing the Treaty on 19th August 1968 and submitting its
instruments for ratification on 9th January 1970.
The formal decision in 1968 to abstain from nuclear acquisition and to sign the
NPT was based on assumptions concerning the existing character of the military
and political situation in Europe. Having decided that non-acquisition was in the
national interest, Sweden was keen to ensure that the 1968 decision was "an
active policy and not a political museum piece".56 Consequently, Sweden
embarked upon a policy of active and comprehensive support for the non-
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172proliferation regime.57 That Sweden maintained such a high profile role in
disarmament and non-proliferation forums, while simultaneously keeping a
weapons option open, may appear paradoxical. However, in effect, Swedish
nuclear weapons were a "non-option" after 1959-1960. The domestic nuclear
debate in Sweden was at its most fierce during the late 195O's. Following the
report of the nuclear study group in December 1959 and the decision "not to
decide", Sweden effectively moved to an unofficial policy of nuclear restraint.58 Its
promotion of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation during the 196O's might
therefore be more consistent with its overall strategy with regard to nuclear
weapons, than might otherwise be supposed.
The Swedish Strategic Culture of Neutrality
The Swedish approach to neutrality is both distinctive and long-standing. In
contrast to other neutral states such as Switzerland, Swedish neutrality is based
neither on constitutional principle nor imposed by international agreement.
Instead, it has developed through what Joseph Board has described as "gradual
practice rather than conscious design".59 Nonetheless, it has become firmly
established within Swedish society and is left virtually unquestioned by the
Swedish people. It is therefore possible to identify a Swedish strategic culture of
neutrality.
Ann Sofie Dahl has suggested, that Swedish neutrality grew to be much more
fin than simply a particular means of organising national security. Instead it
became an integral part of Swedish life and embraced as a national ideal. Debate
on alternative ways of defining national security policy have traditionally been
57
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173both discouraged by Government and spurned by public opinion. A neutral pre¬
disposition has thus pervaded the Swedish consciousness and become deeply
embedded within its strategic culture.
The overriding objective for Swedish defence analysts has always been the
survival of Sweden as a sovereign state. As a result, Sweden has traditionally
maintained a strong system of defence designed to protect its territory from
potential threats, wherever they may arise. Swedish strategy has usually involved
striking a balance between creating a viable military capability in order to avoid
excessive vulnerability on the one hand, and not provoking serious concern
among potential adversaries that put regional interests at risk. Swedish security is
based firmly on a commitment to the regional protection of the Nordic area.
Swedish neutrality must be seen within an historical context. From the conclusion
of the Napoleonic Wars until today, Sweden has successfully avoided military
conflict. The underlying assumption guiding Swedish foreign policy is that it was
prudent for small country such as Sweden to keep out of the power politics played
by great states. The policy of neutrality is "sanctified by more than 170 years of
success" and has become embedded within the national consciousness.
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174non-alignment.62 Soviet activities in Finland once again raised the specter of
Russian imperialism and its threat to Sweden's territorial integrity. Equally,
Germany's occupation of Norway and Denmark illustrated the weakness of the
Nordic region to other hostile European states. WWII thus had two effects on
Swedish strategy. First, Sweden began to believe in the need for stronger armed
forces and a more robust military defence in general; second, attempts were
made to strengthen the regional defence of Scandinavia with the Nordic states
acting in concert.
Donald Hancock has argued that underlying any conception of national
perspective in Swedish foreign policy was a "widely diffused consciousness of
regional affinity with Denmark, Norway and Finland".63 Basic similarities in culture,
religion, language and political systems have provided a firm basis for a regional
identity. The advent of the Cold War confronted the Nordic states with a series of
new security problems. In 1948, Sweden invited Denmark and Norway to join in a
military defense union, which would entail the end of Sweden's policy of non-
alignment. The draft of the treaty suggested that each of the Nordic states would
remain neutral in peacetime, but would come to each others assistance in the
case of war.64
The critical thrust of Sweden's attempts to create a Scandinavian defence pact,
involved assurances for each state that they would remain non-aligned from
major states. This was to prove to be the stumbling block as far as the
Norwegians and Danes were concerned. Norway argued that the Scandinavian
alliance would be too weak without Western assistance, while Finland was forced
into a treaty of "friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance" with the Soviet
Union.65 These problems proved to be insurmountable, with Norway and
Denmark joining NATO in 1949 and Sweden pursuing a policy of neutrality.
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175This Nordic strategic equation has remained unchanged to the present day, with
Sweden and Finland maintaining an official policy of neutrality and Norway and
Denmark aligning themselves with NATO. The scope for discussion of a regional
Nordic strategic culture are therefore limited in practical terms. Nonetheless there
are grounds to suspect a degree of cultural homogeneity within Scandinavia.
Equally, as will shown there are reasons to suspect that Sweden was more
assimilated within NATO's military structure, (in a not dissimilar way to Norway
and Denmark) than official doctrine would suggest. Whilst this chapter is
concerned with Sweden's national strategic culture, there are grounds to
acknowledge the relevance of a regional strategic cultural predisposition.
Emerging from WWII as the only Western state not to demobilize its forces,
Sweden quickly became acutely aware of its vulnerable position as a small state
in-between the East and West blocs. Initially it was assumed that Sweden could
exert only a limited influence over the policy of the dominant political and military
forces in the European theatre: NATO and the Warsaw Pact. As a result of this
strategic assessment, it was concluded that Sweden was of minimal value to
either the US or the Soviets, except in a time of crisis. The concept of
"marginality" thus became popular among Swedish defence analysts, convinced
that an adversary would only devote marginal resources to attacking Sweden. It
was envisaged that in the event of an attack by either the US or the Soviets,
Sweden's realistic aim should be to inflict marginal costs on the opponent. As
Erlander confirmed in 1964, this would involve "building up a defence which
naturally has not much chance of surviving against a concentrated attack by a
great power, but which, nevertheless, may be troublesome to overcome if
Sweden is a secondary objective".66 The emphasis was on ensuring that Sweden
remained secondary, as a military objective of the Great Powers.
' Quoted in Adam Roberts, Nations in Arms: The Theory and Practice of Territorial Defence (Macmillan, 1986).
176Many Swedes remained fearful of the danger posed by the Soviet Union. As
Jozef Kruzel suggests, three possible scenarios were envisaged: first, a Soviet
violation of Swedish territory on its way to occupying NATO airfields in Norway;
second, a Soviet amphibious landing on the Baltic Coast; third, an "air scenario"
whereby Soviet forces would look to occupy Swedish airbases in the event of a
North Atlantic conflict.67
Whether such scenarios were ever likely to become a reality is open to debate.
While Sweden may have come into the military equation in the event of a full-
scale European conflict, it was unlikely that the Soviet Union would have
disturbed the strategic balance by initiating a pre-emptive invasion of Sweden.
Indeed, Sweden, as a non-aligned state, had every reason to be equally mindful
of NATO forces in Europe.
The reasons behind Sweden's willingness to regard the Soviet Union as an
enemy and the US as a protector, cannot be explained on the basis of rationalist
materialist calculation. Rather it is necessary to consider the ideas that
constituted these material circumstances. Swedish strategic culture had thus
evolved according to an "oppositional" perception of the Soviet Union and a "non-
oppositional" perception of NATO.
The question of Sweden's security relationship with the USSR has been
described as "the most important issue in the development of Sweden's strategic
culture".68According to Cole, it was as a result of a series of battles with Russians
upto 1709 that Sweden lost its status as a great power. Until this point, Swedish
leaders had traditionally attempted to find security by creating a "system of
outposts in the Eastern Baltic and by driving the Muscovites from the sea".69 As a
state that has never been occupied by a foreign power, Sweden is highly
67
Jozef Kruzel, "New Challenges for Sweden's Security Policy", Survival (Vol.30, No.6, November-December, 1988),
D.532.
Cole, Sweden without the Bomb, op cit, pp. 175-6.
69
Michael Roberts, Essays in Swedish History (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota, 1977) p.12.
177protective of its territorial integrity. Swedes were therefore easily disposed to
regard a militarily strong Soviet Union as a threat to Nordic security.
Sweden's relationship with the US has been an intriguing feature of its Post-War
foreign policy. Despite its independent, non-aligned status, Sweden is still a
Western state. As modern, liberal, democratic states, Sweden and the US are
close in cultural and political terms. Equally, Swedish military planners closely
followed developments in Western (mostly American) strategic thought.70 In
contrast, Sweden's approach towards arms control and nuclear non-proliferation
has often taken on an anti-American resonance. Sweden has often chosen to
express it's own independence by distancing itself from the United States, as
illustrated by Olof Palme's condemnation of America's involvement in the Vietnam
War.71
Swedish neutrality was designed to "keep Sweden out of the Cold War" and to
maintain flexibility and freedom of action in national security policy. Officially the
policy of neutrality was defined as "freedom from alliances in peacetime in order
to preserve our neutrality in war". A policy of nonalignment was accompanied by a
reliance on the military credibility of Swedish defence forces and supported by
civil and economic defenses and self-sufficiency in military material. Sweden's
conception of neutrality was therefore a holistic one, embracing many aspects of
Swedish society. Its military defence would be "total", involving the total
mobilization of civilian resources in a time of crisis.
A policy of neutrality and nonalignment did not however mean a passive Swedish
foreign policy. There a number of unique features to Swedish neutrality including:
the requirement for strong military defence and a productive, a self-reliant
defence industry, the desire to participate in international opinion-building through
vocal criticism of international "wrong-doing" while playing a mediatory role in
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178international conflict resolution and an active role in the formulation and
implementation of international disarmament and diplomacy initiatives. Often
these tendencies have shaped contradictory outcomes. However, each
represents an important facet of the Swedish strategic culture of neutrality.
The Armed Neutral
Swedish strategic culture has traditionally been charactersied by a need for a
strong military and civil defence. In part, this is a reflection of Sweden's historical
experiences of the military ambitions of great powers and the need to retain
military defences to meet threats. Equally though, this was an inevitable
consequence of Sweden's independent neutral status which meant that it had to
provide for its own security. Sweden's armament industry was built up during
WWII. A concerted effort following the German attack on Norway and Denmark
resulted in a general military build-up that was maintained in the post-war period,
giving Sweden (by the early 1950's) the fourth largest air force in the world.72
Nyberg has suggested that the Swedish airforce has contributed significantly the
credibility of Sweden's armed neutrality, with the construction of four generations
of indigenously designed jet aircraft representing a "major achievement".73
Sweden has thus put a great deal of reliance on military self-reliance as well as
high levels of defence spending. We might therefore refer to Sweden as an
"armed neutral".
The fact that Sweden has maintained a high level of defence spending since
WWII could be used as an argument to suggest that Swedish military strategy
has been based more on a pragmatic response to a competitive strategic
environment, than on a commitment to a more peaceful de-militarized
international system. An analysis of Swedish defence policy provides an
illustration of one of the many paradoxes implicit in the Swedish case. For
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179example, while the dominant political party is unenthusiastic about defence
spending, Sweden has remained committed to a posture of total defence based
on military conscription.74 Equally, despite being proud of an arms industry based
on the most advanced military technology, it is uncomfortable with the sale of
arms to other countries.75
In the 195O's and early 196O's Sweden spent about 5 percent of its GNP on
defence. Since this period, defence spending has steadily decreased to around
2.4 percent of the GNP in 1989.76 Despite this reduction, Sweden has retained a
high level of defence expenditure relative to other European states. The policy of
neutrality has made it difficult to gain access to modern military technology
through alliance cooperation. Nonetheless, as Ingemar Dörfer suggests, Sweden
has managed to circumvent this problem through "clever and selective imports of
components an technology".77 Thus, throughout the Cold War, Sweden enjoyed
the benefits of military exchanges with the US and later, other European nations,
which further strengthened its military defence.
Those advocating a strong independent military posture were at the forefront of
attempts to acquire nuclear weapons. A nuclear deterrent was seen as offering
further credibility to Sweden's independent military status. It is interesting to
consider the question of the relationship between Swedish neutrality and nuclear
motivations : did the former inspire the latter? Theoretically, the strategic culture
of armed neutrality might predispose Swedes to consider nuclear weapons.
Practically, nuclear acquisition might not have been possible without assistance
from other states, thus jeopardising Swedish neutrality and damaging the case for
nuclear weapons. This issue is further complicated by the fact that, as will be
shown, there are reasons to suspect that Sweden was far less neutral than official
doctrine would lead us to believe in that Sweden believed itself to be covered by
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180an American nuclear guarantee.
Sweden as an International Activist
Sweden's policy of neutrality has contributed to a belief that it has strong
credentials to play an active and impartial role in international affairs. Developing
the idealist principles that first arose in Europe during the inter-war period,
Sweden contributed significantly to the emergence of collective security through
the UN. Often performing the role of an international pacifist, Sweden has thus
sought to promote the ideal of world peace, by offering its services around the
world as mediator and neutral arbiter.
Swedish activism has engendered support for developing, small, non-aligned
states in the form of aid and development. This has been accompanied by
attempts to strengthen international law in favour of the small nations and has
often led to a critical stance with regard to the policies of other states, including
South Africa's policy of apartheid, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and
Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1978 and 1982.78 The most controversial critical
stance taken up by Sweden related to US involvement in the Vietnam War.
Having initially supported US policy in Southeast Asia, Sweden reacted negatively
towards the escalation of American military involvement in Vietnam. This was
driven by a rising wave of protests against the war by Swedish youths and
intellectuals. Publicly, Sweden was vocal in its condemnation of US policies,
demanding an end to the bombing of North Vietnam. The virulent opposition to
the Vietnam War and the strident anti-American rhetoric employed by Olof Palme
and others, led to a deterioration in Swedish-American relations.
Sweden's neutrality has thus led to the pursuit of international justice, which has
involved an often critical appraisal of the activities of other states. Sweden has
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181identified strongly with the plight of small nations, and the need to promote
democratic and peaceful solutions to conflictual situations. Sweden's role as
"critic" has often been accompanied by that of "mediator" in international disputes.
Whether Sweden's position as critic and opinion-builder has ever compromised
its credibility as a mediator is open to question. Ulf Bjerled offers the suggestion
that the use of criticism as a foreign policy tool has strengthened not weakened
the possibility of Sweden acting as a mediator.79 Eitherway, the strategic culture
of neutrality has led to a belief in the need to actively utilise Sweden's impartiality.
As a result, a mediatory and critical mentality has embedded itself within Swedish
strategic culture and has informed its attitude toward the activities of other states.
Board has suggested that the success of the SAP in developing a Swedish
Welfare State, based on a "surge of egalitarian solidarity" was important in
perpetuating Sweden's domestic and international tendency to think in terms of
"community interest".80 It is possible to consider Swedish nuclear restraint and
Sweden's participation in arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation efforts
as a function of narrow self-interest. If one assumes that Sweden was never
likely to attain a nuclear status, then it would seem logical and beneficial to
pursue international diplomacy designed to undermine the case for nuclear
weapons and enhance the benefits of conventional defence.
Swedish policy-makers thus felt a need to "level the strategic playing field".
Equally, by promoting Sweden's' credentials as a model of peaceful and
producive societal development, policymakers were able to participate and (to a
degree) contribute to international negotiations and agreements.
Faced with the issue of nuclear weapons acquisition, the Swedish Government
pursued a dual policy of leaving the option of obtaining a nuclear capability open,
while participating in international non-proliferation efforts. Prawitz has suggested
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182that it turned out to be a distinct advantage for Sweden to arrive at the negotiating
table as a state which was supposedly able to acquire nuclear weapons if it so
decided.81 However, for many, by the mid-1960's, it was becoming virtually
impossible to reconcile these potentially contradictory polices. Sweden's
accession to the NPT in 1968 confirmed that its commitment to international non-
proliferation was stronger than its desire for nuclear acquisition.
It has been suggested that Sweden's nuclear restraint was a direct consequence
of its ambitions in the field of nuclear disarmament.82 A fully operational nuclear
weapons programme might have condemned Sweden's credentials as a
forerunner in disarmament negotiations. However, if it is assumed that the policy
of nuclear restraint was a product of the need to be at the forefront of
international disarmament and non-proliferation efforts, then it is necessary to ask
whether this was purely a response to Sweden's security interests, or an
indication of a cultural style in the realm of decision-making. As Prawitz argues,
the nuclear option period lasted for little more than a decade, while Swedish
support for the NPT and the non-proliferation regime has lasted for over twenty
five years. This might suggest that the strategic culture of non-nuclearism and
preference for the international norm of non-proliferation has become strong and
enduring.
Having decided that a nuclear deterrent was not feasible, policy-makers pursued
disarmament and non-proliferation efforts in a way that bolstered Sweden's
international credibility. Over time, these sentiments and tendencies disseminated
into the policy-making arena, such that subsequent generations of political elites
were culturally predisposed towards non-proliferation, both domestically and
externally. While Sweden's initial interest in nuclear disarmament and non-
proliferation may initially have been based on short-term self-interest, it has
subsequently become an integral part of Sweden's strategic culture.
^ Correspondence with Prawitz, op cit.
le Nuclear Non-Prc
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disarmament was important in creating a national anti-nuclear ethos among the
Swedish population. The Social Democratic Government shaped an anti-nuclear
culture, which was decisive in the eventual eschewal of a Swedish nuclear
deterrent. This policy was also compatible with Sweden's national identity. As
Cole claims, Sweden considered itself to be unique in terms the manner in which
it had come to define its own neutrality. There was also a strong sense of pride in
the idea that Sweden represented a model as a peaceful, modern democratic
state. Board has suggested that Swedes are "affected/ afflicted by a strong belief
in their own 'exceptionalism', on the conviction that somehow they are a special
nation, fundamentally different from others".83 In this sense, a high profile status
in the UN and in arms control and disarmament forums was seen as more
beneficial than a nuclear weapons capability. Equally, Sweden's strategic culture
is influenced by the need to follow its own course and to choose its own destiny
as a neutral, non-aligned state. The implication that Sweden could choose
whether or not to acquire nuclear weapons thus illustrated a sense of superiority,
independence and freedom of action.
Compromise and Consensus Within the Swedish Political
Context
By investigating Sweden's institutional framework and political process it is
possible to identify distinctive patterns and proclivities which shaped the nature of
the nuclear debate. As Cole maintains, "Sweden's decision-making and conduct
reflects the nations history, culture, values and elite power structure".84 In terms of
Sweden's nuclear weapons policy, it was this elite power structure and the small,
but influential group of individuals who formed its core, that proved to be one of
the decisive factors in the eventual decision not to acquire nuclear weapons.
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184Sweden's policy of nuclear restraint emphasizes that the issue of military strategy
in Sweden is best considered in terms of the civilian decision-making process.
Despite the military's carefully constructed case for weapons acquisition, the
ultimate decision was determined by the influence of a powerful anti-nuclear
faction. While the significance of the organizational culture of the military cannot
be ignored, Sweden's strategic culture seems to be a product of a series of
broader national cultural trends that led to a distinctive political process and an
observable style in strategic decision-making.
What were the important strategic cultural tendencies that guided the politics of
decision-making at the time when nuclear weapons acquisition was considered?
Who were the key players in the political process and how representative were
they of Swedish culture in general? Can this decision be seen as consistent with
traditional Swedish political and cultural practice? These are the crucial questions
that require attention if fuller insights are to be gained into this case. Ultimately it
is necessary to ask whether the non-nuclear decision was typically Swedish. If
this is the case, and the decision not to proliferate was consistent with Sweden's
national strategic style, then an investigation into the possible influence of a
Swedish strategic culture seems more than appropriate.
It will be contended that the manner in which the issue of a Swedish nuclear
deterrent was introduced into the political process, discussed and finally closed,
was in accordance with Swedish domestic political culture. The Swedish political
style is characterised by consensus decision-making whereby decision-making
power is placed with a small circle of individuals. As Cole suggests, security policy
is treated as subject "reserved for experts" which is consistent with a Swedish
cultural tendency to defer issues to recognised expertise.85 Policy-makers make
decisions based on their own perception of the Swedish national interest with the
question of whether this reflects public opinion remaining irrelevant. This process
is made possible by the ease with which a consensus is attained on foreign policy
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185issues. Foreign and security policy thus does not provide a good forum for public
debate, which would explain why Sweden's policy of non-alignment, armed
neutrality and "total defence" has remained largely unquestioned. This unanimity
is also prevalent with regard to inter-party political discussion. Debate among the
political parties is reserved for domestic political matters: the emphasis is on
presenting a unified, coherent policy to the outside world. This is based on a
strong awareness that Sweden is a small power that needs to "speak with one
voice if its cards are to be played to a maximum advantage".86
While the culture of consensus-decision-making is partly a result of institutional
arrangements and well-established Swedish political practice, it also reflects a
number of broader national cultural tendencies. Board has argued that there is
widespread agreement among politicians and the public on the values that
characterize Swedish society and how this relates to the outside world.87 This
would explain the lack of intensive debate over foreign policy issues and a
decision-making process dominated by a small political elite, acting in the public
interest. That there is minimal dispute over security matters thus facilitates a
coherent, consensual, policy-making framework.
Having emerged as a serious political issue in the mid 195O's, the debate over
the idea of a Swedish nuclear deterrent was characterised by what became
known as Handlingsfrihet (freedom of action).88 This involved postponing any firm
decision as to whether Sweden should pursue a nuclear weapons programme,
while continuing with protection-related research. As Reiss argues, this policy of
delay had the merit of avoiding the two extremes: it did not close the issue, which
would have limited the range of future options, but equally, it did not invite the
international condemnation that an overt nuclear weapons programme would
inevitably provoke. Furthermore, by being deliberately ambiguous, the Swedish
Government was able to appease opposing factions by giving each the hope that
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186their objectives could be achieved. This policy was both politically prudent, and
indicative of the Swedish tendency to follow a middle path and seek reconciliation
amidst hostile debate. This was the style that diplomats looked to promote as a
means of enhancing Sweden's status as a mediator in international disputes.
Traditionally, Sweden has portrayed itself as a homogenous, independent society
capable of expressing a single, unified political voice. To have made a firm
decision either for or against weaponization, during the period when the debate
over nuclear weapons was at its most intensive, would not have been consistent
with Sweden's political and strategic style. The policy of "deciding not to decide"
was therefore consistent with a distinctive style in foreign policy-making, which
stresses the need for compromise, caution and consensus. The need to remain
united and alleviate division was particularly acute within the dominant political
party, the SAP, whose leader, Tage Erlander, was ultimately responsible for the
decision not to acquire nuclear weapons. Any attempt to identify Sweden's
political or strategic culture must refer to the dominance of the SAP. Cole has
described the SAP as the "sole legitimate guardian of the Swedish national
ethos"; by the 195O's, this party had become a "state within a state".
The issue of nuclear weapons acquisition tested the political cohesiveness and
ideological unity of the SAP by jeopardising its long-standing political
predominance in Sweden. As Wallin suggests, the party had split before over
defence issues. There was therefore every reason to take the issue of equipping
the military with nuclear weapons, very seriously.90 The issue of nuclear
acquisition was first considered by parliament in November 1955. In 1957 the
director of the FOA stated that Sweden was capable of producing nuclear
weapons which would become fully operational by 1963.91 This engendered a
serious rift in the SAP at a time when party unity was essential if re-election was
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187to be secured. By the time of the ÖB-57 report, a majority of Social Democrats
favoured a nuclear option, while an anti-nuclear faction within the party, remained
vehemently opposed. Elsewhere, the pro-nuclear stance was supported by a
number of leading conservatives and sections of the liberal media such as Dagen
Nyheter which became a firm advocate of nuclear weapons acquisition.
The case for nuclear weapons was dealt a blow by the AWC's report in 1959,
which recommended defensive research only.92 This report effectively
strengthened the position of the anti-nuclear lobby within the SAP, which had
grown following the introduction of anti-nuclear Communists into a ruling left-wing
coalition following the 1958 elections. As Cole suggests, proponents of nuclear
weapons production found themselves "increasingly isolated".93 While the military
steadfastly clung to the hope of an active weapons research programme, the
issue was, by 1965, politically dead.
By considering the Swedish case from the perspective of domestic politics, it
becomes evident that the advice offered by the military concerning the need for a
Swedish nuclear deterrent, was largely ignored by the political elite. Despite
continued formal and informal approaches to the Government, the strategic
analysis offered by the Supreme Commander was not decisive. This raises an
interesting point: if as Prawitz argues, the decision not to acquire nuclear
weapons was based on the belief that it was not conducive to Sweden's security
interests, then this would imply a conception of security based on something
more than rationalist materialist calculation. It would seem unlikely that the
Swedish Government would choose to question or challenge strategic advice
offered by the military. It is therefore logical to assume that the Government's
refusal to act on the pro-nuclear advocation of the military, indicates that strategic
considerations were somehow subordinated by other security or political interests.
Arnett, op cit, pp.35-36.
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the extent of Sweden's interest in conventional defence implies an
acknowledgement of the importance of strategic matters to the Swedish
Government. Rather, it illustrates that the issue of nuclear weapons involved
questions of a political, economic, diplomatic and moral nature which led
decision-makers to focus more on the strategic disadvantages of nuclear
weapons, rather than the benefits suggested by the military.
It would appear that the decision not to acquire nuclear weapons was taken by
the Swedish Government and its ruling party, the SAP. This might suggest that it
would be relevant to consider the cultural style of Swedish strategic decision¬
making according to the culture of the SAP. However, as has already been
suggested, Sweden's decision-making on national security issues is restricted to
only a few individuals who act in the name of national public interest. If political
elites within the SAP were responsible for policy-making on the question of
nuclear weapons, then it is necessary to address a question raised earlier: were
the views and perceptions held by these elites consistent with the cultural style of
the party and Swedish society in general?
The literature relating to Swedish domestic politics and the non-nuclear decision,
suggests that the SAP's political elite did not pursue an independent, radical
departure from traditional party policy. This might be explained by the fact that the
SAP, and the Swedish political process in general, is not well disposed to
autocratic decision-making. Equally, this could be a result of the unanimous and
consensual nature of thinking on issues of national security alluded to previously.
A more likely suggestion is that this was a result of the fact that party leaders
were forced to follow a conservative middle-line in order to minimize the extreme
political division within the party over nuclear weapons. If the SAP were to retain
its ascendancy in the Riksdag, then the requirement was for a purposeful
unanimity, which stressed the importance of the party's strongest traditions. It was
not a time for radical, autonomous individualism.
189However, for Cole, this relationship between SAP culture and elite decision¬
making would be better considered in terms of the way in which members of the
elite such as Erlander and Unden individually and independently shaped SAP
policy.94 Cole suggests that in order to understand Sweden's conduct over the
issue of nuclear weapons, it is essential to understand Unden: "Sweden's policy
was shaped by his dialectic reasoning" which promoted a policy of neutrality as
"the antithesis of the two-bloc world system".95 Prawitz makes a similar point
when stressing the importance of Unden's resistance to Swedish nuclear
Qfi
acquisition.
For others, such as Reiss and Agrell, it was the influence of Prime Minister
Erlander that was decisive. Reiss stresses the importance of Erlander in
maintaining party discipline and minimising divisions, whilst Agrell argues that
Erlander decided "how the research program should be defined".97 At the time
when the FOA was pushing for an elimination of the distinction between research
aimed at providing protection and that aimed at construction, Erlander recognised
the merits of a policy of postponement which satisfied opposing elements within
his party. He suggests in his memoirs that party unity could be upheld if "we
accepted a policy of postponement and agreed to research with regard to nuclear
bombs, but had guarantees that the research would only deal with how to protect
oneself from attack".98 The freedom of action line was thus very much a product
of Erlander's political will.
Where does this leave the application of a strategic culture approach? If Cole is
to believed then nuclear decision-making was a function of the individual ideas
and beliefs of members of the elite and not broader strategic collectives. It might
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190therefore be disingenuous to regard a strategic culture as informing nuclear
questions. However, Erlander, Unden and others were en-culturated within
Swedish Social Democratic culture, which in turn was shaped by broader national
cultural trends. The boundaries between these ideational levels of analysis are far
from clear cut and are highly inter-penetrable, which sets a difficult task for a
strategic culturalist in deciphering which was decisive in shaping the nuclear
debate. The important point to make is that it is wrong to focus purely on one
particular level of analysis such as the "individual".
Thus, while the needs of the SAP were shaped to suit the nature of the nuclear
debate, the strategic outcome was consistent with Social Democratic culture.
Although the Swedish case cannot be considered without looking at the
distinctive policy-making style of Erlander, ultimately it is necessary to see him as
a product of his party's political culture. If as Cole suggests, the SAP has
"dominated Sweden's foreign and domestic policy planning for the better part of
the Twentieth Century", then it would be feasible to suggest that the cultural style
exhibited by the party will be an essential component in Sweden's strategic
culture." The greater the persistency of these cultural trends across time and
across the relevant objects of analysis, (the political elite), then the more likely it is
that there was a positive relationship between non-nuclear decision-making and
strategic culture.
The literature pertaining to SAP culture reveals a dual tendency in terms of its
influence on strategic decision-making. Cole's analysis offers an illuminating
insight into how this dualism manifested itself over the issue of nuclear weapons.
As has already been suggested, the SAP was deeply divided in the nuclear
debate. Pro-nuclear activists within the party based their argument on a pragmatic
conception of Swedish security needs. The anti-nuclear faction, which Cole
describes as the "ideological component of the party" followed a moral idealist
line which strongly rejected "realist notions of the national interest and balance of
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Which of these strategic cultures was more in accordance with the culture of
Swedish society broadly speaking? As has already been illustrated, public opinion
was largely irrelevant in the debate over nuclear weapons. Issues of national
security were considered to be the concern of the political and strategic
specialists. As Reiss maintains, as far as the Swedish people were concerned,
the issue of a supplementary pension scheme was of far greater significance.101
However, it might be feasible to suggest that the anti-nuclear faction within the
SAP "cultivated an image of Sweden, both at home and abroad, that perfectly
complemented the country's shared ethos".102 Cole suggests that the lessons
learnt from Sweden's strategic history has led to the emergence of a national
ethos which favors aloofness, neutrality and non-alignment. Cole concludes that
this explains Sweden's belief in the futility of expressing national pride through
weapons construction. A nuclear weapons programme would thus seem
incompatible with the broader national strategic culture.103
The Swedish Military
The Swedish military provided the most consistent and structured argument for a
nuclear deterrent. Following the advent of the nuclear era, Swedish strategists
perceived nuclear weapons as symbolising modern military technological
advance, and became interested in the tactical implications of a small Swedish
nuclear force. Military analysts in Sweden proved to be voracious consumers of
American strategic precepts and traditions. As Cole suggests, the "vocabulary
and reference points military analysts used reflected the absorption of Western
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192views on nuclear weapons".104 Pro-nuclear advocates within the military thus
promoted weaponization as a logical development for an advanced modern,
western state as well as a rational strategic response to the nuclear security
environment.
Swedish military strength and pride has always rested with its airforce. Adam
Roberts attributes this to the impact of the Battle of Britain on Swedish military
planners.105 Following WWII, the Swedish airforce maintained a close contact
with the British Royal Airforce, basing its air defence on the British model and
purchasing both fighters and radars. An emphasis on airpower, allowed the
Swedish military to concentrate on advanced technical solutions to strategic
problems. One such technical solution was nuclear weapons acquisition. As
Agrell suggests, the idea of nuclear weapons had its earliest advocates within the
Swedish airforce.106 Airforce Command reckoned that if Sweden was to
weaponize, then it would look to deliver a tactical strike from the air, thereby
giving the airforce an important new role in defence strategy.107 Nuclear weapons
acquisition was thus encouraged by the airforce on the basis of organizational
interest.
Sweden's system of defence has traditionally been based on three alternative
force postures: 1) Power projection, which involves attacking an adversary before
they penetrate Swedish territory; 2) Perimeter defence, which attempts to set a
high entrance cost to an attacker; 3)Territorial defence, involving defence in depth
with an emphasis on surviving a long protracted war of attrition.108 For the
airforce, a nuclear weapons capability would confirm their belief in the utility of
power projection, thus emphasising Sweden's resolve to strike early and
decisively. The navy remained committed to a system of perimeter defence which
would confirm its importance in protecting Sweden's long coastal frontier. For the
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193army, territorial defence represented the only strategic scenario whereby Sweden
would rely on a large field and conscript forces.
Each of the armed services thus favoured the strategy that most accentuated
their own importance. The Government was faced with the option of a defence
based on high technology, which favoured the airforce (and, to a degree the
navy,) or a low technology which favoured the army. Realistically, the airforce was
the only branch of the armed services that could be guaranteed a role in a
nuclear strategy. Both the navy and the army feared that their forces would be
rendered obsolete in the new nuclear climate. The Swedish government refused
to commit itself eitherway. The SAP's leadership sought to persuade the airforce
away from its nuclear ambitions, while maintaining an interest in a research
programme which could protect against the effects of a nuclear war and could, if
required produce a nuclear weapons capability should an emergency arise.
By 1961 it became clear that there was insufficient political will to proceed with
the full-scale production of nuclear weapons. At a time when the budgetary
constraints on a weapons programme were becoming more salient, the airforce
proceeded with a plan to develop the System 37 Viggen aircraft, a large
technological and financial undertaking that forced the issue of a nuclear
weapons capability into the background. As Wallin argues, ultimately for a small
state such as Sweden, the ability to "maintain one of the largest air forces in the
Europe and to provide it with successive generations of indigenously produced
fighter aircraft may confer more prestige than a small nuclear force of doubtful
military value".109
The debate over nuclear weapons thus provides an interesting insight into the
character of civil-military relations in Sweden. Board has observed the manner in
which civilian supremacy over the military is unquestionable in Sweden, just as in
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194the United States. The military does not enter into party politics and confines itself
to budgetary questions related purely to their own sphere of influence.110 As
Larsson suggests, the military establishment in Sweden "has never been allowed
to develop into a 'state within a state' and to act as an independent political
force".111The scope of the Swedish military's objectives is thus limited to the
protection of Sweden's independence. The nuclear weapons issue confirms this
suggestion: despite repeated attempts by the Swedish military to push the
nuclear weapons issue onto the political agenda, civilian policymakers appeared
to follow their own course once the issue became a matter of serious public
debate.
Cole takes this analysis further when observing that the dichotomy between
Sweden's military and its politicians was more fundamental. For Cole, the
Swedish military came to rely on a "vernacular that was both anathema to
Swedish socialists (including the SAP) and incompatible with Swedish historical
experience".112 This is another reference to the SAP's belief in the futility of
expressing power through weapons acquisition and indeed an eschewal of the
term 'power' generally. Eitherway, it would seem that if a Swedish strategic
culture did influence the decision not to acquire nuclear weapons, then it cannot
be attributed to any great degree to the culture of the military. The importance of
the military (and more specifically the airforce) was in providing the strategic case
for weaponization. Beyond this, its significance was negligible. The military
encountered a firm and powerfully committed anti-nuclear faction in government,
most notably the defence minister who conspired to thwart persistent requests
submitted by the Supreme Commander for weapons acquisition.
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195An Unofficial Alignment ?
How neutral was Sweden? As was intimated earlier, there are reasons to suspect
that while Sweden may be conceptualised as a neutral and non-aligned state, it
has assimilated itself informally within the political and military structure of NATO.
As Tunander notes, Sweden was both a neutral state and a state "plugged in to
NATO".113 Having interviewed a number of senior US and Swedish military
officials, Tunander concludes that Sweden's secret military collaboration with
NATO was such that it was on a parallel with Danish-Norway basing policy or
French secret agreements with NATO. Thus the Swedes were cooperating
closely with NATO while officially standing outside of its military structure.
Furthermore, it is suggested that Swedish defence staff had a secure line of
communications with the US airforce headquarters in Wiesbaden, and was
prepared to accept US troops in a war or a prewar situation.114 Crucially, from the
nuclear perspective, in addition to the nuclear guarantees mentioned earlier,
Sweden contributed to signal intelligence which assisted the operations of US
strategic bomber forces and cruise missiles, which would fly over Swedish
territory in the event of war.115
The implications of Tunander's findings are that Sweden pursued a dual policy of
official neutrality and unofficial NATO alignment. Upon closer inspection, this is
consistent with Swedish strategic culture. The reality of Sweden's unofficial links
with NATO were known by very few. Tunander even goes so far as to suggest
that Unden, Foreign Minister between 1945 and 1962, knew nothing of Sweden's
NATO links.116 Effectively Sweden's relationship with NATO was conducted by a
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196few individuals who maintained close informal ties with their respective colleagues
in other states. It appears that nothing was written down and that everything was
left to an informal understanding, which is very much in tandem with the Swedish
style in relation to these matters.
Tunander's findings are supported by Anne Sofie Dahl, who alludes to the NPK
report (referred to earlier) in arguing that Sweden had maintained intimate
contacts with NATO countries during the 195O's and 1960's, including the
exchange of sensitive information and on military planning.117 Dahl concludes that
the timing of the NPK's report was designed to clear a path for an official re-
articulation of Sweden's neutral strategy. Sweden signed up to the Partnership for
Peace Program (PFP) in Summer 1994, and joined the European Union in 1995,
which might suggest a reorientation of the traditional policy of neutrality.
Dahl uses structural realist theory to account both for Sweden's contact with
NATO during the Cold War and for its re-definition of security in a post-cold War
world. According to structural realists, Sweden's reliance on NATO during the
Cold War would probably be seen as a strategy of "free riding", whereby small/
weak states rely on others for security.118 Equally, a re-definition of Swedish
security interests following the end of the Cold War is explained by the
adjustment of a small state to structural changes in the international system and
the balance of power.
Research into Sweden's policy of neutrality has attracted the attentions of a
number of structural realists interested in Sweden's position as a small state
looking to preserve the balance of power in Scandinavia and non-alignment.119 As
Board suggests, non-Swedes have somehow acquired the impression that
Sweden's neutrality is somehow a product of "morality, untainted by political
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197calculation"; rather, the appeal to morality is common among small states as a
means of compensating for inferior military capability.
120
James Robbins has argued that while Sweden's neutral status is indeed
longstanding, the specific alliance-free character of its neutrality in the post-WWII
period resulted from a failed Swedish attempt to establish the Scandinavian
Defence Alliance.121 Thus for structural realists, Swedish neutrality has never
been based on idealistically motivated considerations. Instead, it is a response to
considerations of national self-interest that are common amongst small states in
the international system. According to this argument, Sweden's preference for
non-alignment during the Cold War was based more on a belief that it would
upset the balance of power in the Nordic region, rather than a moral, distinctly
Swedish disavowal of alliances. Equally, there was a limit to the scope of Swedish
neutrality that suggested an element of pragmatic self-interest. For example,
Sweden did not remain ideologically neutral where the issue of democratic as
opposed to autocratic systems of government was concerned. Equally, Sweden
was vocally critical of US involvement in Vietnam, and issued a rhetorical
commitment to the plight of small, oppressed states in the developing world.122
This emphasises the active nature of Swedish neutrality which "as distinguished
from the languid, passive attitude of pacifism, attempts to hold its own course so
long as it is possible". Whilst many interpreted the lack of Swedish resistance
to Nazi demands during WWII to indicate a form of pacifism, in reality the
Swedish Government held a firm and committed course based on a long-term
preservation rather than an emotional commitment to the non-violation of Nordic
territory.
The structural realist argument is limited insomuch as it fails to account for the
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198distinctly Swedish nature of this case of non-alignment. As Unden suggested on
numerous occasions, Swedish policy was based on a firm belief in the need to
avoid what he referred to as the "bloc-forming". Paul Cole has suggested that it is
possible to trace this attitude back to Sweden's failures during its period of great
power involvement and its subsequent desire to remain free of international
commitment. Sweden's aloofness and neutrality during the Cold War thus
reflected in large measure the lessons of what Swedes refer to as "the Great
Power era".124 This would suggest that Swedish neutrality is based on something
more than pragmatic self-interest, As Kruzel suggests, whilst in theory, a policy of
neutrality is one option amongst many, in reality, Swedes regard it as
sacrosanct.125 Having never been invaded, Swedes remain proud of their status
as a peaceful, independent nation and seek to maintain a high international
profile by projecting their country as a modern, wealthy, social democracy,
capable of contributing to the creation of a more peaceful and economically
prosperous international environment.
There are elements of self-interest and pragmatism in Sweden's policy of
neutrality, which appears to have been adopted as a convenient posture to avert
potential threats. A policy of neutrality may well have been used to manipulate
international and domestic opinion. Internationally, Sweden's role as mediator
and diplomat was enhanced by a policy of neutrality. Equally, from a Soviet
perspective a neutral Sweden was viewed as far less threatening than a NATO-
aligned Sweden. Domestically, a policy of neutrality appealed to Swedish people,
who developed a sense of pride in its countries neutrality and could be easily
motivated by leaders who spoke of perpetuating national independence and non-
alignment. In this sense, elites may well have manipulated strategic culture to
their own ends. Consequently, the culture of neutrality has become deeply
embedded in the Swedish psyche, in a manner which has mitigated against a
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199change in policy direction.
Sweden felt insecure and in need of protection against the possibility of Soviet
aggression. Again this may be accounted for with reference to security dilemmas
and security-material analysis. Alternatively, a strategic culture account would
seek to ask how and why Sweden came to fear the Soviet Union to such a
degree that it would contradict its preference for neutrality in favour of aligning
itself unofficially with NATO. Equally, we must ask which ideas shaped Sweden's
affinity with the West? Explanations which rely purely on security-material factors
are insufficient. By looking into Swedish historical experiences and their
assimilation into strategic culture we can identify the ideas that shaped these
policy outcomes.
What does this suggest about the nuclear option? If it is accepted that Sweden
was informally aligned to NATO, then the issue of an independent nuclear option
becomes more straightforward: Sweden was covered by the US nuclear umbrella
in the same way as the other Scandinavian states officially belonging to NATO
and thus there was no need to acquire nuclear weapons.
However, the issue of nuclear weapons was a very real one in Sweden by the late
195O's. Was this because Sweden doubted the credibility of US guarantees at
this stage? Did an informal agreement between the US and Sweden come later?
One might speculate endlessly in the search for answers to such questions.
Ultimately one is left with the question of whether the foundations of Swedish
neutrality were as hollow as Tunander and others might suggest.
Its seems incontrovertible that a bomb lobby emerged in Sweden in the 1950's
and it did so with the support of a large section of the Swedish people. This may
well be reflective of a desire to build an independent, self-reliant defensive military
posture with the most up-to-date military technology, which meant nuclear
200weapons. Neutrality meant to act alone; Sweden sought a strong "total"
defence; a call for nuclear acquisition might therefore seem inevitable. Ultimately
the particular brand of Swedish neutrality that stressed the need for an
independent nuclear capability was not strong enough to have an enduring effect
on policy outcome. Indeed, neutrality in general might not have been strong
enough to avert an informal alignment. Eitherway, it is important to recognise the
relevance of these competing tendencies if one is to gain greater insights into this
case.
Secret Nuclear Intentions?
Having signed the NPT in 1970 and having subsequently emerged as a firm
advocate of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, it has widely been
accepted that Sweden's nuclear intentions have been benign. As Larsson
suggests, having dismantled is plutonium laboratory in 1972, Sweden retained a
research programme that had no orientation towards domestic nuclear weapons
and that was scaled down monotonously over the next twenty five years.
Nonetheless, suggestions have emerged that Sweden has not given up the
option of nuclear weapons. This line of thought was given a fresh impetus in 1985
when the Swedish science magazine, Ny Teknik published an article in which it
was claimed that ten nuclear tests involving weapons-grade plutonium, had been
carried out at a site near Stockholm in 1972 and a neutron pulse generator
suitable for fission explosions had been constructed.128 These revelations initiated
a flood of media interest into Sweden's nuclear intentions. Some reports went as
far as to suggest that the government had operated a "weapons program under
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201civilian cover".
In 1994, the Washington Post again pursued a similar theme in suggesting that
Sweden still had the capability to construct a nuclear arsenal should it wish to and
that a nuclear reactor at Agesta had not been dismantled in a manner that was
consistent with Sweden's commitment to the NPT.129 This has led to suggestions
that Sweden has enjoyed the benefits of a "virtual" nuclear arsenal, reaping the
political rewards of an official non-nuclear status, while maintaining the ability to
assemble a weapons capability at relatively short notice should security
conditions worsen. As Mazarr contends, "the relevant question about Sweden's
nuclear capacity therefore is not whether it could build nuclear weapons, but
rather how quickly it could build them".130
A number of other writers, such as Arnett, Reiss and Larsson have cast doubts
over the idea that a secret option to "go nuclear" has been maintained. Arnett for
example has suggested that the Ny Teknik article was part of a political ploy to
smear Palme who had initially followed a pro-nuclear line.131 Furthermore, Arnett
contends that none of the experiments carried out in 1972 involved "fabricated
components of a weapon".132 Reiss suggests that the activity highlighted in Ny
Teknik came under Sweden's legal "protected research programme".133 Reiss
does not doubt that the information and data gathered from the tests improved
Sweden's competence in the nuclear field and could feasibly have been used for
a weapons programme, although he suggests that this research was designed
more for the FOA to "learn about foreign nuclear capabilities and possible
countermeasures".134 As Larson maintains, the aim of the Sweden's research
program following NPT ratification, was to instigate a competent assessment of
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202the potential nuclear threats to Sweden. 135Amett also questions the notion that
the Agesta reactor was capable of producing the plutonium necessary for
weapons production arguing and that its maintenance was on-going simply as a
means of ensuring adequate protection for the local environment.136Equally, the
reactor had been placed under bilateral safeguards as a result of an agreement
between Sweden and the US in 1958, whereby the US agreed to supply
1T7
uranium.
How do we assess the contention that Sweden has kept its nuclear options open?
The FOA did not stop its military research following the Swedish decision to sign
the NPT, nor was the civilian nuclear programme curtailed. Yet this does not
necessarily indicate ongoing nuclear weapon intentions. There are also technical
reasons for assuming that a weapons option was not feasible. By 1970, Sweden
had abandoned heavy water reactors and was utilising US designed light water
plants with imported uranium.138 Imported nuclear material came with safeguards,
which rendered a weapons option as unfeasible. Having already dismantled its
plutonium facilities, Sweden went further in 1974 by reorganising the FOA and
dispersing its nuclear expertise. Larsson suggests that by 1997, the FOA had
around 30 people looking into defensive research, with very little interest or
expertise in weapons designs.
Quite why so much attention has surrounded a secret Swedish option is unclear.
Perhaps as Hoist suggests, Sweden's "aggressive and self-righteous policy of
nuclear abstinence" might invite unwanted attention.140 Equally, the suggestion
that the official policy of neutrality has been open to question might have aroused
suspicion, especially given the closed, secretive informal nature of Sweden's
diplomatic and political style. Finally, as Arnett notes, the notion of a secret
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203weapons option may well be necessary for realists and technological determinists
who struggle to account for Sweden's failure to develop its nuclear technology
and acquire the weapons necessary to meet security threats.141 This chapter
seeks to provide a basis for arguing that even if it was established that Sweden
had kept its option open, this should be seen more in terms of an indication of
Sweden's strategic cultural tendency to "hedge its bets" and reserve judgement
on military issues, rather than a confirmation of the credibility of realist theorizing.
Conclusion: The Relevance of Strategic Culture to Sweden's
Non-Nuclear Weapon Outcome
The issue of Swedish nuclear weapons has attracted much interest not least
because it brings into question a number of accounts that are commonly used to
account for proliferation scenarios. The technological determinist model would
predict that Sweden, as a modern, technologically advanced state would
automatically seek to acquire a nuclear weapons capability, on the basis that if
the technology exists, then it will be developed. This was not the case. By 1968
Sweden, having utilised its own supplies of uranium, appears to have had enough
heavy water for at least one reactor.142 Equally, an appreciable amount of
nuclear-related research had been conducted, practical problems associated with
weapons design had been overcome, and a process for reprocessing reactor fuel
had been tested.143 Nonetheless, Sweden opted to officially abandon research
into weapons production and favoured a commitment to the NPT. In terms of
nuclear weapons, security policy was thus not technologically determined.144
The decision not to acquire nuclear weapons was an intensely political one.
141
Arnett, op cit, p.36.
142
Reiss, op cit, p.43.
143
Cole describes Sweden's nuclear research program as "elaborate, sophisticated, and expensive". Cole, "Atomic
Bombast", p.234.
144
The Swedish non-nuclear weapon outcome also condemns the suggestion that nuclear weapons provide a confirmation of modern statehood. As a prosperous, modern democratic state, Sweden is acutely aware of the importance of international image. Sweden's eschewal of nuclear weapons, accompanied by a firm and independent commitment to the international norm of non-proliferation, would appear to refute the idea that nuclear weapons confer international
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recognition through weapons acquisition.
204Despite the fact that public opinion was initially in favour of weapons acquisition,
an anti-nuclear faction in government succeeded in capturing the essence of
public opinion and diverting it towards non-nuclearism. The aim of this research
has been to identify the cultural element underlying this strategic decision. In a
state where decisions over questions of military strategy are reserved for a small
political elite, which largely ignored the military's advice over the question of
nuclear weapons and followed its own course, it would be seem logical to
consider strategic culture in terms of the culture of the dominant political party. As
has been suggested, the SAP, and particularly its left-wing, anti-nuclear faction
succeeded in shaping public perceptions over the nuclear issue. As a result a
strategic culture based on nuclear restraint and the need to establish a firm
commitment to international disarmament and non-proliferation, became
prevalent.
It is worth remembering that the history of Sweden's nuclear weapons debate is
effectively a history of the decision-making of a few, significant individuals. It is
entirely possible that these individuals proceeded according to their own
perceptions and belief-systems in a way that would a render a study of Swedish
societal or national strategic culture to be of limited value. However, as has been
shown, it is the Swedish way to use political and strategic expertise in order to
express a single unified voice. Open political division over security matters is
minimal. The Swedish strategic decision-making process is thus both cohesive
and consensual. It would therefore be reasonable to assume that these elites are
culturally reliable as indicators of Swedish society. In many ways, these
tendencies were indicative of broader cultural pre-dispositions: Sweden as an
ethnically and politically homogenous society and as part of a peaceful regional
security community has developed according to the principles of compromise,
negotiation, mediation and collectivity. Sweden's strategic commitment to the
nuclear non-proliferation regime is therefore based on firmly rooted cultural
trends.
205The argument that Sweden abstained from nuclear acquisition because it
believed that the US would offer to assist in the event of a Soviet attack, is not in
question here. Equally it will be accepted that Sweden considered the
development of a small tactical nuclear force (which was is its only realistic
nuclear option) as a deterrent against the Soviet Union, to be strategically
disadvantageous. But this leaves questions unanswered. Despite these restraints,
the weapons option made it onto the agenda in Sweden and it did so with a
considerable degree of support from diverse elements. How was this possible?
By the 1950's Sweden felt itself threatened by the Soviet Union's large
conventional and nuclear capability. The Soviet threat was viewed through a
perceptual prism that accentuated the threat and exaggerated responses. This
prism was the product of long standing historical experiences which had shaped
Swedish strategic culture. Faced with this fear, Sweden considered a nuclear
option as a response. Furthermore, by the 1950's Sweden's strategic culture of
neutrality had come to shape nearly every aspect of its foreign policy. Having
officially committed itself to neutrality and non-alignment, officially there was no
possibility of it either obtaining a nuclear capability from another state or
sheltering under another states nuclear umbrella. Strategically exposed and self-
reliant, Sweden turned towards an indigenous capability.
Throughout the early Cold War period nuclear weapons were gradually emerging
as a regular feature of military strategy. Sweden's strategic cultural preference for
remaining at the forefront of modern military technology and to equip its armed
forces with state-of-the-art equipment, led to vociferous calls from the Swedish
Airforce for a nuclear capability. The case for nuclear acquisition was
strengthened further by the strategic culture of armed neutrality, whereby Sweden
sought to create the strongest military defence possible. By the mid 196O's the
popular perception within Sweden was that nuclear weapons would be used in a
major war in Europe and that Sweden may well be forced to confront a nuclear
attack. As Nils Andren suggests, the building of rock shelters in the larger cities
206and the work on thorough plans for evacuating civilians to remote areas in the
country, indicate a genuine belief
that Sweden should prepare and mitigate against possible nuclear dangers.145
Faced with this possibility, weapon advocates glossed over any technological
limitations on a nuclear programme or financial costs involved and pressured the
government to proceed with weapons research.
However, there were competing strategic cultural tendencies at work which
mitigated against nuclear acquisition. If Tunander and Dahl are to be believed,
then one such tendency might be the habit of pursuing pragmatic agreements
with NATO states, in particular the US, which may have secured some form of
nuclear agreement. Whether this came in the form of a specific guarantee is open
to speculation.
Furthermore, Sweden's strategic culture of mediation, consensus building and
international non-nuclearism became significant in shaping its foreign policy. As
its profile in these matters gathered momentum by the late 1960's it became
impossible to reconcile this with a nuclear option. The strategic culture of non-
proliferation promotion was re-enforced by the international culture of nuclear
non-proliferation that formed around the NPT and which was successively re-
enforced into the 197O's and beyond. Sweden's tendency to see itself as "the
good guy" in international affairs and to promote global peace, disarmament and
non-proliferation may have overridden any strategic cultural predisposition
towards nuclear acquisition. However, it is important not to discount the possibility
that a decision not to acquire nuclear weapons had already been taken by the
time Sweden committed itself to support of the non-proliferation efforts.
Realist theories would posit that the non-nuclear outcome was predicated on a
calculation of interest. This research does not set out to refute the notion that
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207Swedish nuclear restraint was based on national security interests: policy-makers
acted according to their perception of Sweden's national interest. A strategic
culturalist would ask which ideas informed any notion of interest and thus which
ideas led to a belief in the need to trust and depend on the US, to fear and guard
against the Soviet Union, to stand as a "good international citizen" and ultimately
to abstain from nuclear acquisition.
One illustrative example of this would be to ask why Sweden did not respond to
material threat of a Soviet nuclear capability by acquiring its own nuclear defence.
The answer may relate to the possibility of some form of American security
guarantee, yet this leaves open the question of why Sweden felt protected by US
extended deterrence, when a number of full NATO allies were unsure as to the
extent of the US' commitment? Ultimately this may have been the result of narrow
self-interest: Sweden may have had no other choice but to rely on the US.
However, this chapter has highlighted a number of strategic cultural tendencies
which indicate that Sweden may have been culturally pre-disposed to accept this
commitment.
It is not possible to identify one consistent strategic culture that influenced
Sweden's policy of nuclear non-acquisition. Multiple cultural tendencies, at many
different levels are at work and are often in competition with each other.
Nevertheless, the manner in which the nuclear weapons issue arose in Sweden,
the way in which it was discussed, the assumptions on which the debate was
based and the eventual conclusion that was reached, were consistent with a
number of Swedish cultural proclivities. This would appear to confirm the
importance of research into the relationship between Sweden's policy of nuclear
restraint and its strategic culture.
208Chapter Six: Conclusion
This thesis has investigated the utility of a strategic culture approach in analysing
non-nuclear weapon outcomes. Research has been divided into two parts: first,
an analysis of the debate surrounding strategic culture: second, an investigation
into non-nuclear outcomes in Australia, South Africa and Sweden. In each of
these cases, strategic culture offers some valuable insights concerning why non-
nuclear outcomes were chosen. Nevertheless, research continues to be
dominated by theoretical perspectives which assume that strategic outcomes can
be explained with reference to rational responses to material conditions. The
focus here has been to question these predominant non-cultural explanations.
In Chapter One it was suggested that the concept of strategic culture has been
under-explored. Writers have made references to strategic culture but with
minimal recourse to theory or methodology. Research that has sought to
conceptualise strategic culture in theoretical terms is extremely diverse and
eclectic with little emerging in the way of consensus. Often there is disagreement
as to how it should be defined, at what level of analysis it can be located, and how
it can be situated in relation to other theories.
In terms of a strategic culture methodology, there are numerous problems and
limitations. The main issue relates to how strategic cultures are identified, and
how their influences are measured. As has been suggested, cultural analysis
involves dealing with intangibles. There are no hard, quantifiable variables
available for a strategic cultural methodology. This might explain why strategic
culture has not traditionally attracted attention within positivist IR research.
However, the research of Alastair lain Johnston suggests that writers might seek
to provide a theory and methodology for strategic culture and to then test for its
explanatory potential against realist theories.1
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209The strategic culture approach favoured for this research seeks to fully utilise its
potential benefits without pursuing overly ambitious methodological aims. In part,
this is because the strategic culture approach advocated is not intended as a
direct test of realist theories, but also because attempts to devise comprehensive
strategic cultural methodology confront many problems. To ascertain the main
constituents of a strategic culture involves an exhaustive cultural analysis, which
would involve digging deep within a state's historical and formative experiences
and looking for persistency across a wide range of objects and actors and over a
long time period. This is not necessarily impossible, but is not the task of this
thesis. With the use of specific case studies, the aim has been to draw out of the
existing literature possible cultural proclivities, and then to consider how they may
have shaped outcomes. For this reason, cases with plentiful literature have been
chosen. In doing so, it has been possible to provide a thick cultural description of
the pre-dispositions that have exerted an often important influence on decision¬
making. The main problem, as will be discussed shortly, has been on deciphering
which cultural level of analysis to focus on.
Ontologically, this research does not offer a radical alternative to mainstream
realist theories. Strategic culture is considered from a state-centric perspective
and is concerned with states' use of military force. However, the central argument
is that existing mainstream research is limited in its explanatory scope by failing to
give sufficient credence to the role of cultures, and ideas in general. Those
theories that fail to allow for the observation that states are composed of plethora
of cultural tendencies that shape how states respond to material stimuli are
offering limited theoretical explanations.
The task is therefore to problematise existing accounts. How has this been
possible? Much of the literature relating to the culturalist programme in IR invites
discussion relating to whether culture supplements or supplants realist theories. In
other words, it is necessary to ask questions concerning whether cultural theories
210offer us a new alternative theory or whether we should look into ways of factoring
cultural variables into existing non-cultural theories. This research has sought to
side-track this debate by referring to the way in which strategic culture constitutes
the material assumptions made by realists. Strategic cultures give meaning to
material forces for decision-makers, shaping their choice of certain strategies and
their rejection of others.
As Colin Gray suggests, strategy is made by individuals who cannot fail but be
cultural.2 Strategists therefore view material forces through the perceptual prism
of culture. Research that fails to account for these ideational processes is limited
in the insights it can provide. The strategic culture approach used in this thesis
seeks to identify the "cultural conditions of possibility" for traditional non-ideational
explanations and in the process clarify why the latter do not apply as well as they
might be expected to.
In part, this reflects a belief that strategic culture may be ill-suited to providing a
new, alternative theory, in the way that mainstream social scientists would
demand. This is because it might be unable to provide a theory of the origins of
strategic culture and how it is translated into strategic outcomes in a way that can
be applied universally to account for all states' strategies. However, strategic
cultural tendencies are relevant and do shape outcomes but they are not a
causative phenomenon. Rather, they are constitutive.
Strategic Culture and Non-Nuclear Decision-Making
Realist theory has dominated thinking about nuclear weapons since the 1950's.3
Most realists would assume that "the principle cause of nuclear proliferation is the
desire of states to gain increased security from external attack in an anarchic
2
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211world".4 As John Mearsheimer argues, the international system is a "brutal arena
where states look for opportunities to take advantage of each other
...
international relations is not a constant state of war, but is a state of relentless
security competition".5 Nuclear acquisition is thus a rational and self-interested
response to external material threats and allows a state "freedom of action vis-ä-
vis other actors who will be deterred form undertaking militarily provocative
behaviour".6 Some realists even go so far as to suggest that the proliferation of
nuclear weapons may lead to a more lasting international peace and that "more
may be better".7
The fact that most states have preferred not to acquire nuclear weapons might
therefore be problematic for realist theories. Why would states not seek to
maximise their power through the acquisition of the most devastating weaponry
available? Devising an answer is a complex task. Traditional accounts for non-
nuclear outcomes continue to assume that states act out of self-interest which
reflect prevailing security-material factors. As Betts maintains,
"Not every nation that views nuclear weapons as a potentially useful form of
military and/or political power will make a committed effort to acquire them. The
predictable reactions of other countries may make nuclear status self-defeating. Thus it is advantageous for nations to sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and remain non-nuclear weapons states to avoid nuclear
confrontations".8
Most realist theories would support Thayer's pessimistic conclusion regarding the
possibility of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons in light of the fundamental
security dilemma facing states.9 As Harold Müller suggests, most realists adopt a
4
Bradley Thayer, The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation and the Utility of the Non-Proliferation Regime", in Raju G.C. Thomas Ed. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime: Prospects for the 21st Century. (London: Macmillan, 1998).p.78. 5
John Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions", International Security19 1994-1995 p. 10. 6
T.V.Paul, "Power, Influence and Nuclear Weapons; A Reassessment" in T.V Paul, Richard J.Harknett and James J. Wirtz (eds.) The Absolute Weapon Revisited: Nuclear Arms and the Emerging International Order (Ann Arbour: University of Michagan Press, 1998), p.19.
7
Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More may be Better", Adelphi Papers (London, IISS, 1981); John Mearsheimer, The Case for a Ukrainian Deterrent", Foreign Affairs 72, 3 (1993) For a discussion of the debate relating to the effects of the nuclear prolifieration, see Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate fW .W.Norton, 1995).
Richard K. Betts, "Paranoids, Pygmies, Pariahs and Nonproliferation Revisited", in Frankel and Davis (eds.) The Proliferation Puzzle: Why Nuclear Weapons Spread and What Results (London: Frank Cass, 1993), p. 81. 9
Thayer, op cit.
212"not yet" approach towards non-nuclear weapon states. This suggests that "even
those countries which have temporarily eschewed the nuclear weapon option,
despite the possession of a technological capability, and have chosen another
security arrangement, may opt for nuclear weapons in the final analysis".10
According to Kenneth Waltz, this is because "there is a constant possibility that
conflict will be settled by force".11 Hence, to be first in a regional nuclear arms
race could open up a "window of opportunity"; to be second could be fatal. States
must therefore adjust to changes in their security environment or perish.
According to the "not yet" approach, non-nuclear postures are merely transitory
options and likely to change at any stage. States will respond rationally to material
threats that need to be addressed and subsequently acquire nuclear weapons.
But do states always act rationally in response to material conditions? In
analysing non-nuclear outcomes in Australia, South Africa and Sweden it appears
that states do not always act in this manner. States may be strategic culturally
pre-disposed to eschew nuclear options and to maintain a long-term commitment
to non-nuclear weapon policies, irrespective of changes in security-material
conditions.
Threats and Allies
One of the dominant themes that emerges from the literature corresponding to
these case studies relates to how states respond to threats and to allies. Threats
are likely to determine whether a state has nuclear ambitions, while the existence
of allies shapes possibilities of external nuclear protection. Most realist theories
would contend that states arm themselves in response to threats. If states do not
acquire nuclear weapons, then one possible explanation might therefore be that
they are not threatened. This is the most popular explanation offered for South
Africa's decision to denuclearise, but has less applicability in the cases of
10
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213Australia and Sweden. The important question to ask is: how does a state decide
whether or not it is threatened? Focusing purely on material factors is insufficient.
Perceptions of threats depend on material conditions and capabilities, yet it is the
ideas that underpin these perceptions that gives material factors meaning.
The dominant explanation for South Africa's non-nuclear outcome relates to the
suggestion of an improvement in security environment in the late 198O's and
therefore a diminution in threat. A non-nuclear outcome thus resulted from the fact
that South Africa no longer felt threatened. However, we must address the issue
of why South Africa felt threatened in the first place such that nuclear weapons
were acquired. South Africa considered Soviet military and nuclear intentions and
Marxist forces in the "front-line states" to present a threat to its security and
sought nuclear weapons as a deterrent. A rational material calculation might have
led to a sense of security based on South Africa's conventional superiority in
Southern Africa and the assumption that South Africa was of marginal strategic
interest to the Soviet Union during the Cold War. However, South African threat
perceptions are better understood if we consider the laager mentality and the
strategic cultural fear of total onslaught and perpetual threat. It was thus a cultural
pre-disposition that shaped such a negative view of the other states in Southern
Africa and that distorted considerations of Soviet intentions on the region.
With an improvement in regional relations by the late 198O's and the ending of the
Cold War, the focus of South Africa's anxiety was largely diminished. This led to a
more positive perception of the external environment and hence, less of a
requirement for nuclear weapons. It is necessary therefore to consider the
strategic culture which gave rise to perceptions of insecurity in the first place,
before explaining non-nuclear policy according to improving security conditions.
However, there were other reasons for South Africa giving up its nuclear
weapons, based on the perpetuation of insecurities. By the late 198O's the White
regime was internally at breaking point, with the disenfranchised Black majority
214becoming increasingly hostile towards the Government. Internal opponents of the
White regime were considered to be part of the total onslaught facing
Afrikanerdom. Facing the capitulation it had always feared, White South Africa
was forced to make immediate concessions. With the inevitability of whole-sale
reform looming, the Afrikaner government made haste to insure against a black
nuclear inheritance, the prospect of which set alarm bells ringing. Thus it was
partly as a result of escalating internal insecurity that South Africa pursued a non-
nuclear option.
Australia and Sweden considered themselves threatened enough to consider the
possibility of nuclear acquisition. Ultimately, both opted to sign the NPT and give
up the nuclear option. Is this because threats were not considered to be severe
enough? Australia has been referred to as the "frightened country" possessing a
strategic culture of fear and anxiety which has shaped perceptions of threats. This
strategic culture reflects the idea that White Australia is an isolated and vulnerable
Western colony, set amongst "hostile Asian hordes". Such was this sense of
insecurity, that Australia considered acquiring nuclear weapons, initially in the
form of a transfer from the UK and subsequently through an indigenous
programme.
If Australia had considered threats according to rational calculations based on
material conditions, then it may well have concluded that it was peripheral to the
strategic calculus of its perceived enemies and was, in any case, capable of
repelling a conventional attack from its most likely aggressor, namely Indonesia.
By identifying the strategic culture of fear, which shaped an excessively negative
assessment of Asian states, it is possible to gain insights into why Australia
perceived its external environment in the manner that it did. Australian
experiences at the hands of the Japanese during the WWII accentuated the
persistent and often exaggerated fear of the so-called "yellow peril". These threat
perceptions were re-enforced by the emergence of a strong anti-communist
215tendency within Australian strategic culture, which shaped negative assumptions
concerning Chinese intentions.
The decision to opt for nuclear restraint was shaped by a weakening of the
strategic culture of fear which emerged with Whitlam's Labour Government in
1972 rather than from any great improvement in security-material conditions. After
1972, Australia acted according to a less threatening vision of its regional
environment thereby strengthening its rejection of nuclear weapons.
In Sweden, the threat posed by the Soviet Union was severe enough to open up
the nuclear issue. In material terms it might have been completely rational for
Sweden to consider the Soviet Union and its nuclear weapons, as representing a
threat to national security. Geographically close, militarily strong, inherently
expansionist and heavily armed with nuclear weapons, there was every reason to
be fearful of Soviet intentions. However, Sweden's perception of the Soviet Union
is better understood within the context of its strategic culture.
Swedish attitudes towards the Soviet Union were shaped by its historical
experiences of Russian imperialism and its cultural fear of territorial violation,
which shaped its neutralist policy. Sweden maintained a perennial fear of attack
from the East in a way that shaped a pessimistic prediction of Soviet intentions
during the Cold War. This fear does not appear to have receded to any great
degree during the period in which Sweden made its non-nuclear decision.
Whatever link is made between threats and non-nuclear outcomes, it seems clear
that a simple focus on material conditions offers minimal insights. How do we
explain situations where states are seen as threats, when in hard material terms,
they present a negligible danger? In each of these case studies, perceptions of
threat and insecurity have resulted from "in-group" mentalities which have been
re-enforced by a "fear and loathing" of "others". Initial motivation for nuclear
acquisition were guided by realpolitik or "oppositional" identities. In South Africa
216this "oppositional" identity was strong enough to guide decision-makes towards
nuclear weapons. In Australia and Sweden it was only strong enough to bring the
nuclear issue onto the agenda.
Non-nuclear outcomes in all three cases were shaped by alternative strategic
cultures, which overrode "oppositional" identities. In Australia an oppositional
strategic culture was prevalent throughout the period when nuclear weapons were
being considered, but was overridden by the "traditionalist" mentality which
shaped a non-nuclear weapons policy. Subsequently a "non-oppositional" identity
emerged in the 197O's, which strengthened a policy a nuclear restraint. In
Sweden an oppositional strategic culture brought the issue of nuclear weapons to
the fore but was overridden by a non-oppositional mentality, which shaped a
preference for nuclear restraint and an active non-proliferation policy. South
Africa's nuclearisation was shaped by a strong oppositional identity, which by the
late 198O's was challenged by the emergence of a less oppositional Afrikaner
identity, which shaped a non-nuclear outcome. One may speculate as to whether
South African denuclearsiation was the result of a new Afrikaner identity or simply
a tactical adjustment of the more traditional laager mentality.
Dominant explanations for non-nuclear decision-making have been based on the
assumption that some states are seen as allies that may offer security guarantees
and therefore a reason not to acquire nuclear weapons. Yet how are states that
present similar material characteristics, defined as either threats or allies? In each
of these cases, the US and NATO appears to have been perceived as an ally in a
way that affected nuclear decision-making. In Australia, US non-proliferation
policy restricted Anglo-Australian nuclear co-operation and hence any nuclear
weapons programme, while US nuclear weapons were considered to offer
Australia a necessary measure of defence. The most popular explanation for
South Africa's policy refers to nuclear weapons as a political tool with which to
manipulate the US and which were eventually dismantled partly because of its
debilitating isolation and estrangement from the West. Equally, the Swedish case
217for nuclear restraint may have been predicated on assumptions concerning US
extended deterrence.
Traditional accounts of the importance of the US to nuclear decision-making in
these three states, refer to material factors, mainly related to American military
strength and nuclear capability. This thesis has posed questions as to the ideas
that constitute these material considerations. Australia's and South Africa's
colonial heritage has shaped a Western orientation that has informed its search
for security. Australia as a "frightened country" has traditionally perceived itself to
be a Western colony situated amidst hostile Asian hordes. The attachment to its
Western allies is therefore a function of Australia's colonial heritage. Prior to the
retraction of British military commitment East of Suez in the mid 196O's and the
development of a more independent foreign policy after 1972, Australia
traditionally saw itself as a strategic extension of the British empire. Australian
defence would therefore be guaranteed by its Imperial protectors. This generated
a strategic culture of dependence, which subsequently (following the retraction of
British military commitments) shaped an easy reliance on US nuclear weapons
and a reluctance to pursue an independent capability in light of US non-
proliferation policy.
Isolated and distant from its Western cultural origins, South Africa has traditionally
sought to tie itself to the security interests of the West. Faced with diplomatic
isolation by the 197O's, South Africa combined an anti-Communist foreign policy
with a nuclear weapons capability as a means of perpetuating its importance to
US security. With the ending of the Cold War, South Africa's isolation from the
international community and ostensibly the West, was imposing significant
political and economic costs. The dismantlement of its nuclear capability and a
commitment to the NPT was part of a policy to rejuvenate relations with the West.
Thus, Australia and South Africa were historically and strategic culturally
predisposed towards a Western identity, which shaped choices of potential allies.
218A Western identity appears to have re-enforced or even generated a fierce anti-
communism in both instances, which shaped perceptions of enemies and threats.
A communist political ideology appears to have complimented oppositional
strategic cultural tendencies in both cases. In Australia this led to an external
focus on communist China. In South Africa the anti-communist focus was both
internal and external, since the threat was considered to be total and emerging on
all fronts.
In Sweden, a policy of neutrality precluded an official anti-communist foreign
policy. Nevertheless Sweden's historical experiences at the hands of Russian
imperialism had become embedded within Swedish strategic culture in a way that
accentuated its fear of Soviet Communism. This might have led it to turn to the
West (unofficially) for protection. Yet as with Australia and South Africa, Sweden
possessed a Western cultural identity. Socially, politically and militarily Sweden
had strong links with the West that shaped a Western strategic cultural
orientation. Sweden was strategic culturally disposed to regard the US and NATO
as allies, which may have led to the assumption that Sweden fell under the
Western nuclear umbrella irrespective of its official policy of neutrality. This
suggested a non-nuclear Swedish policy.
Thus, in each of these cases the nature of threats and allies was crucial to
decision over nuclear weapons was crucial. Yet these threats and allies must
been seen within a strategic cultural context. Why were Soviet nuclear weapons
seen by Sweden as threatening while British and American nuclear weapons
were seen as protecting? Both were close to Sweden in material terms, yet
strategic culture constituted a different perception of each. Focusing on threats
and allies in terms of rational responses to material conditions is therefore
insufficient.
219Material Constraints on Nuclear Decision-making
Traditional accounts for non-nuclear weapon decision-making typically focus on
technological and financial constraints that determine outcomes. Were any of
these states forced to adopt non-nuclear policies because of insurmountable
material constraints? In Australia and Sweden there were technological restraints
in acquiring an immediate nuclear weapons capability. At the time when domestic
debate was at its fiercest over the question of weapons acquisition there were
numerous limitations imposed by inadequate reactor technology, lack of expertise
with weapons designs, limited access to delivery systems and the restrictions of
finance.
In Sweden, it has been supposed that while there were technological limitations,
these could be overcome over time, such that a weapons capability could be
obtained relatively quickly, should the motivation exist. Sweden has since been
suspected of having a virtual nuclear capability, which illustrates that technology
might not necessarily be a timeless material barrier to proliferation. In Australia, as
with Sweden, there were abundant reserves of natural uranium, but the progress
of its nuclear programme was inhibited by a lack of reactor technology a
deficiency in manpower and a lack of the desired delivery systems.
South Africa was able to produce six nuclear devices with a seventh under
construction at the time when a decision was taken to dencuclearise. South Africa
was thus able to generate sufficient fissile material to construct a relatively simple
"gun-barrel"-type nuclear weapon. Questions remain as to whether these
weapons could have been used? If we assume that a nuclear capability was
designed purely as a political weapon, then the issue of usability is less important.
However, speculation surrounds the extent to which South Africa had more
ambitious tactical roles for its nuclear weapons. Did technological restrictions
220delay the development of thermonuclear designs? At present, these questions
remain open-ended.
References are often made to financial restrictions as determining non-nuclear
outcomes. In each of these cases, finance appears to have been restraining, but
not decisive. As Ian Bellany suggests with the Australian case, a nuclear weapons
programme would have involved the diversion of considerable diversion of
manpower from other sectors, which would have resulted in serious economic
disruption.12 Jan Prawitz has argued that the issue of financial costs became a
prominent factor in the Swedish debate over nuclear weapons by the mid-
196O's.13
Often, weapons opponents appear to have justified their non-nuclear stance on
the basis of the enormous financial costs involved with a weapons programme.
Yet the question remains open as to whether financial considerations
fundamentally constrained the nuclear ambitions of decision-makers in any of
these cases. It may be possible that, given sufficient political will, funds would
have been found.
Material factors thus appear to have imposed constraints at particular times. For
example, Sweden could not have acquired nuclear weapons in 1950 irrespective
of whether it wanted to. However, in none of these case studies did these material
factors impose long term insurmountable obstacles to nuclear weapons
acquisition. Pro-nuclear advocates sought ways and means of overcoming
technological barriers and then of shortening the delay between seeking to
acquire nuclear weapons and actually acquiring them.
While there is little doubt that these material factors such as technology and
finance were significant in terms of nuclear decision-making, this thesis has
12
Ian Bellany, Australia in the Nuclear Age: National Defence and National Development (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1972).
13
Correspondence with Jan Prawitz, October 15lh 2000.
221emphasised that they provide no meaning independent of the strategic cultures
that constitute them. Material constraints were clearly in evidence. Yet the focus
should be on uncovering the strategic cultural motivations and the methods which
led to particular ways of dealing with these technological issues.
In terms of potential methods of acquisition, nuclear decision-making was subject
to considerable political constraints in each of these cases. Despite its close
collaboration with the British in nuclear weapons testing and the joint project at
Woomera, Australia's access to nuclear technology and information on weapons
designs was restricted by nuclear agreements between Britain and the US. Britain
appears to have been not unwilling to provide its Commonwealth partner with
information and assistance, yet US non-proliferation policy prohibited any
substantial collaboration. Britain was unprepared to jeopardise its access to
American nuclear information, while Australia was unprepared to compromise its
relationship with either of its allies.
In Sweden, a policy of neutrality precluded extensive nuclear cooperation with
other states. As with Australia, any nuclear programme would have had to
proceed "in house". Nonetheless, as has been shown, there are reasons to
suspect that Sweden co-operated informally with other states on security matters
when it considered it to be in its interest to do so. This might lead to the
conclusion that Sweden could have obtained the necessary technology to
proceed with a weapons programme if the Riksdag had approved.
Political constraints were also important in the South African case. Politically
isolated as a result of its apartheid policies, South Africa may have been forced to
collaborate with other "pariah" states in order to gain access to technology
necessary for a nuclear weapons programme. Much debate surrounds the extent
to which South Africa collaborated with states such as Israel, as well as the
support which Pretoria received from states that officially approved of international
sanctions. Nevertheless, there is reason to suspect that the political constraints
222facing South Africa were an important factor in delaying the progression of its
nuclear programme.
In all three cases, accession to the NPT has imposed even greater constraints on
nuclear weapons acquisition. As official non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS), to
acquire nuclear technology for military purposes would be to violate the treaty,
which is politically unfeasible. In terms of explaining non-nuclear outcomes it is
perhaps more important to consider the political and strategic cultural reasons
behind these states joining and adhering to the NPT, than of the limitations it
imposed on access to technology.
The focus should therefore be on identifying cultural influences underlying these
political constraints. In Australia the strategic culture of dependence ensured that
priority was given to maintaining alliances and therefore adherence to US no-
proliferation policy; in South Africa, the policy of apartheid which led to diplomatic
isolation and hence limited nuclear cooperation was culturally integral to
Afrikanerdom; in Sweden, a strategic culture of neutrality, precluded extensive
external nuclear collaboration.
The Impact of "Nuclear Weapons"
By the late 195O's many states perceived the "nuclear weapon" to be a potentially
desirable addition to military arsenals. This was based on a belief that nuclear
weapons were likely to spread in the same way as conventional weaponry and
were therefore likely to become an integral part of modern military strategy. The
development of a nuclear capability both in the civilian and military realms was
also seen as a sign of modernity and technological progression, a trend initiated
by the two most powerful states, the US and the USSR.
In Australia, South Africa and Sweden a bomb lobby appears to have emerged
that was driven a belief that the state must keep pace with trends in nuclear
223acquisition. An emerging international "culture of nuclear acquisition", based on
the assumption that nuclear weapons were good things to acquire, was
internalised by many states into their own strategic cultures. As Jim Walsh
suggests with regard to Australia, bomb advocates argued that if nuclear
weapons were to become part of the regular armoury of modern, advanced
industrialised countries, then Australia would need to keep pace in order to
participate and contribute to its collective security arrangements.14 Central to this
equation was the notion that nuclear weapons could be used in conflict situations.
This was more critical for Australia, since Western states appear to have been
less restrained in their plans for the actual use of nuclear weapons in South East
Asia, than in Europe. Australia thus felt compelled to attempt to either obtain
nuclear weapons from other states, secure confirmations of "weapons on
demand", or develop an indigenous nuclear capability.
Sweden has traditionally always kept pace with developments in military
technology, a trend which one can trace back to the military revolution of the 17th
century. Consequently, the strategic culture of nuclear acquisition was easily
internalised by many Swedish domestic elements. As a neutral, non-aligned state
within close proximity of another potentially hostile nuclear weapon state (NWS),
considerations as to a possible nuclear deterrent were therefore underway from
an early stage. In South Africa the culture of nuclear acquisition as a means of
solving insecurity proved to be decisive: South Africa turned to a nuclear
capability as a means of deterring Marxist forces in Southern Africa and cajoling
the foreign policy of Western states, most notably the US.
Emerging alongside this strategic culture of acquisition, was a "taboo" against the
actual use of nuclear weapons. Peter Gizewski has suggested that a "nuclear
taboo" emerged at the end of the Second World War as news of the impact of the
bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki filtered into official and popular
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224consciousness.15 By the time the first thermonuclear device was detonated in
November 1952, "a discernible consensus was forming around the notion that the
use of nuclear weapons was indeed a 'taboo' in all but the most extreme
circumstances".16 The taboo developed largely as a result of a realisation of the
enormous destructive potential of nuclear weapons. Once introduced into conflict,
they could not be contained, restrained, confined or limited.17
The emergence of a international nuclear taboo equated to a strategic culture of
nuclear non-use. Eric Herring has described the nuclear taboo as "a strategic
cultural prohibition against the use of nuclear weapons: it is an assumption that
nuclear weapons should not be used rather than a conscious cost-benefit
calculation".18 The strategic culture of nuclear non-use may have imposed
restraints on the strategies of states possessing nuclear weapons. The US refusal
to use nuclear weapons in the Korean or Vietnam wars and Soviet unwillingness
to use nuclear weapons in Afghanistan might provide evidence of the workings of
the taboo. In addition, Chinese unwillingness to use nuclear weapons against
Vietnam in 1979 and British nuclear abstinence in its war with Argentina in 1983,
show that other NWS' may have been similarly restrained.
By the 196O's the taboo against the use of nuclear weapons was accompanied by
an emergence of a taboo against the acquisition of nuclear weapons. This taboo
was stimulated by a realisation that the spread of nuclear weapons to more states
increased the possibility that they might be used in conflictual situations. In
arguing for restraints on the proliferation of nuclear weapons, US Secretary of
State, John Foster Dulles suggested in 1957 that, "as matters are going, the time
will come when the pettiest and most irresponsible dictator could get hold of
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225weapons with which to threaten immense harm".19 This implied that the further
proliferation of nuclear weapons technology could have destablising
consequences, and should therefore be contained wherever possible.
In 1968 this culture of non-proliferation was institutionalised in the form of the
NPT. What effect did this strategic cultural shift to non-acquisition have on the
nuclear debate in Australia, South Africa and Sweden? In Australia and Sweden
the external culture of non-acquisition appears to have embedded itself within
domestic strategic cultures and in a manner which decisively shaped nuclear
decision-making. Both states opted to support the NPT and the norm of non-
proliferation thus strengthening the international culture of non-acquisition.
This thesis has emphasised how both Australia and particularly Sweden were
strategic culturally predisposed towards this international culture of non-
acquisition. Australia has traditionally exhibited a tendency to support the
international rule of law and to contribute to common security, in the process
taking a moral standpoint over nuclear weapons issues. This may be explained as
an example of Australia acting out of self-interest as a small state, without nuclear
weapons in a region containing other NWS. Yet the rigour with which Australia
has contributed to efforts at international disarmament, as illustrated by the
establishment of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear
Weapons, has become something of a strategic cultural trait and may have
underpinned its decision to abstain from nuclear acquisition.
Sweden's non-nuclear decision was partly influenced by its desire to remain at the
forefront of international negotiations on disarmament and non-proliferation
issues. This was based on a belief that nuclear weapons were unnecessary and
detrimental to the development of world peace. As with Australia, it might also be
concluded that Sweden actively promoted non-proliferation and disarmament
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226because it was a small state without nuclear weapons. However, Sweden has
sought to promote itself as an international arbiter and neutral mediator thus
facilitating international cooperation and consensus. This has resonance with
Swedish strategic culture, which places much emphasis on consensus and
compromise.
Thus in both of these cases, it is possible to identify a strategic culture of
conformity which shaped decisions against nuclear acquisition. Both Australia and
Sweden have sought to be seen as "good international citizens" and to contribute
to notions of common security and international peace. This is incompatible with
attempts to acquire nuclear weapons.
South Africa's desire to acquire nuclear weapons overrode the influence of an
external culture of non-acquisition. In part this may be because South Africa felt
isolated and estranged from international trends and thus developed its own
insular responses to its security problems. To a degree, South Africa may have
developed a "culture of non-conformity" in relation to the international community,
in contrast to Australia and Sweden's strategic cultures. By the late 198O's South
Africa was recognising the need to re-assimilate itself within the international
community. This re-assimilation was likely to proceed more easily with an official
non-nuclear weapon status. South Africa may therefore have independently
responded to the external culture of non-acquisition rather than been driven by it.
However, it may also be the case that the liberal reformist elements of
Afrikanerdom had culturally evolved to embrace and internalise external non-
proliferation cultures and therefore influenced a policy of denuclearisation.
The Implications for Strategic Cultural Research
The strategic culture approach used in this thesis has sought to avoid
methodological over-sophistication. As has been illustrated, there are many
methodological problems involved with empirically uncovering all of the aspects
227relating to a state's strategic culture. The aim of this thesis has been simply to
"tease out" of the available literature the extent to which dominant explanations
make implicit cultural assumptions. It is worth returning to some of the
methodological issues raised in chapter one and to consider how they apply to
these cases studies.
One of the criticism leveled at first generation research into strategic culture was
that it might imply that one could identify a unique strategic culture within a state
that is persistent across time and affects the preferences of actors. These cases
illustrate that while cultural tendencies exist, they are not monolithic and all-
encompassing national phenomena. Are cultures malleable and changeable or
are they slow-to-change and static? In Australia the strategic cultures of fear and
dependence appear deeply rooted and long-standing. Australia's reliance on
collective security still guides its security policy. Much has been made of the
strategic cultural shift after 1972, which took the emphasis away from an
'oppositional' regional outlook towards one of cooperation. Whether these
perceptions changed quickly and across the whole of Australian society is open to
debate. Yet in terms of foreign policy and specifically nuclear weapons, it
"exhibited a swift and decisive influence.
In South Africa the laager mentality predominated throughout the period when
nuclear weapons were seen as necessary. However, it has been suggested that
Afrikaner strategic culture evolved to embrace new liberal ideas in the early
198O's and in a way which facilitated a change of policy with regard to nuclear
weapons. It might be possible to attribute this cultural shift to a pragmatic
adjustment to the changing threat, based on the traditional Afrikaner mentality.
Put another way, the reformists, were first and foremost Afrikaners, who sought to
adjust to the changing nature of the "total onslaught" and recognised the
untenability of existing policies. The suggestion that De Klerk may have
dismantled South Africa's nuclear weapons out of fear as to how they might be
used by the new government, may have provide evidence of the fact that that the
228laager lived on. South African strategic culture may therefore have been highly
static and resistant to change.
In Sweden it is possible to identify a number of persistent strategic cultural
themes, including: neutralism and non-alignment, fear of Russian imperialism,
requirement for consensus and compromise and a commitment to international
peace and cooperation. In the main, these cultural trends have been long¬
standing and resistant to change, and have shaped Swedish thinking over the
issue of nuclear weapons. The challenge has been to consider which is the most
predominant strategic cultural trend. As with all three cases, Sweden possesses
competing cultural tendencies, such as a fear of Russian imperialism and a wish
to build a strong and independent defence while pursuing an agenda for
international peace and disarmament. It might appear that the latter was more
influential in terms of the debate over nuclear acquisition.
As has been suggested, contemporary research into the relationship between
culture and strategy has located its analysis at many different levels of analysis.
This thesis has focused on domestic strategic cultures, yet this still leaves room
for maneuver. Should the focus be on organizational culture as illustrated by Kier,
national culture as exhibited by Johnston, or societal culture as demonstrated by
Rosen? How can strategic cultural research acknowledge the impact of external
cultures? Having stressed the importance of international taboos and cultures of
nuclear non-acquisition, it may seem impossible to restrict analysis purely to the
domestic. In approaching these case studies, it appears that all these levels of
analysis may be important. In each case military organizations were responsible
for raising the issue of nuclear weapons acquisition, yet only in South Africa,
where the military and civilian realms overlapped, were their calls acted upon. So
at what level were decisions made?
In seeking to elucidate strategic cultural tendencies in each of these cases, the
main methodological problem relates to the issue of how to account for the role of
229individuals. In each of these cases, decisions on nuclear issues have been taken
by individuals which raises the immediate question of whether these individuals
are representative of a culture or are acting according to their own individual
beliefs. The nuclear decision-making process in the cases considered has been
relatively closed and secretive, with virtually no public debate. While it is difficult to
be sure as to the significance of input from individuals from the military, scientific
or economic spheres, it would appear that final decisions on nuclear issues were,
in each case, taken by senior figures within the ruling political party.
In the Australian case, it is difficult to look beyond successive Prime Ministers to
assess how policy was shaped. Indeed as Hymans suggests, Australian nuclear
policy was shaped by a small number of key individuals. The task for the strategic
culturalist is to identify whether these Prime Ministers reflect a particular cultural
trend. Menzies almost certainly reflected the traditionalist, conservative strategic
culture which sough to retain imperial links; Holt was more inclined to go "all the
way with LBJ", while Gorton epitomised the nationalist, "oppositionist" strategic
culture that favoured defence self-reliance and inevitably the acquisition of
nuclear weapons. Prime Minister McMahon was enculturated more in the
conservative realm and thus stalled the nuclear programme prior to Whitlam's
signing of the NPT. Whitlam's Labour government signaled the emergence of a
less oppositional and more "Asianized" Australian strategic culture, which shaped
a long-term policy of nuclear restraint. Individuals were thus important in this
process, but were also indicative of broader strategic cultural trends, which
developed at multiple levels.
In the South African case, it is possible to find a higher degree of continuity and
consensus prior to the fragmentation of Afrikanerdom in the 198O's. Having
attained power in 1948, the National Party was lead by a series of Prime Ministers
enculturated within the Afrikaner strategic cultural mentality. Despite particular
differences in style and emphases, successive leaders approached the question
of nuclear weapons according to a deeply ingrained laager mentality, which
230pervaded the whole of White South African society. The ascendancy of De Klerk
within the party might be seen as evidence of the emergence of a more liberal
Afrikaner strategic culture, which shaped a non-nuclear outcome. Thus when
approaching the South African case, it is possible to identify a more holistic, "total"
conception of strategic culture, which permeated every level of Afrikaner society,
be it within social organisations such as the Broederbond, the SADF, or the
governing National Party.
In Sweden, to discuss the impact of culture on nuclear decision-making is to
discuss the culture of the Social Democrat Party (SAP), which held power
throughout the period when nuclear weapons were considered. The decision to
delay any final conclusion to the nuclear issue was almost certainly reflective of
the parties' tendency to seek compromise solutions. Equally the strategic cultural
tendency to seek unanimity and consensus ensured that the Party would not risk
the creation of factions which a nuclear decision would have engendered. These
cultural tendencies permeated many areas of Swedish society. Thus while it is
possible to discuss the Swedish nuclear decision-making process in terms of
political organisational culture, this culture was indicative of broader national
cultural trends.
This raises questions about the relationship between political factors and cultural
factors. This thesis does not question the importance of political factors. In all
three cases, the non-nuclear decision was a political one. This is not a problem
for a strategic culture approach. The focus for this research is to identify the
cultural milieu underlying political considerations, which may involve a
consideration of political culture. The challenge is to accounts which identify the
importance of political factors by using a strictly materialist ontology.
In strict definitional terms, political culture may refer to the culture of domestic
political institutions while strategic culture deals with the culture of military
strategic institutions and organizations. As was suggested in Chapter One,
231strategic culture might be used to refer to the military dimension of political
culture. However, it is not helpful to compartmentalize discussion of culture too
greatly. The political, strategic and military realms are not easily delineated, with
cultural tendencies overlapping at many different levels. This is particularly the
case with South Africa, where the boundaries between state and military
institutions became blurred as society was mobilized in accordance with the rubric
of total strategy. The emphasis must therefore been less on distinguishing
between exclusive political, strategic, organizational and national cultures, and
more on investigating the relationship between them. In doing so, it will become
clear that theories which focus purely on external or "systemic" factors and treat
states as unitary actors, are offering potentially narrow explanations.
Chapter One discussed Bradley Klein's contention that elites might manipulate
strategic culture for there own ends, and Charles Kupchan's suggestion that elites
could become entrapped within the strategic cultures which they seek to create. In
Australia and Sweden it is possible that elites may have propagated certain
images in order to manipulate a culture to suit their objectives. Australia's
conservative elites appear to have attempted to perpetuate a cultural reliance on
empire and fears of Asian threats, while nationalists mobilised support for their
independent self-reliant policy objectives. In Sweden, elites nurtured and
preserved the neutral ethos, thereby mobilising society behind its policy of Total
Defence. This neutralist strategic culture may now be entrapping the Swedish
government from integrating itself more closely with Europe in a post-Cold War
environment.20 If these strategic cultural trends are seen as important in shaping
non-nuclear outcomes, then the instrumentality of strategic culture may well be
worth considering.
This instrumentality issue is most pronounced in South Africa, where elites appear
to have propagated and disseminated images, which supported and strengthened
20
See Ann-Sofie Dahl, "To Be Or Not to Be Neutral: Swedish Security in the Post-Cold War Era", in Efraim Inbar and Gabriel Sheffer (eds.) The National Security of Small States in a Changing World, (London: Frank Cass, 1997).
232their "oppositional" view of the external environment. In order to mobilise society
behind the Total Strategy, the Afrikaner elite relied upon a manipulation of enemy
images and in-group solidarity. For reformist Afrikaners attempting to embrace
new conceptions of security, this strategic culture became restricting by
generating inertia and resistance to suggestions that South Africa should
denuclearise.
The Value of a Strategic Culture Approach
In each case it has been possible to identify tendencies and patterns, or shared
ethos' within particular strategic collectives which have been referred to as
strategic cultures. For instance in the case of South Africa, the literature makes
continual references to the same particular Afrikaner tendencies in relation to a
range of strategic issues. Afrikaners appear to have approached threats
according to a similar mentality on a range of issues, regardless of differences in
material circumstances, such that this might be referred to as a strategic culture.
This is not to say that we can then predict how South Africa would respond to
certain conditions. This would involve giving strategic culture a causal, timeless
property, which it might not have. However, cultural patterns exist in South Africa,
just as they do in Australia and Sweden, which suggests that non-ideational
accounts are missing something with their analysis.
It appears that many of the rationalist material assumptions made by traditional
explanations of non-nuclear decision-making possess an implicit cultural
dimension that is often not acknowledged. Most realist explanations do not refuse
to acknowledge cultural factors, but do try to reduce cultural effects to
epiphenomena of the distribution of material power. This thesis seeks to justify a
more prominent role for strategic cultural factors, not in terms of offering additional
or superior causal explanations but in constituting non-cultural factors. The task
233has therefore been to "unpack the ideational and cultural baggage" of materialist
explanations that is required in order to make the latter work.21
This thesis has not provided any new empirical evidence with which to construct
new explanations for non-nuclear outcomes. The methodological problems
associated with conducting empirical research into nuclear decision-making are
often severe. Official documentation relating to nuclear policy is often scarce,
while it is difficult to decipher whether the information that is available is reliable.22
This issue has resonance in the case of South Africa. Despite the willingness of
South African government to make public its nuclear intentions as part of the
process of denuclearisation, questions remain concerning the issue of how
advanced South Africa's nuclear programme became, and what its motivations
and intentions were.
In Sweden, the tendency to make decisions in an informal and unofficial manner,
and to ensure that there was "nothing on paper"23, leaves many questions relating
to Swedish nuclear policy unanswered. When was a decision taken to opt for
nuclear restraint? How close did Sweden come to acquiring a usable nuclear
force? Were any agreements made with the US, regarding security guarantees?
In the case of Australia, the recent release of historical nuclear policy documents
has encouraged scholars such as Walsh and Jacques Hymans to offer empirical
challenges to the dominant assumptions made by previous explanations. While
the greater availability of information relating to Australian nuclear policy allows
more scope for empirical analysis, caution must be taken when making
assumptions.
Randall Schweller and William Wohlforth suggest, "realism is a political
philosophy or worldview that is profoundly pessimistic about the human condition,
21
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22 See Ogilvie-White, op cit, p.43.
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234moral progress and the capacity of human reason to create a world of harmony".24
Inter-state relations, are therefore inherently conflictual and driven by the dictates
of international anarchy.
A strategic culture approach would support Wendt's argument that "anarchy is
what states make of it".25 If states adopt hostile conflictual relations then this is
because of the way they are culturally constructed which dictates whether states
view each other as friend or foe. Furthermore, there is no reason to assume that
states cannot embrace long-standing perceptions of friends if they are culturally
pre-disposed to do so, such that relations might not be always liable to break
down in the way that some pessimistic realists assume.
As has been shown, this can have important implications for nuclear weapons
decision-making. The fact that states might not constantly view each other as foes
might provide some answers as to why states might pursue non-nuclear
outcomes. Nonetheless, the literature relating to these and other cases is
anchored to traditional rationalist materialist explanations, which provide little
room for ideas. This thesis has supported those accounts which consider the
importance of culture to the strategic realm. A number of recent accounts of other
states appear to be moving in this direction and with a similar attention to theory.
In recently analysing India's nuclear decision-making, George Perkovich
specifically challenges realist explanations for India nuclear outcomes. Perkovich
states:
"At bottom, prevalent Western, or more accurately American-originated theories,
structural realism, rational choice and nuclear deterrence
- each of which informs
the other - cannot explain why and how India's policy developed from 1947-1964.
Nor can they explain why India waited thirty four years after China's first nuclear
weapon test to declare that it had countervailing nuclear weapons".26
24
Randall LSchweller and William C. Wohlforth "Power Test: Evaluating Realism in Response to the End of the Cold War",
Security Studies, Vol. 9 No.3 (Spring 2000), p.68.
25
Alexander Wendt "Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics," International
Organization 46:2 (1992).
26
George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (University of California Press, 1999) p.453.
235Instead, Perkovich suggests, that "India's national identity and normative
aspirations have shaped nuclear policy choices".27 A similar argument is
advanced in Avner Cohen's account of Israel and the Bomb where attention is
turned explicitly towards culture. Cohen suggests that
"Israel's nuclear opacity is by now more than a phenomenon of international
politics or strategy
- it is a cultural and normative phenomenon as well.
Individuals and events determined the way Israel has stumbled into opacity in the
195O's and 1960's, but since then opacity has become embedded in Israel's
national security culture".28
Perkovich and Cohen are describing states where nuclear acquisition appears to
be the preferred outcome. However, these accounts are significant in revealing
the way in which proliferation analysts are gradually turning towards cultural and
ideational factors. Elsewhere it has recently been suggested that strategic culture
is "in vogue, both in policy circles and in the academic literature".29
So what next for strategic culture? The next move should be towards devising
more sophisticated theoretical frameworks in which these strategic cultural factors
can be analysed. At present, strategic culture is a widely discussed yet
indiscriminately applied research tool. Without a degree of consensus as to what
strategic culture is and how it should be applied, it is doubtful whether it will
progress as a concept. The fact that this research has highlighted as many
problems with a strategic culture approach as it had expounded benefits,
suggests that the task is a complex one. Nonetheless, as the cases used in this
thesis emphasise, it is possible to identify strategic cultural tendencies, which
shape particular strategic outcomes within states. This is a credible and significant
starting point. By treating culture as a residual or secondary variable traditional
explanations might therefore be depriving themselves of a some valuable insights.
27
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